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Chapter 1
Introduction
If peasants slaughter their fowls, then the fowls are sick – or the
peasants. German country saying
Currently we observe an active debate on the optimal degree of centrali-
sation in wage bargaining. The driving forces for the growing interest seem
to be international trends towards decentralisation and – in Germany – the
re-unification of the west and east (former communist) countries. German
wage bargaining institutions appeared stable even in the late eighties and
early nineties when nation-wide wage setting in Sweden was abandoned and
other countries (e.g. Australia and New Zealand) experienced similar trends.1
Only the re-unification with the former communist East countries, and the
implied severe economic problems in the East countries seem to have set the
ball of decentralisation rolling in Germany. According to Kohaut & Schn-
abel (1999),2 coverage of firms3 has decreased in the period 1995–1998 from
53.4% to 47.7% in the West countries and from 27.6% to 25.8% in the East
countries. The corresponding employee coverage rates have decreased from
72.2% to 67.8% and from 56.2% to 50.2%, respectively. This likely under-
states the true extent of decentralisation, since exits of firms from employers’
associations (and of employees from unions) are accompanied by an increas-
ing application of opening and hardship clauses, and more subtle strategies
of wage agreement avoidance: As documented in Artus & Sterkel (1998),
many firms adjust wages downward by assigning their employees to lower
performance groups.4 Additionally, the number of registered company wage
agreements (‘Firmentarifvertra¨ge’) increased in the period 1992–2001 from
1For reports of the developments and their backgrounds in Sweden and Germany see
Swensson & Pontusson (2000) and Thelen (2000)
2They report computations of Kohaut & Bellmann (1997)
3Firm Coverage denotes the share of firms applying collective wage agreements.
4‘Performance groups’ is an ad hoc translation of the so-called term ‘Leistungsgruppen’.
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2422 to 4817 in the West and from 1178 to 1985 in the East countries.5
Apparently, at least the trends in the West countries cannot be explained
completely by the huge social and economic differences between East and
West.
The question whether these erosions reflect efficient adjustments to chang-
ing market forces or whether they are accompanied with friction losses, or
indicate even market failure, suggests itself. At least economists (which claim
to be experts on this issue) seem to be divided into completely different
camps. On the one hand, there exists a large strand of empirical literature
containing (admittedly not so direct) evidence in favour of centralisation (we
will discuss this in further detail). On the other hand, many economists
derive arguments from abstract economic reasoning against centralisation.
They argue that decentralisation must be superior in complex economic en-
vironments since central negotiators don’t have the necessary information for
the provision of efficient solutions, or that centrally negotiated wage schemes
cannot reflect the diversity and heterogeneity of local situations and thus
put too many restrictions on compensation policy. The ‘evidence’ of these
arguments seems so compelling to them that less attempts are made to write
them down in formal models or to investigate it empirically.
A representative example of this reasoning, accompanied by a clear and
unfavourable assessment of centralised wage setting, provides the report
(2003) of the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachversta¨ndigenrat).
Regarding the wage determination process, the crucial problem is
that the general collective wage agreement [‘Fla¨chentarifvertrag’]
does not solve the adjustment problem between demand and sup-
ply adequately. Conditions are too different – between plants of
the same industry, between regions, between different industries,
between the employed and the unemployed. The system of col-
lective bargaining does not accommodate to this appropriately in
the negotiations with the application of results from one industry
to others to a large extent. §461 on page 260. [Translation by
Johannes Ludsteck]6
It is an job and task classification scheme governing the remuneration in German collective
wage agreements.
5See Bundesministerium (2001), p. 8.
6The original German wording is: “In Bezug auf den Lohnfindungsprozess besteht
das entscheidende Problem darin, dass der Fla¨chentarifvertrag das Abstimmungsproblem
zwischen der Nachfrage nach Arbeitskra¨ften und dem Angebot von Arbeitskra¨ften nicht
hinreichen lo¨st. Die Bedingungen sind zu unterschiedlich – zwischen den Betrieben der
gleichen Branche, zwischen den Regionen, zwischen den verschiedenen Branchen, zwischen
3We pursue two modest goals in this book. Firstly, we review the theo-
retical and empirical economic literature on the issue and show that many
questions are unsettled, at least with respect to the empirical relevance of the
arguments. In the course of this review we also try to point to some issues
which are widely neglected in the economic literature on centralisation. Fur-
thermore, we will show that some seemingly ‘self-evident’ arguments don’t
stand up to a closer examination. Secondly, we design models capturing some
aspects of the heterogeneity argument above, and show that they yield only
ambiguous results regarding the employment and welfare effects of central-
isation in wage bargaining. To sum up, this work is mainly a stocktaking
of economist’s knowledge on centralisation issues, with a rather pessimistic
assessment.
To clear matters: we do not think that peasants are sick, as the country
saying above presupposes. But we try to substantiate that peasants do not
know whether their fowls are sick, and thus urge them to investigate things
more carefully.
Bescha¨ftigten und Arbeitslosen. Dem tra¨gt das Kollektivvertragssystem in den Verhand-
lungen mit der weitgehenden U¨bertragung der Ergebnisse von einer Branche auf die andere
nicht angemessen Rechnung.”
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6 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Motivation
At a glance, this chapter appears to be superfluous since several relevant
surveys on the issue exist. A closer look, however, reveals that extensive the-
oretical surveys are now about ten years old, that the division of theoretical
and empirical work is mirrored in most surveys (i.e. they specialise heav-
ily on theoretical or empirical aspects), and that little attention is payed to
the relation between centralisation and the structure/distribution of wages
(which is surprising since this relation seems to be the most stable one). To
close these gaps, we will complement the older surveys with current argu-
ments, we will try to combine the presentation of theoretical models with
the respective empirical evidence as far as possible, and we will discuss the
relation between centralisation and wage dispersion in greater detail than it
is done in the literature. Finally, we will try to point to some issues which
are largely neglected in the literature, and to emphasise several unsettled
problems.
It is clear, however, that the considerably large scope of the topic and
the limited size of this work urge us to establish priorities and to ignore
some relevant and interesting issues. Firstly, we do not provide a description
of bargaining institutions and their evolution, because several contributions
(e.g. Flanagan, 1999; Layard, Nickell, & Jackman, 1991; Berthold & Fehn,
1996; Blau & Kahn, 1996; Golden, Lange, & Wallerstein, 1993, and Golden
& Wallerstein, 2000) contain sketchy summaries, and an extensive descrip-
tion would go beyond the scope of this work.1 Secondly, we are quiet about
the legal aspects of bargaining institutions (see Ruoff, 1999 for a discussion
relating to the German legal framework). And thirdly, we ignore the inter-
esting literature discussing the effects of the European unification and the
European Monetary Union (EMU) on bargaining institutions. These issues
are discussed in some detail in Calmfors (2001) and Lesch (1999).
The access to the centralisation debate is hampered for to reader not ac-
quainted with the literature by the fact that most surveys put emphasis on
certain aspects of centralisation, but don’t point to this specialisation. There-
fore we start here with a short ‘classification’ of the main existing surveys.
Then we sketch the relevant field of research by explaining its theoretical
foundations and central conceptional problems on the basis of definitions of
1Unfortunately, an up-to-date comprehensive international synopsis of bargaining in-
stitutions is missing, but needed. There exist some valuable book-length treatments, e.g.
Crouch (1993), Flanagan, Soskice, & Ulman (1983), Addison et al. (1993), and Ebbing-
haus & Visser (2000). However, countries are described in separate chapters, in different
styles, and by different authors there, leaving the burden of comparisons and integration
to the reader.
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key terms. This will be followed by a thorough discussion of the results from
the debate. However, though we try to integrate theoretical reasoning and
empirical evidence as much as possible, we will have to put a large part of
the empirical literature into a separate chapter. The reasons are (1) that the
connection between theoretical arguments and empirical evidence is indirect
or loose sometimes, and (2) that the discussion of methodological problems
and the description of data and specification idiosyncrasies would fraught the
exposition and cross the argumentation.
2.1.1 The Most Important Surveys
The most extensive theoretical contribution seems to be Hoel, Moene, &
Wallerstein (1993). It provides a clear and formal exposition of the relevant
theoretical arguments. Furthermore, in contains some new arguments and
explains ‘folk knowledge’ which is scattered in marginal notes and footnotes
in the literature. However, empirical aspects are left aside in their treat-
ment. Calmfors (1993) shares this clear emphasis on theoretical reasoning
but is less formal and therefore accessible for a wide readership. The only
contribution in German seems to be Berthold & Fehn (1996). It complements
a verbal theoretical discussion with selected descriptive empirical data. The
authors cannot, however, hide a preconception in favour of decentralisation.
Often they judge ‘by appearances’ alone (neglecting existing empirical evi-
dence), and some of their verbal arguments aren’t backed up by empirical
evidence. On the whole, their contribution is rather a politically commit-
ted plea against central wage setting (or – more fundamentally – against
collective wage bargaining in general) than a level-headed assessment.
A contribution, focussing more on empirical issues, is Booth et al. (2001).
It includes also some current theoretical arguments and provides an extensive
summary of empirical results on Calmfors & Driffill’s hump-shape hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the authors fail to discuss the differences and contradictions
in the results of the listed empirical studies. The current book of Aidt &
Tzannatos (2002) provides a lengthy discussion of general efficiency aspects of
union activity and collective bargaining2 and surveys the empirical literature
on centralisation in several synoptical tables. However, their treatment of
empirical results is rather mechanical. E.g. they simply count the number
of regressions which deliver certain types of results. Since the base unit of
their analysis is a single regression, studies which produce several regressions
2The hypotheses on efficiency-improving functions of unions, formulated by Freeman &
Medoff (1984) more than 20 years ago, have attracted little attention since then. Though
we think that many of their questions are unsettled, we cannot go into the details of this
debate here.
8 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
by simply exchanging irrelevant control variables, obtain higher weights in
their computations. Flanagan (1999) seems to be the only current survey
(focussing on empirical aspects) providing a reflected discussion of conceptual
and methodological problems.3 Furthermore, some papers address several
centralisation issues at the margin, as Farber (1986), Fitzenberger & Franz
(1999), and Fitzenberger & Franz (1994).
The analytic surveys are complemented by several mainly descriptive pa-
pers on bargaining institutions and their evolution in OECD countries, e.g.
Katz (1993), Thelen (1991, 2000), Swensson & Pontusson (2000), Golden &
Wallerstein (2000), Freter (1998), Addison et al. (1993), Ebbinghaus & Visser
(2000). We will provide no extensive comparative description of bargaining
institutions, but place only some marginal (anecdotical) notes to support or
illuminate the argumentation. The interested reader is referred to the cited
literature.
Before we step into the details, we will – lead by definitions of central
terms – sketch some important topics and theoretical foundations of the
centralisation debate in a panorama. We will use this introductory section
also in order to discuss some aspects of bargaining which do not fit seamlessly
in the chapters below.
2.2 Central Definitions
2.2.1 Centralisation
In general, centralisation means that workers or employers unite/merge in
order to bargain collectively or to accomplish their goals on the labour market.
Aggregation of individuals to groups or of groups to lager ones can occur
along several dimensions and in several ways. We start by a short character-
isation of the dimensions and modes of aggregation and then proceed with a
characterisation of the directly (and indirectly) involved groups.
3His conclusions are accordingly much more pessimistic than the conclusions of his
colleagues. His article ends with an extremely pessimistic judgement of the possibilities
to measure centralisation of wage bargaining. On page 1172 he writes “Many indicators
of institutional structure used in empirical research do not measure the concepts stressed
by theory. Union density captures neither the scope nor the intensity of union influence
and union coverage does not capture bargaining power. Indexes of corporatism obscure
more than they reveal, and should be supplanted by explicit modelling of and tests for
institutional interactions.
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2.2.2 Dimensions and Modes of Centralisation
A closer look at the issue reveals that centralisation is a multidimensional
phenomenon. Bargaining can take place at several levels. The most im-
portant ones are profession, firm, industry, sector, region and nation. The
economic analysis of centralisation effects is complicated by the fact that
these effects may depend heavily on the considered dimension (e.g. central-
isation with respect to occupation may have other effects as centralisation
along industry borders.) We will give examples for such differences int the
sections below. In some countries (e.g. France and Italy), unions are sep-
arated along religious or ideological lines, implying that we could consider
ideology and even religion as possible dimensions of centralisation.4 It should
be clear that the latter dimensions of centralisation do not lend themselves
to simple economic explanations.
Especially empirical work on centralisation effects is complicated im-
mensely by the fact that centralisation can be realised in many ways and that
the dominant level of wage setting is not always reflected in a correspond-
ing organisational structure of the bargaining parties. Merger of bargaining
units (unions, employer organisations) is a self-suggesting way to centralise
bargaining, but it may be supplanted by informal coordination. While wage
setting takes place formally at the regional level in Germany, wages are set
effectively at the industry level, since some agreements are often adopted by
most other regional units.
The variety of forms and faces of centralisation is increased by the fact
that the resulting or intended wage structure is not necessarily correlated
with the level of bargaining. For example, the highly centralised bargaining
system in Austria generates higher wage dispersion than more decentralised
bargaining institutions in France and Italy. We will give a more detailed
discussion of these issues in section 2.5.1.
2.2.3 The Relevant Groups
Unions and Employers
The relevance of unions and employer organisations in wage setting is self-
evident. Almost all economic thinking concentrates, however, on the role of
unions.5 This bias translates directly to empirical research, i.e. only union
4Denominational unions [‘Richtungsgewerkschaften’], e.g. the ‘Katholischer Arbeit-
nehmer Bund (KAB)’, exist in Germany too, but they have almost no impact on wage
setting.
5Rare exceptions are Soskice (1990), Swensson & Pontusson (2000), Katz (1993), The-
len (2000), and Artus (2001). Thelen & Artus aren’t economists, however!
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concentration and density is considered in most studies.6 The argument, that
only unions determine the bargaining level and employers react passively by
matching union organisation structures, is not valid empirically since, for
example central wage bargaining was initiated and propagated by employers’
associations in Sweden, and the exit of members from employers’ associations
seems to be the driving force for decentralisation in Germany.
We cannot go into the details further, since considerable investigations
we could refer to, simply don’t exist.7
2.2.4 ‘Third’ Parties
Nonmembers Besides unions and employers’ associations, other parties
may influence bargaining outcomes (and the viability of centralised wage set-
ting) though they don’t participate actively in the negotiations. The most
important of these groups seem to be nonmemebers of unions and employers’
associations. The role of non-unionised workers is considered extensively in
many theoretical models, e.g. Shister (1943), Farber (1983), Blair & Craw-
ford (1984), Burda (1990) and empirical investigations8. We will consider
such models in more detail in section 6.
As already noted above, employers abstaining from collective bargaining,
are ignored largely (or only mentioned in marginal notes) in the theoretical
literature. This is hard to comprehend, since the strategic situation on the
employer side is different in many respects from its counterpart on the union
side.
The Government Besides unions and employers, also the government and
the public may have specific interests in collective bargaining outcomes and
try to influence them. Governments influence wage bargaining indirectly
(e.g. by setting legal restrictions through regulations of negotiation proce-
dures and peace clauses or by providing a legal frame for the enforcement
agreements) or participate directly in bargaining.9 Several empirical studies
(Farber & Western, 2002; Card, 1998; Freeman & Pelletier, 1990; Machin,
6An obvious reason for this ignorance is that employers’ associations are much more
silent about membership than unions.
7Economists cannot, however, claim to stand in the tradition of their often cited pre-
cursor and founder Adam Smith who showed an extreme attitude in this respect. In Smith
(1776) he writes on page 70: “We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combination of mas-
ters; though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account,
that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the object. Masters are
always and every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to
raise the wages of labour above their actual rate.”
8See Farber (1986) for a survey.
2.3. FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS 11
1997) account for this explicitly. For example, Farber & Western (2002) and
Machin (1997) find significant influence of Ronald Reagan’s and Margaret
Thatcher’s anti-union campaigns. On the other hand, the commonplace that
the ideological orientation (left/right) of the government affects bargaining
outcomes directly, cannot be confirmed in the majority of empirical studies.
The Public Though the public is neglected widely in the literature, it may
be relevant in practice, and – more importantly here – its impact on wage
setting may depend on the degree of centralisation. The relevance of the
public (opinion) can be derived from the observation that wage negotiations
are reported and commented extensively in the mass media. – Or that a
considerable number of economists ‘participate’ in bargaining by appealing
(in a normative way) to the parties in public.10
If unions care about the public opinion, centralisation effects may ex-
ist. In decentralised wage setting, especially if contracting is staggered, local
strikes neither affect local public live and consumption, nor have a noteworthy
impact on aggregate variables. Then the public opinion should be a minor
concern, since individual local negotiations will not cross the stimulus thresh-
old of the mass media. A transition from centralised to more decentralised
wage setting consequently would remove pressure from the bargaining parties
(and economists would loose targets of their consultation activities).
2.3 Foundations and Conceptual Problems of
Bargaining Models
Before we start with a discussion of centralisation effects, we sketch some of
the foundations and conceptual problems of wage bargaining models. This
seems to be imperative since the foundations are weak and the associated
problems are severe. Furthermore, some centralisation effects depend heavily
on basic assumptions.
9Wallerstein (1996) and Golden & Wallerstein (2000) distinguish in their empirical
work 15 types of government involvement in wage setting. Examples are: provision of
minimum wages, recommendation of guidelines or norms, compulsory indexation (cost of
living adjustment), compulsory arbitration, or even formal tripartite agreements.
10These economists apparently know that the information content of their statements is
approximately zero, since most of them say the same (‘cut wages’) since decades and they
see that unions don’t follow them (since decades). If one takes the neoclassical theory of
unions seriously, there is no reason for advice to the (full informed and rational) bargain-
ing parties from outside. The attempt to influence bargaining outcomes through media
presence can consequently be taken as an implicit argument against the pure neoclassical
view.
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2.3.1 Objectives and Aggregation Problems
Unions
Bargaining outcomes depend naturally on the bargaining parties’ objectives.
Whereas the objectives of firms can in principle be approximated by simple
profit functions,11 union objectives are less clear. This is the case since unions
are associations of many workers with heterogenous preferences. Things are
complicated furthermore by the endogeneity problem of membership (at least
in open shop unions12), i.e. membership depends on union objectives. Con-
sequently, membership and objectives have to be determined simultaneously,
giving rise to the interrelated theoretical problems of existence and aggrega-
tion.
If workers are rational and interested only in monetary payoffs, an union
existence problem results because such workers have no incentive to become
union members if the firm does not discriminate nonmembers. We will dis-
cuss this problem and possible consequences for centralisation extensively in
chapter 6.
The aggregation problem is to derive a social preference relation from
individual ones. If union objectives are established by democratic majority
voting, it can be shown13 that a unique consistent aggregated utility func-
tion exists only if voting is restricted to a single issue/decision variable (e.g.
wages) and the (indirect) utility functions of all member are single-peaked
(see Flanagan, 1993 or Blair & Crawford, 1984). Otherwise not even repre-
sentative voting can guarantee the existence of a unique outcome (see McK-
elvey, 1976 or Flanagan, 1993).14 Then, economic models, able to predict
union behaviour, do not exist.
The ways out of that problem proposed in the literature are not convinc-
ing. Some authors argue that union leaders stabilize outcomes by manipulat-
ing voting sequences in order to push their own interests,15 others claim that
wages be the most relevant issue and that voting consequently is effectively
one-dimensional. Flanagan (1993) argues that the status quo is maintained
in pat situations.16
11We are aware that this simplicity vanishes in presence of adjustment costs and uncer-
tainty.
12Closed shops/open shops are firms where union membership of workers is compul-
sory/not compulsory.
13The proof is simply a special case of Arrows (1951) impossibility theorem.
14A possibly important detail (neglected in the literature) which may generate inconsis-
tencies, is that leaders are elected with simple majority (median), whereas strikes (ballots)
require agreement rates of 60-80% in some countries.
15See Pemberton, 1988.
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An alternative approach to micro foundation, which is often pursued in
the literature, is simply to ignore the problem and to use fairly general utility
functions putting as few restrictions as possibly on union behavior. Farber
(1986) and Kaufman (2002) are full of examples of theoretical and empirical
applications.17
We complain that no serious empirical attempts have been made to un-
derstand union member behaviour and decision making in unions, but we
cannot propose a solution to these problems here. Instead, we close this sec-
tion by pointing to a detail which is ignored in the literature, but may be
relevant in the centralisation debate: Majorities for strikes may be harder to
obtain in more centralised unions, since they span a much more heterogenous
group of workers (implying a greater number of relevant preference dimen-
sions) This may take away power from large unions.
Employers’ Associations
This section is very short since we didn’t find any model on preference aggre-
gation in employers’ associations. We will sketch Johansen’s (1982) general
analysis of the stability of coalitions in section 2.4.16. But his analysis is
fairly abstract and not related specifically to employers’ associations. The
lack of interest in employers’ associations is surprising since, as we mentioned
already above, employers seem to be the driving forces for current decentrali-
sation trends in Germany18 and centralisaton/concentration on the employer
side are quite different to the union side. For example, we observe no frac-
tionalisation along ideological or religious lines and intra-organisational con-
centration may be higher than within unions because of large differences in
firm size. The only attempt to collect data on employer concentration was
made by Windmuller (1987). He finds that employers’ associations are more
concentrated than unions. For example, in the late eighties about 75% of
firms Belgian firms were organised in the central employers’s association,
while union density was about 55%. In France, where union density rates
are significantly below 20%, about 90% of firms are organised. Of course,
16Plott (1967) includes this explicitly in his definition of a voting equilibrium.
17Our short discussion explains why formal models of union behaviour are relatively
young. The first systematic attempt goes back to Dunlop (1944) who proposed the wage
bill as objective. Ross (1948) initiated an intense debate by considering unions as complex
political organisations and denying the possibility to represent their objectives in a formal
and consistent way.
18In our investigations we found only one descriptive analysis of membership in em-
ployers’ associations (Artus, 2001). We could not identify clear testable hypotheses there,
however. The only international comparative study of employers’ associations, Gladstone
& Windmuller (1986) contains only some basic information and ist not up-to-date.
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membership rates may be misleading and have to be complemented with
information on internal coordination. Nevertheless, we will mention several
examples in the empirical literature below where this approach (concentrate
on numbers and disregard coordination) was applied to the analysis of union
concentration.
2.3.2 The Structure of Bargaining Models
The outcomes of bargaining models depend heavily on the rules of the game
(and the sequence of actions). As regards the determination of wages and
employment, basically two modes are possible:
1. Wages and employment are determined simultaneously by the bargain-
ing parties (efficient bargaining).
2. Union and employer determine wages jointly19 and employment is de-
termined by the employer unilaterally (right-to-manage structure).
The standard reference on efficient bargaining is McDonald & Solow
(1981), Manning (1987) investigates the relation between both structures.
Since the outcomes of both structures differ significantly, it is of great im-
portance to identify which of them applies in practice. The question is of
special importance in the context of the centralisation debate since efficient
bargaining appears to be feasible only with firm level bargaining (we will
explain this below). The theoretical analysis shows that unions and employ-
ers prefer efficient bargaining if both structures are feasible (and agreements
regarding the distribution of efficiency gains are enforceable). The reason is
that efficient bargaining is based on joint optimisation of union’s and firm’s
objectives whereas right-to-manage bargaining implies a (recursive) sequence
of two one-dimensional optimization problems which leads to inferior results
– compared to joint optimisation.20
Though economists do not agree on the relevant structure, a majority
prefers right-to-manage bargaining by pointing to asymmetric information.
19In the monopoly union models wages are set unilaterally by the union.
20The argument can be shown also graphically: In a diagram with employment and
wages on the horinzontal and vertical axis, the right-to-manage optimum must lie on the
firm’s labour demand curve because the firm sets employment (taking wages as given) in
the second stage of the game. On the other hand, the efficient bargaining solution must be
located on a tangent point of the firm’s iso profit and the union’s indifference curves and
therefore cannot be identical with the right-to-manage solution, since the labour demand
curve is the locus of alle maxima of the iso profit curves. If indifference curves are well
formed, iso profit curves must have negative slopes at tangent points with the iso profit
curves.
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Already half a century ago, Leontieff (1946) mentioned that employment is
too high from the firm’s point of view ex post. Therefore management has
an incentive to decrease employment below the level fixed in the bargaining
procedure. An extensive discussion of the issue provide Hall & Lazear (1984)
and Hall & Lilien (1979). They analyse contracting problems caused by pri-
vate information of the firm on exogenous variables which influence employ-
ment.21 Espinosa & Rhee (1989), Schultz (1997) and Sestini (1999) challenge
this view by showing that these information problems can be avoided in re-
peated negotiations by application of subgame perfect trigger strategies.22
However, the range of cooperative solutions (i.e. solutions where the firm
doesn’t cheat) shrinks if uncertainty about the relevant variables increases.23
Unfortunately, also empirical approaches yield no conclusive evidence. The
na¨ıve strategy to check simply whether the bargaining contracts contain ex-
plicit specifications regarding employment is successful only in a few cases.24
Nevertheless, some economists argue that this cannot be interpreted as evi-
dence against efficient bargaining since employment may be fixed implicitly,
e.g. by manning rules25 or implied. We have moved a short sketch of the
inconclusive empirical evidence on this issue to the appendix.
Centralisation Effects Depending on the Bargaining Structure
Evidently, efficient bargaining is feasible at most with firm level wage setting.
An employers’ association committing itself to a certain level of employment
had to distribute it over all of the membership firms. Since employment is
too large from a firm’s point of view, this is impractical. Again a cooperative
truth-telling solution is feasible, but highly unlikely. Since the centralisation
effect depends on the feasibility of efficient bargaining at the firm level, it is
probably not relevant in practice, however.
21In addition to the pure observation problem the firm may have an incentive to ma-
nipulate variables which employment depends on.
22For a exposition of the theory see Fudenberg & Tirole (1991) or any textbook on game
theory.
23The feasibility of the cooperative solution depends furthermore on the patience (time
preferences) and the expected life time of the firm, see Fudenberg & Tirole (1991), section
5.6.
24A current example for explicit agreement on employment is the 5000 x 5000-agreement
between the German IG Metall and the Volkswagen AG. In the contract the Volkswagen
AG commits itself to hire 5000 unemployed workers at a wage of 5000 Deutsche Mark.
25Note that this argument does not explain why the parties use indirect, complex and
error-prone formulations as manning rules instead of simply fixing the number of employed
workers.
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2.3.3 Bargaining Models
Neither the optimisation of joint gains in efficient bargaining nor the op-
timisation sequence in right-to-manage structures yield a sharing rule for
the possible gains. This has to be fixed in a bilateral bargaining procedure.
The work horses for bargaining theory are the Nash (1950, 1962) bargaining
solution and Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offers game. Binmore, Rubin-
stein, & Wolinsky (1986) have shown the equivalence of both solutions if
the time step between alternating offers approaches zero. In addition, their
equivalence theorem delivers intuitive interpretations for the parameters of
the abstract axiomatic Nash solution. We will not explain the details of the
theory here since it is standard and contained even in introductory textbooks.
Since we will make use of the monopoly union model in later chapters,
we comment briefly on its relation to the bilateral bargaining models here.
The monopoly union model results as the limiting case from the Nash solu-
tion when the union has maximum bargaining power (is infinitely patient).
Formally, this means that the union determines wages unilaterally, i.e. max-
imises its utility taking the firm’s labour demand as given. Though the
monopoly union model deals with an unrealistic borderline case, it is used
often in order to avoid the formal complexity of the Nash solution.
We have to admit, however, that all conventional bargaining models
and solution concepts have small predictive power for real world bargain-
ing. With their experimental investigation of the ultimatum game, Gu¨th,
Schmittberger, & Schwarz (1982) have inspired a large number of studies
which contain overwhelming experimental evidence against the relevance of
the Nash solution.26 Attempts to rehabilitate it (e.g. Binmore, Shaked, &
Sutton, 1985) were not successful.27 The results of experimental studies can
be summarised in two sentences: (1) Fairness plays an important role – even
in high stake experiments.28 And (2), though egalitarian sharing rules serve
as focal points, results are biased somewhat towards the game theoretic equi-
librium, but large deviations from these ‘focal’ points are punished even if it
is costly to the punisher.
Unfortunately the literature has not produced a ready-to-use alterna-
tive theory of bargaining.29 Therefore we will proceed using the traditional
26Surveys on the large strand of literature give Gu¨th (1995) and Roth (1995).
27For example, Ochs & Roth (1989) show that the accordance between Rubinstein game
predictions for games with infinite (or finite but stochastic) time horizons and the experi-
mental evidence can be explained by the fact that the noncooperative solution approaches
fair sharing rules if players are patient.
28See Roth, Prasnikar, & Okuno-Fujiwara (1991) or Cameron (1999).
29Fehr & Schmidt (2000) review some attempts to incorporate fairness, altruism and so-
cial preferences into utility and game theory. These approaches appear somewhat arbitrary
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models with reference to the disclaimer that they provide only a raw approx-
imation.
2.3.4 Summary
Even a roughly sketched panorama of some basic issues of centralisation
shows that the change of the level of bargaining involves changes of a com-
plex environment (including the participating groups). By this, it may trig-
ger second order effects (of unknown relevance and magnitude) which cannot
be captured easily in simple formal models of bargaining. After a closer in-
spection, also important theoretical foundations (aggregation and bargaining
theory) turn into Pandora’s box.30 Accordingly, this section turned from a
conventional prologue into a collection of blind spots and disclaimers. Let us
now – despite of many remaining problems – proceed with a presentation of
the positive results from the literature.
and less systematic, however.
30This seemingly heretical assessment is shared by renowned economists, e.g. Manning
(1994): “The only theoretical prediction [of union bargaining theory] that seems to be
robust is that unions raise wages above the alternative wage, but we probably do not need
a sophisticated theoretical framework to guess that this might be the case.”
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2.4 Theoretical Arguments in Favour of and
against Centralisation
The large number and heterogeneity of centralisation effects makes it difficult
to cast them into a clear and consistent scheme. In consideration of this, we
decided to organise the material (coarsely) according to expositional conve-
nience. We start with models abstracting from firm/worker heterogeneity,
extend the analysis to environments with heterogeneity, and complement the
discussion with some reflections on the endogeneity of centralisation levels in
a separate section.
The separate discussion of endogeneity demands a short justification.
Economists expect that agents determine the bargaining level by weight-
ing its advantages and disadvantages. As a consequence, the endogeneity
problem cannot be solved independently of the analysis of employment and
wage effects. Therefore this section will not (mainly) present new models,
but discuss the ability of the models from the other sections to explain the
prevailing bargaining level. Though the endogeneity problem could, in prin-
ciple, be attached directly to the presentation of the respective models, it
seems to concentrate this discussion to put some more weight on it (as it
obtains in the literature).
The survey concludes with a short discussion of the effects of centralisa-
tion on strike incidence. We put it at the end of the survey because it does
not fit seamlessly into the structure of the argumentation.
2.4.1 Price Externalities
The discussion of price externalities, re-initiated31 by the important contribu-
tion of Calmfors & Driffill (1988), plays an important role in the centralisation
debate since then. Since the argument is very simple, we will give here only
a short verbal summary of the argument. By the way, Calmfors & Driffill did
not provide an explicit formal presentation of the argument. Instead they
showed the results on the basis of numerical simulations. An elegant formal
31It is interesting to note that the US government attempted to foster centralisation of
bargaining institutions after the Korean war, and that this attempt was justified by sim-
ilar arguments. The Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Commission (CICBC),
was established 1969 with the intension, “to curb the excess of decentralised, locally au-
tonomous bargaining by adopting procedures to strengthen the role of the nationale labor
organisation and the national associations of contractors...”, see Hartman & Franke (1980).
The CICBC was, however, unsuccessful and short-lived. About ten years later, the gov-
ernment tried to impose direct controls in order to tackle significant increases of wages in
the construction industry.
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formulation contains Hoel (1991) which is summarised in Hoel et al., 1993.
The Argument
Consider an economy with identical firms. If wages of a firm are raised
by its union, this (in general) induces an increase of its output price. In
general (we will discuss special cases below), this generates an externality
since the output price increase raises the aggregate price level and decreases
real wages also in the rest of the economy. By this, it creates an incentive for
an individual local union to realise a real wage increase by shifting part of the
price effects to the rest of the economy. The evolving externality depends on
the elasticity of output prices with respect to wages and on the elasticity of
the aggregate price level with respect to an individual firm’s output price.32
It is clear that the externality disappears in local wage setting under per-
fect competition since then an individual firm cannot raise its output price.
Consequently, the union considers the aggregate price level as independent
of its behaviour and has no price-shift incentive. This is not valid any more,
however, under monopolistic competition. In this case, a firm can shift part
of the wage increase to its consumers and thus induces its union to exploit
the ‘beggar my neighbours’ mechanism (Hoel, 1991). The externality van-
ishes in completely central wage setting since then wages of all workers are
arguments of the union utility function. Basically, Calmfors & Driffill’s argu-
ment can be interpreted as an application of an important aspect if Olson’s
(1965) theory of groups: Small groups are forceful because they are not urged
to care about the externalities they exert on the rest of the economy when
pursuing their interests.
A closer inspection of the issue reveals that the relation between the lev-
els of bargaining (centralisation) and wages may be nonlinear if intermediate
levels are considered too. Specifically, Calmfors & Driffill claim that inter-
mediate levels of bargaining are associated with higher wages (and lower
employment) than completely centralised and decentralised ones. This is
the celebrated hump-shape hypothesis. Again the argument is very simple.
Products of firms within an industry (e.g. butter from firm A and but-
ter from firm B) are closer substitutes than between industries (e.g. butter
and furniture). Therefore competition between firms of the same industry is
more intense than between industries.33 Consequently, industry unions are
able to exploit the output price externality if they rise all wages in a sector
32The external effect can be decomposed further. For example, it works also through
input-output relations, since the output of some firms are inputs for others.
33This idea is not new. Marshall has pointed to this fact already a century ago.
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simultaneously. On the contrary, local unions are defeated by the high price
elasticity within industries.
The results from the analysis can be summarised in three points: (1) De-
centralised and centralised wage setting generate equivalent outcomes under
perfect competition. (2) Under monopolistic competition, complete central-
isation is superior since price externalities prevail with local wage setting.
And (3), intermediate levels of bargaining are generally inferior.
Empirical Relevance
Since the empirical relevance of the argument depends on the magnitudes of
the involved elasticities, an empirical evaluation of the argument could, in
principle, be performed by estimating these elasticities. Unfortunately esti-
mates of these elasticities (especially at the firm level) are hard to obtain, at
best with huge errors. Therefore almost all empirical studies concentrate on
themacroeconomic relation between the level of wage setting and the macroe-
conomic indicators wages, inflation and unemployment. We have shifted the
discussion of these applications to a special section (2.5), since the empir-
ical evaluation of the argument is associated with several econometric and
measurement problems (demanding an extensive discussion), and the empir-
ical literature has grown considerably in the last decade (demanding much
space).
Two intuitive theoretical criticisms of the hump-shape argument can be
summarised here, however: Danthine & Hunt (1994) point to the fact that
firms of an industry compete with firms of the same industry in foreign
countries. Therefore the impact of the price externality should be correlated
negatively with the degree of openness for international trade and the hump-
shape should disappear in small open economies.
Rowthorn (1992) shows in an extension of Calmfors & Driffill’s (1988)
simulation model that the hump-shape levels off under moderate cooperation
of industry unions. He formalises cooperation by assuming that individual
unions maximise a weighted sum of their own member’s utilities and the
utilities of workers in other industries.34 In his simulations the hump-shape
flattens significantly even with moderate weights for workers from other in-
dustries.
34Rowthorn argues that cooperation be not necessarily driven by altruism, but may also
result from intertemporal optimisation.
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2.4.2 Unemployment Externalities
Two further externalities act through unemployment. Local unions generate
an unemployment externality since unemployed members increase (expected)
unemployment duration of others in the rest of the economy if they search
for a job somewhere else (Mortensen, 1986; Calmfors, 1993). Therefore, the
magnitude of the effect depends on mobility of workers and should inter-
nalised to a great deal already in regional wage setting.
The second one is a fiscal externality related to unemployment. It was
stressed by Blanchard & Summers (1987) und Calmfors & Driffill (1988).
An increase of unemployment implies higher unemployment insurance con-
tributions of the employed. Since the rest of the economy contributes to the
benefits of every dismissed worker, unions can shift a part of these costs to
the rest of the economy by raising wages.
2.4.3 Interaction between Centralisation and Taxa-
tion
The Arguments
The idea that centralisation provides a framework for the internalisation of
externalities was applied to the analysis of taxation problems by Gruber,
Summers, & Vergara (1993) and Alesina & Perotti (1997).
Gruber, Summers and Vergara (1993) The authors hypothesise that
wage taxes are less distortionary in highly centralised economies. The ar-
gument is again that central unions internalise the connection between tax
burden and redistribution. Their formal model is essentially a two stage
(Stackelberg- ) game between the government, fixing tax rates as first mover,
and the bargaining agents, responding with their wage policy.35
The basic argument can be read directly from the unions’s utility function:
V = w (1− τ)L+ (N − L) b+ g H(τ w L)
where g ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of centralisation, H(·) represents the
production function of the government, and w, τ , N , L and b denote wages,
the tax rate, the number of workers, employment and unemployment benefits,
respectively.
35Bargaining in the second stage of the game is modelled as efficient bargaining. Efficient
bargaining is used here only for sake of simplicity an does not change the qualitative
predictions of the model, however.
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In the handy special case H(x) = x, the government ‘reimburses’ all col-
lected wage taxes to highly centralised unions (g = 1), whereas the govern-
ment turns into a black hole devouring tax revenues if unions are decentralised
(g = 0). It is self-evident that no deadweight loss arises (with H(x) = x)
in a completely centralised labour market. The relation between tax rates
and centralisation follows in a straightforward manner from the optimisation
problem of the government. It fixes the tax rate such that the marginal gain
of a unit revenue equals its deadweight loss. Since the deadweight decreases
with centralisation, centralisation and tax rate are correlated positively.
This positive assessment of the interaction between government and cen-
tral unions is criticised vehemently in the rent-seeking literature. Centralised
bargaining is viewed as dangerous there, because
“... this may give labour unions a strong political position, and
because this position may be used to “blackmail” the government
to political concessions of various types. Examples of such conces-
sions are tax-financed “gifts” to unions, various types of privileges
for the activities of unions (including the right to “secondary pick-
eting”), or even tax-financed transfer of the ownership of industry
to union-controlled organisations, as illustrated by the push by
unions for collective, union-controlled “wage-earners funds” in
Sweden. In my personal view, this political aspect is the overrid-
ing argument against strongly centralised wage bargaining, rather
than the consequences for wage formation.” (Lindbeck, 1990, p.
322).
This view rests on the central assumption that institutional arrangements
are settled by opportunistic individuals in order to pursue private gains. Con-
sequently, it neglects efficiency-increasing effects of institutions (such effects
will be sketched in section 2.4.15.) Though this view clearly opens ways to
some important insights regarding the problems of centralisation, a conse-
quent application of its conclusions reveals its naivity (if taken at face value).
It were simple to derive a ban of political parties in democratic societies from
this view since parties give its leaders and members access to political power
and allow them to influence redistribution and allocation of property rights
directly.36
36It is interesting to note that Lindbeck mentions (and attacks) only unions. Concen-
tration and power on the employer side may be no less dangerous because of considerable
accumulation of capital.
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Alesina & Perotti (1997) Alesina & Perotti (1997) find that the effect of
distortionary taxation on unit labour cost depends nonlinearly (in a hump-
shape relation) on the level of bargaining (centralisation). In essence, their
model is a straightforward extension/application of the output price external-
ity. Consider the effect of a wage tax increase. Under imperfect competition
unions can shift part of the additional tax burden on to employers. Obvi-
ously, this opportunity increases with decreasing competition. Consequently
unit labour costs increase with increasing levels of centralisation. The cen-
tralisation effect is not monotonic, however, since central unions can take
into account the relation between wage taxes and the benefits to their mem-
bers which are (by assumption) financed out of these taxes. The authors
show this formally: taxes vanish from (after tax) unit labour costs if the
expected benefit stream, financed out of tax revenues, is included into the
union objective.
In contrast to Gruber et al. (1993), Alesina & Perotti (1997) obtain a
hump-shape because they account for the competition effect accompanying
centralisation (i.e. competition between unions decreases in the transition
from decentralised to intermediate levels, giving them greater power to shift
tax burden to employers).
Empirical Relevance
Both, Gruber et al. (1993) and Alesina & Perotti (1997) conduct empirical
tests of their theories in cross-country regression models. A testable impli-
cation of the model in Gruber et al. is that the distortion of wage taxes on
labour supply decreases with increasing levels of centralisation.37 Building on
this, Gruber et al. show in the empirical application that labour employment
is less affected by changes in centralised countries.
Similarly, Alesina & Perotti find a hump-shape between unit wage costs
and centralisation in the data. However, two further studies, Daveri &
Tabellini (2000) and Bookmann & Peters (2003), which estimate similar mod-
els (they use unemployment as the dependent variable instead of unit labour
37Efficient bargaining leads (with H(x) = x) to the following first order condition
F ′(L) =
b
1− τ (1− g)
with production function F (L). Implicit differentiation yields
∂L
∂g
= − b τ
F ′′(L) (1− τ (1− g))2 > 0
.
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costs), nebulise Alesina & Perotti’s results. We will postpone a detailed dis-
cussion of the applications to section 2.5.4 in order to make use of synergies
with other empirical applications.
One qualifying remark on the strategy pursued in Gruber et al. seems in
order here. Their evidence is somewhat indirect and rests on the availability
of a sensible measure of labour supply. According to the central point of
the paper, centralised unions get the government to spend tax wage revenues
exclusively to the benefit of workers, whereas governments in decentralised
economies mimic black holes wasting wage tax revenues or passing them on to
capital. The central question, how tax revenues are used, could be answered
more directly by analysing government expenditures.
2.4.4 Interactions between Unions and Central Banks
Inflation-averse Unions
Cukierman & Lippi (1999) and Guzzo & Velasco (1999) integrate the in-
teraction between unions and central banks into the framework of Calmfors
& Driffill (1988) and Hoel (1991). Central banks react to wage setting of
unions with an adaption of money supply as in Kydland & Prescott (1977)
and Barro & Gordon (1983). The common basic idea in both contributions is
that liberal central banks respond to increases of unemployment with an in-
crease of money supply (i.e pursue a accommodating monetary policy). This
deters inflation-averse unions from aggressive wage claims because they can
decrease inflation rates by wage moderation. Contrarily, conservative central
banks do not create incentives to wage moderation, since they do respond to
unemployment (i.e. pursue a non-accommodating policy).
Basically, the effect of centralisation on the unemployment rate is driven
by the same mechanisms as in Calmfors & Driffill (1988): The elasticity
of labour demand with respect to wages declines with increasing centrali-
sation. This competition effect endows unions with greater ‘market’ power
and induces more aggressive wage claims. On the other hand, centralisation
shallows opportunities to shift the costs of wage claims to the rest of the
economy (this is called the strategic effect). With low inflation-aversion of
the unions or conservative policy of the central bank, the competition effect
dominates for all levels of centralisation in Cukierman & Lippi’s theoretical
model, implying that wages and unemployment rates increase monotonically
with centralisation. A hump-shape prevails only if inflation-aversion of the
unions is strong enough or the central bank pursues a conservative policy.
We note (and should remind this when comparing the predictions of their
model with the model sketched in the following section) that the monotone
2.4. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 25
relation comes from an ad hoc assumption regarding the labour demand of
firms. (Absolute values of) wage elasticities increase monotonically with de-
centralisation and approach infinity if the number of unions does.
Guzzo & Velasco (1999) derive labour demand from production functions
with variable elasticities of substitution and obtain contrary results for the
relation of centralisation and unemployment. For sufficiently low elastici-
ties of substitution the relation is positive monotonous, for sufficiently large
elasticities it is U-shaped (i.e. intermediate levels of centralisation maximise
employment!). The main difference to Cukierman & Lippi (1999) is that the
elasticity of labour demand does not approach infinity with an increasing
number of unions, but converges towards the elasticity of substitution which
is determined by the production function.
Real Effects of Monetary Policy
The models of Franzese & Hall (1998), Iversen & Soskice (1998), Iversen
(1999), and Iversen & Soskice (2000) deliver almost opposite predictions. In
these models unions have no preferences for inflation (i.e. inflation does not
appear directly as an argument) but care only for the trade off between wages
and employment. Nevertheless central bank behaviour creates real effects:
With neutral money supply (i.e. money supply does not respond to wage
setting), wage increases are neutralised by price increases. However, if the
central bank responds to aggressive wage claims with a reduction of nominal
money supply in order to fight a wage policy- driven increase of inflation,
a decrease of the real money supply will result. This harms employment
by lowering real demand and has therefore a moderating effect on rational
unions. Of course, this incentive is present only if unions are sufficiently large
(or coordinated) to be able to influence inflation by their wage policy. There-
fore, the moderation effect of independent central banks attains a maximum
with intermediate levels of centralisation. This effect vanishes with fully cen-
tralised bargaining since externalities are internalised already at this level.
Note that the argument of the theory converts the hump-shape relation into
a u-shape relation for countries with non-accommodating monetary policy.
By this, it reverts the assessment of the prevailing level of bargaining. For
example, German wage setters might have chosen just the right bargaining
level in face of the highly independent and inflation-averse German central
bank.
26 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
Empirical Relevance
Since the models of Cukierman & Lippi yield contrary predictions as all other,
we expect that an empirical test should be able to differentiate between both
theories. Surprisingly, Cukierman & Lippi (1999) as well as Iversen (1998)
and Franzese & Hall (1998) have found support for their opposing theories.
Again, we have to postpone a detailed discussion to the empirical part of the
survey.
2.4.5 Interrelation of Bargaining Institutions and the
Political/Legal Environment
The Argument
Kittel & Traxler (2000), Blaschke, Kittel, & Traxler (2001), Traxler (2003b,
2003a) emphasise that horizontal and vertical integration “represent differ-
ent dimensions of the problem of internalizing externalities that cannot be
reduced to one another”. They even suggest that they obstruct each other
because they depend on orthogonal loyalties. The shift of bargaining to a
higher level increases the distance between officials/negotiators and the ba-
sis, and by that increases opportunities and incentives to neutralise centrally
set rules by individual agreements at the firm level. Therefore Traxler and
his co-authors consider an external legal/institutional framework as a crucial
basis for the feasibility and effectiveness of centralisation. The framework
consists of a laws enabling the enforceability of collective agreements, as for
example collective bargaining autonomy, peace clauses and regulations con-
cerning lock-outs. The authors label this issue with the term ‘governability’38
and try to capture it with a dichotomous index.
The idea that legal enforcement devices foster feasibility of cooperative
collective solutions is not new in economics. Nevertheless, legal frameworks
were disregarded widely in empirical applications, perhaps because of the im-
plicit assumption that centralisation and the availability of such a framework
were highly correlated. Though this contingency hypothesis is plausible, we
are somewhat surprised that just sociologists39 emphasise the role of exoge-
nous institutional rules. Legal rules are possibly only the visible expression
of social (background) norms. Laws do not appear from nowhere but are pro-
duced by democratic parliaments. Teulings & Hartog (1998) report (indirect)
evidence in favour of this endogeneity hypothesis. To this aim they investi-
gate the correlation between the centralisation indicators of Lehmbruch and
38See Kittel & Traxler (2000), p. 1175.
39All co-authors are sociologists.
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Calmfors & Driffill, and the Hofstede-Indicators.40 They regress the ranks
of the both centralisation indicators on the four dimensions of the Hofstede-
index and find significant coefficients for ‘power distance’ and ‘masculinity’,
i.e. people in countries with more centralised bargaining institutions bear
stronger aversion against inequality and weight social relations more than
individual success. The regression tells us, of course, nothing about the di-
rection of the causal relation. Besides this, attitude measurement is even
more complex, fuzzy, and error prone than measurement of many economic
variables (including marginal productivity?). The point of Traxler and his
co-authors point appears to be nevertheless plausible and relevant for em-
pirical work since legal rules show considerable stickiness. Consequently, the
legal framework can be considered as quasi-exogenous or ‘predetermined’ in
the sort and medium run.
Empirical Relevance
Traxler and his co-authors go on to substantiate their theory in an empirical
study. Again, since the details of the estimations are somewhat involved,
we will explain them in the empirical section below. However, we anticipate
that reservations are in order against the pursued empirical implementation
strategy, and that we consider their results as inconclusive or less reliable.
2.4.6 Synchronisation, Hysteresis, and Indexation
The Arguments
McCallum’s (1983), Bruno & Sachs’s (1985), and Tarantelli’s (1986) observa-
tion that centralised economies came faster to terms with the oil price shocks
in the seventies and eighties was probably the central trigger for the debate
on centralisation. Taylor (1980) provides a possible explanation for the dif-
fering speed of adjustment to price shocks in a dynamic model of wage setting
with staggered contracts. He shows that unions have (under imperfect in-
dexation) low incentives to adjust wage claims quickly to changing prices in
an environment of staggered contracts. Consequently, centralisation allows
faster adjustment to price shocks by synchronising contract negotiations.
40The Hofstede index represents four dimensions of the role of social norms in soci-
eties. It captures the role of egoism (dubbed ‘individualism versus collectivism’) in a
society, the attitude towards inequality (dubbed ‘power distance’), the attitude towards
uncertainty and deviant behaviour (dubbed ‘uncertainty avoidance’), and the relevance of
social relations (dubbed ‘masculinity versus feminity). The semantics of his terminology
is capable of being misunderstood – especially for economists. Terms like ‘uncertainty’
and ‘individualism’ bear another and particular meaning in economics.
28 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
In the same direction points the analysis of welfare implications of wage
contract lengths in Ball (1987). He finds externalities of contract length
which may be eliminated by centralisation. An extension of contract length
of one firm has two opposed effects on other firms. (1) The individual firm
can predict future wages and prices better if aggregate wage and price levels
respond slowly to shocks. (2) On the other hand, exogenous shocks translate
into higher demand volatility if prices are sticky. Therefore, sticky prices
destabilise employment. A negative net effect results if the second effects
dominates. In general, it depends on model parameters whether contract
duration is too small or too high, but – except in rare special cases – contract
duration is not optimal with local wage setting.
Empirical Relevance
An evaluation of Taylors argument appears extremely difficult. The attempt
of Layard et al. (1991) to identify significant effects of centralisation on the
adjustment of wages and prices to macroeconomic shocks was not successful.
However, the observation that contract duration is not optimised exactly
but fixed by simple heuristics and changed only after severe exogenous shocks
is against noteworthy effects of Ball’s externalities. At a glance, contract du-
ration times do not depend systematically on centralisation of wage setting. If
they do, other mechanisms may even out contract duration differences. For
example, longer contract lengths in the United States are often combined
with COLA-clauses.41 Other determinants of contract duration, not related
directly to centralisation, may be more important. For example, Aoki (1984)
explains longer average contract duration in the USA (compared with Ger-
many and Japan) by the fact that incumbent unions are protected against
challenges during the contract period. Though centralisation plays a role
here, Ball’s arguments of predictability and demand volatility apparently are
of minor concern to the agents.
The literature does not provide a clear answer to the related question why
wage contracts are formulated in nominal or real terms or why COLA-clauses
are applied in some countries only. The only current empirical paper dealing
with the issue directly seems to be Bratsberg & Ragan (2000). They docu-
ment a drop in the application of COLA-clauses in the United States. In an
econometric analysis, they identify decreasing inflation risks and shrinking
bargaining power of unions as main causes. Further causes (in diminishing
importance) are deregulation, increasing participation of female and a de-
crease of full-time jobs in manufacturing. However, their interpretation of
41COLA stands for ‘Cost Of Living Adjustment.’
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the estimation results is somewhat ad hoc. It is theoretically not clear, for
example, why decreasing union power should lead to a drop of indexation
clauses, since the attitude of unions towards COLA is mixed, at least in in-
ternational comparisons. While unions in the Netherlands went on strike in
favour of upkeeping COLA clauses, German unions reject them.42
Also economists don’t agree on the assessment of indexation. Fischer &
Summers (1989) warn about indexation with the argument that it entices
governments to exploit the Phillips-curve relation (by alleviating its conse-
quences). According to their view, unconsidered effects of inflation could
then overcompensate the positive effects of indexation. Ball & Cecchetti
(1991) challenge this view by constructing a model where increasing indexa-
tion (i.e. coverage of a larger share of wages by index clauses) creates a net
increase of the inflation rate, but is nevertheless efficient.
2.4.7 Monopsonistic and Oligopsonistic Labour Mar-
kets
The Argument
The outcomes of union-firm wage bargaining can be interpreted as profit
sharing contracts (in the sense of Weitzman’s writings). This gives firms the
opportunity in local bargaining to influence bargained wages through their
employment policy – if they possess some market power. They possess market
power, for example, if their labour demand is significant, compared to the
whole labour demand. Hoel et al. (1993) show this in a simple formal model.
Consider a simple bargaining problem. Union utility u = w − v depends
only on wage w and alternative income v. Firm profits are pi = R(n)− w n.
Maximisation of the Nash-product uα pi1−α yields the following sharing of
profits
w = α
R(n)
n
+ (1− α) v and pi = (1− α) (R(n)− v n)
In a two stage game, the firm maximises its share of gross profits given this
sharing rule by setting R′(n) = v < w. This generates higher employment
with local bargaining. Of course, this requires that the labour demand func-
tion is not infinitely elastic from the firm’s point of view. Furthermore, a
problem similar to the efficient bargaining dilemma arises: The firm raises
employment only in order to exert pressure on wages, and the level of wages
fixed in the union-firm wage contract is too high ex post. Therefore, the firm
42In Germany, also dispensation of legitimacy of COLA clauses is controversial, see
Hagermeier, Kempen, Zachert, & Zilius (1984).
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has an incentive to fire part of the workers after bargaining. Since a com-
pletely rational union knows this, it will not believe in the firms promises
and the contract is not viable.
In analogy to the efficient bargaining case (cf. section 2.3.2 and Hoel
et al., 1993) credibility can be restored in repeated games.
Empirical Relevance
The existence of unemployment was considered as convincing evidence
against monopsonistic or oligopsonistic market power of firms. Current con-
tributions (e.g. Bhaskar, Manning, & To, 2002; Manning, 2002, 2003; Card
& Krueger, 1995; a very early but apparently not received contribution is
Schlicht, 1982) challenge this view. They show that unemployment is com-
patible with monopsony or inelastic firm labour supply if other imperfections
(e.g. search costs) exist, and provide some empirical evidence in favour of
the hypothesis. In a current contribution, Fakhfakh & Fitzroy (2003) pro-
vide strong empirical evidence in favour of inelastic labour supply using a
employer-employee matched data set of 6000 French firms. With the excep-
tion of this paper, clear evidence is rather poor until now because of data
availability problems. Since there is considerable progress in the generation
and analysis of employer-employee matched data, we can hope to learn much
on this issue in the near future.
A problem with the monopsony argument is that local monopsonists are
loosers of centralisation. Therefore, it is hard to comprehend why they par-
ticipate in centralised bargaining. A closer look at descriptive data (the
‘Tariflohnstatistik’, conducted by the ‘Statistisches Bundesamt’, the German
national statistical office) reveals that the lower performance groups (‘Leis-
tungsgruppen’, they serve as remuneration indicators) are almost empty in
conurbation areas, but filled in rural ones. The implication that low perfor-
mance workers are not needed in conurbation areas seems not very realistic.
Instead, it can be interpreted as implicit wage differentiation between areas
with high and low competition for workers.
2.4.8 Substitutability of Inputs – Centralisation ac-
cording to Region and Occupation/Profession
The Argument
Bargaining power of a union depends heavily on how fast its members can be
replaced by outsiders or members of other unions. Naturally, several unions
act as competitors if their members are substitutes.
2.4. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 31
Oswald (1979) provides a framework for the analysis. It is straightforward
to represent substitutability by means of the labour demand function:
Li = L(w1, . . . , wk)
Labour demand depends on the own wage wi and the wages of all other
(k − 1) unions/professional groups (w1, . . . , wi−1, wi+1, . . . , wk). In general,
dLi/dwi < 0. The signs of the dLi/dwj, j 6= i depend on the elasticity of
substitution between factor i and j. If inputs are substitutes dLi/dwj > 0,
with complementary inputs, we have dLi/dwj < 0. Since the basic argument
is straightforward, we do not repeat the formal discussion in Hoel et al. (1993)
here, but sketch only the intuition.
If inputs are substitutes, unions act as competitors or – formulated in the
game-theoretic approach of Horn & Wolinsky (1988) – one union’s members
can be used as scabs against the wage claims and strike threads of other
unions. This simple reasoning predicts that unions (professional groups)
merge in order to prevent competition if their members are gross substitutes.
It is simple to show that centralisation increases wages in the case of substi-
tutes and decreases them with complements (for a formal argument see Hoel
et al., 1993). Therefore, the theory does not only allow an evaluation of wage
and efficiency aspects but also explains whether centralisation occurs.
Empirical Relevance
If mobility of workers is low, the competition effect is important only for
regional labour markets. Current examples from German labour markets
suggest, however, that centralisation with respect to profession/occupation
may be an issue of growing importance in the future. The departure of the
‘Pilotenvereinigung Cockpit’ from the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft
(DAG) was associated with extremely high wage demands. Similarly, the
German train driver union attracted attention through high wage claims
and the refute to bargain together with the general union Transnet. Both
professions are apparently highly specialised and difficult to replace. And
both unions use this power in order to push up the wages of their members.43
Unfortunately, the predictive power of the theory vanishes if one tries to
explain international differences in centralisation of wage setting. For ex-
ample, it is hard to explain the high importance of professional unions in
the United Kingdom and its low importance in Germany since the industrial
structure of the both countries appears to be highly similar. A glimpse at
43Remarkably, the behaviour of these groups was not welcomed by employers as a valu-
able pioneering action towards greater decentralised wage setting.
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the historical literature shows that the predecessors of English and German
unions (e.g. journeyman clubs) were quite different already in the eighteenth
century and that organisational structures show extreme inertia (an issue
mostly ignored in the economic theory.) Granted this observation, the exis-
tence of powerful umbrella organisations may hinder privileged professional
groups to break rank and so may help to avoid negative consequences of
decentralisation.
On the other hand, the literature on skill biased technical change
(SBTC) stresses negative effects of centralisation with respect to profes-
sion/qualification. For example, Acemoglu, Aghion, & Violante (2001) ex-
plain decreasing unionisation rates by SBTC, arguing that increasing skill
premia erode solidarity between skill groups, inducing the more qualified
workers to leave unions. Furthermore, the empirical literature on SBTC ap-
pears to be a possible source for information regarding substitutability of
worker groups. However, we have to admit that we did not try to trace it in
detail because the definition of skill groups is rather coarse in most applica-
tions (unskilled, skilled and college graduates in most cases), and therefore
we do not expect that it reveals much evidence regarding cooperation be-
tween skill groups. We already know that unions predominantly represent
the medium skilled, that density is highest among this group, and that college
graduates are hardly organised in unions. The empirical evidence presented
in Acemoglu et al. (2001) does not go beyond that.
Instead of regarding occupational groups, we could resort to the spatial
dimension of competition and use fluctuation of workers as a proxy for com-
petition between workers or unions. In this interpretation, unions have a
stronger incentive to merge or build regional cooperation clusters if regional
mobility of workers is high. A view at table 2.144 shows that this na¨ıve the-
ory is not confirmed by the data. According to the data, the USA should
have the (regionally) most centralised labour market with a worker fluctua-
tion rate of 96.2%45, followed by Canada (92.6%), Finland (77.0%), the UK
(74.8%), and Italy (68.1%). Fluctuation is rather low in Germany (63.0%)
and even lower France (59.6%) and Japan (39.1%). A comparison with the
centralisation indicator values in the last column reveals no clear relation
between turnover and centralisation of bargaining. (Even if we found one,
the bivariate analysis remains prone to spurious correlation bias.)
Also an inspection of the empirical literature on union mergers (see
Michelson, 2000 for an introductory survey and Chaison, 1996 for a book-
44The table is an extract from table 19 in Layard & Nickell (1999).
45Turnover is measured as the sum of accession and separation rates. These rates, in
turn, are yearly averages and measured as percent of total employment.
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Country Period Accession Separation Turnover CD
Belgium 1985 29.0 19.9 41.8 8
Denmark∗ 1984-1991 29.0 29.0 58.0 4
Finland 1984 40.0 37.0 77.0 5
France 1987 298.9 30.7 59.6 11
Germany 1984-1990 31.6 30.4 62.0 6
Italy 1985-1991 34.5 33.6 68.1 13
Netherlands∗,a 1990 11.9 10.1 22.0 7
Spain 1993-1994 26.6 28.5 55.1 -
Sweden∗ 1977-1981 16.8 17.8 34.6 3
UK 1967-1985 37.2 37.6 74.8 12
Japana 1988-1992 20.2 18.9 39.1 14
Canada 1988 48.2 44.4 92.6 17
USA 1985-1993 - - 96.0 16
USA∗ 1977-1981 45.2 46.0 91.2 16
Sources: turnover, accession, and separation measures are taken from Layard & Nickell
(1999), the centralisation indicator is from Calmfors & Driffill (1988)
Notes: ∗: Manufacturing only,
a: continuing firms only
Turnover rates are computed as sum of accession and separation rates.
All numbers are yearly averages.
CD: ranking of countries according to the Calmfors & Driffill-indicator of centralisation.
Higher indicator values correspond to more decentralised bargaining. (Some positions in
the range {1, . . . , 17} are empty, since fluctuation data is not available for some countries,
e.g. Austria which occupies range 1 of the ranking)
Table 2.1: Worker accession, separation, and turnover rates in percent
length treatment) does not yield valuable results. Surprisingly, these articles
focus on the organisational, administrative, membership acquisition, and cost
aspects of mergers, but disregard competition issues. It is unclear whether we
should interpret this as evidence against the relevance of competition, or as
hint to a blind spot in this strand of research.
We found only one empirical study investigating centralisation with re-
spect to profession/occupation: Machin, Stewart, & Reenen (1993). In an
econometric analysis of firm data from England,46 the authors find that the
presence of several unions has no significant effect on wages if they bargain
jointly. If bargaining is conducted independently, however, significant wage
46The use the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) 1984.
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markups result.47
2.4.9 Insider-Outsider Effects
Insider-outsider theories (see e.g. Lindbeck & Snower, 1988a, 1988b) analyse
issues related directly to substitutability of workers. While the models above
assume imperfect substitutability, insider-outsider theories try to explain it
by selfish behaviour of insiders, i.e. by (unionised) employed workers.
According to Lindbeck & Snower’s approach, insiders hinder the man-
agement to hire new workers (outsiders) in an upswing by threatening to
withdraw cooperation from entrants or to harass them. The implied reduc-
tion of outsider productivity deters management from hiring outsiders and
gives higher bargaining power to insiders. Fehr (1990) shows that Lindbeck
& Snower’s solution of the model is not subgame perfect. The firm has
an incentive to replace all insiders by outsiders if insiders threaten to re-
duce gross productivity. Therefore the insider threat is neither rational nor
credible. Fehr shows furthermore that unvoluntary unemployment does not
exist with a two-tier contract where insiders get higher wages and entrants
get market-clearing wages. Although Fehr cleared the theoretical aspects, an
empirical puzzle remains: Two-tiered contracts are observed rarely.48 Fehr &
Kirchsteiger (1994) explain this using a model based on fairness preferences
of entrants. An alternative to postulating utility interdependence is sim-
ply to abandon strict rationality assumptions.49 Thus, although Lindbeck &
Snower’s solution is not subgame-perfect, it may nevertheless be relevant in
practice.
We do not want to go further into the details of this discussion, but
investigate possible implications for the centralisation debate. Surprisingly,
though insider-outsider aspects are mentioned frequently in the centralisation
debate,50 only the formal model of Fitzenberger & Franz (1999) focusses on
the issue. Their model tries to capture central aspects of insider-outsider
theories with two central assumptions. Firstly, productivity of outsiders
is below that of insiders, formally gross labour input is Le = LI + pi LO,
where LI denotes the number of insiders, LO the number of outsiders,
47Naylor (1995) explains their findings on the basis of Horn & Wolinsky (1988).
48There exist, however indirect and subtle forms of differentiation between incumbents
and entrants. For example, academics start their careers often with placements. Both
the duration as well as the frequency of placements seem to show a pronounced counter-
cyclical pattern. Current political debates center on the introduction of explicit two-tier
remuneration schemes into collective wage agreements.
49See chapter 6 and the experimental evidence cited there.
50For an related issue see section 2.4.16.
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and pi ∈ (0, 1) the relative productivity of outsiders. Secondly, relative
weights of outsiders in the union utility function are less than unity, formally
V (LI , LO, w) = (LI + g LO) (w − b)β, where g ∈ (0, 1) denotes the weight
of outsiders. Stochastic fluctuations, which generate employment changes
in firms, are represented by exponentially distributed demand or produc-
tivity shocks. Unfortunately, the introduction of stochastic shocks renders
the model intractable symbolically and urges the authors to accept possi-
bly severe inconsistencies. The exponential distribution of shocks generates
a complicated stationary Markov process of firm employment, and the pro-
ductivity discount parameter pi introduces state-dependence of employment
(since outsiders become insiders after one period of employment). State de-
pendence requires a stochastic dynamic solution concept for the employment
decisions of firms. However, the authors resort to a purely static optimisation
of period profits. (By the way: It is not clear whether they were aware of
this inconsistency. They do not justify the application of the inferior solution
concept or comment on the state dependence problem). In a numerical anal-
ysis of the system’s steady state they find ambiguous effects of centralisation
on employment but they do not even try to give an intuitive explanation of
the effects. Besides that, the results may possibly be artifacts, caused by the
application of an inadequate solution concept.
The ongoing theoretical and practical debates on two-tier wage schemes
for entrants and long-term unemployed workers in Germany indicate a po-
tentially high relevance of the insider-outsider problem. However, since the
model generates ambiguous effects, is highly stylised (for example, the spec-
ification of the model restricts firm employment to 0,1, or 2 workers), and
yields no clear prediction regarding the size of the effects, it appears to early
to assess its implications and relevance in more detail.
2.4.10 Fairness, Envy, and Wage Compression
The Argument
Decentralisation of wage setting generates other externalities if union (or
their members’) utility functions are interdependent in the sense that wage
(or income or consumption) of union A enters utility function of another
union B directly (and vice versa).51 In a less formal and abstract formulation:
workers are altruistic or envious. This idea is implicitly used (but not applied
to the centralisation debate) in several models explaining the wage structure
within firms, e.g. Akerlof & Yellen (1990), Frank (1984), and Levine (1991).
51Of course, mutual (or symmetric) interdependence are the most relevant cases but not
necessary to generate the externality.
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Hoel et al. (1993) show that the envy externality can be eliminated by
coordination.52 It is clear that envious and identical unions play a zero sum
game if they do not cooperate, since a relative wage above unity of one union
implies a relative wage below unity for the other union. Nevertheless, it
is straightforward to show that both unions choose higher wages and lower
employment in the non-cooperative solution. Though the argument is rele-
vant also in an environment with homogenous unions and firms, it seems to
be much more important in a world with heterogenous firms and workers.
Differences in remuneration become prominent when firms are different but
workers are not (or the differences between workers are at least not ostenta-
tious). The slogan ‘equal pay for equal work,’ stressed again and again by
unions serves as indirect evidence for this.
Empirical Relevance
The assumption that relative consumption matters was discussed in detail
already by Duesenberry (1967).53 Nevertheless, economists ignore it often
customarily. The main reason seems to be that explicit account of util-
ity interdependence makes formal models much more complicated.54 But a
long search is required in order to find an empirical rationale for this cus-
tom. Experimental investigations (Fehr & Schmidt (2000) provides a survey,
Holla¨nder (2001) contains a theoretical analysis of the implications) point
to utility interdependencies in many cases of daily life. Since externalities
are present both in the case of positive (altruism) and negative (envy) inter-
dependencies and internalisation does not depend of the type, coordination
(centralisation) of unions increases welfare unambiguously. They vanish only
in the borderline case of utility independence.
A comparison of polls reported in Agell & Lundborg, 1999 (for Sweden)
and Bewley, 1998 (for the USA) suggest that relative wage comparisons are
more important to Swedish workers.55 This could be taken as an explanation
52Gylfason & Lindbeck (1984) analyse a similar model but treat centralisation effects
only in passing remarks.
53It is used implicitly in Keynes’ (1936) rationale for the absence of wage adjustment
to falling demand. “Since there is imperfect mobility of labour, and wages do not tend
to a exact equality of net advantage in different occupations, any individual or group
of individuals, who consent to a reduction of money-wages, will suffer from a relative
reduction in real wages, wich is a sufficient justification for them to resist it.” ((1936),
Chapter 2, III, p. 14).
54Rumelin, Schmidt, & Munk (1996) show that interpersonal dependency of preferences
may even result in indeterminacy of preferences.
55Relative wage comparisons are relevant in the USA too, however. Brown (1978) finds
in an investigation of air force industry workers that worker’s primary concern was about
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of the higher degree of centralisation in Sweden. – And as a rationale for
the lack of coordination in the USA. However, a closer view at the polls
cited above shows that an accurate and reliable empirical evaluation of the
issue should be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because of extreme
measurement problems. Furthermore, though the stable relation56 between
centralisation and wage dispersion is suggestive for that, it is unclear to what
extent these externalities are really internalised in practice.
2.4.11 Efficiency Wage Effects
The Argument
Efficiency wage theories consider the impact of fluctuation costs (Schlicht,
1978; Salop, 1979), moral hazard (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984), adverse selec-
tion (Weiss, 1980), and fairness considerations (Solow, 1979; Akerlof, 1982).
In most variants of this strand of literature, firms raise the wage above a
level compatible with market clearing57 and such ‘create’ externalities to
other firms, since higher wages in one firms make fluctuation or motivation
problems in other firms worse. Hoel (1989) shows in a bargaining model
with efficiency wage ingredients that these externalities are internalised by
centralisation.
Empirical Relevance
The relevance of this centralisation effect depends on the existence of effi-
ciency wage problems in labour contracts. As in many other regards, the
economic profession is split here too. Some empirical studies contain rather
indirect evidence on efficiency wages. Industry wage differentials (Krueger &
Summers, 1988; Wagner, 1990; Katz & Summers, 1989; Barth & Zweimu¨ller,
1994; Bellmann & Mo¨ller, 1993, 1996; Gerlach & Stephan, 2003), or firm size
effects (Oi & Idson, 1986; Wagner, 1991, 1997) remaining after controlling
for several important personal traits (qualification, tenure, experience, sex
etc.) are interpreted as indirect evidence in favour of efficiency wage theories.
There exists also some more direct evidence, e.g. Rebitzer (1995), Wadhwani
relative wages between groups and that they were rather prepared to accept small common
drops of wages than relative wage losses.
56We will report some empirical results on this issue in section below.
57The explanation of unemployment by efficiency wage theories is questionable, however.
Moral hazard problems can in principle by eliminated by bonding. Furthermore unem-
ployment is replaced by wage differentials if a second labour market without information
problems is present. For a short survey see Schlicht (1990).
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& Wall (1991), Konings & Walsh (1994). These econometric studies suffer,
however from severe observation and identification problems.
2.4.12 Wage Drift: Pattern and Multi-Level Bargain-
ing
Significant deviations between standard and effective wages (wage drift) are
symptomatic for highly centralised labour markets. Flanagan (1990) reports
that wage drift was responsible (in the eighties) for about 30–60 % of gross
real wage growth in the Nordic countries.58 Wage drift results either if firms
(unilaterally) raise wages above standard wages, e.g. in order to avoid effi-
ciency wage problems, or if local parties negotiate a mark-up over standard
wages from central negotiations. Re-negotiations at the firm or regional level
are customary in the Nordic countries. The existence of wage drift poses sev-
eral questions on most stylised models of centralisation and wage bargaining.
The most important of these questions is whether and to what extent effec-
tive wages are affected at all by central negotiations. If standard wages had
no impact, the question whether central negotiations take place all is open.
A straightforward implication for welfare considerations were that central
negotiations simply are waste of time. And an important consequence for
empirical studies were that the top level of wage negotiations is not a reliable
indicator for the degree of centralisation.
If markups of effective wages over standard wages differ between firms,
we have to explain why this occurs and to investigate whether the wage-
compressing function of centralisation is effective at all. We will analyse
these problems briefly within the framework of efficiency wage models and
multi-level bargaining models.
Efficiency Wage Models
Schlicht (1992) analyses the relation between standard and effective wages
in a pure efficiency wage model. In his setting, effective wages depend on
standard wages and (imaginary) fair wages (i.e. wages perceived as fair
by workers). Fair wages in turn depend on standard and average wages
(paid in the respective branch/industry). Mark-ups of effective wages over
standard wages are caused (as in all efficiency wage models) the dependence
of productivity on wages. Schlicht obtains the surprising result that high wage
drift results just then if standard wages have only small impact on fair wages!
58Phelps-Brown (1962) and Holmlund (1986) appear to be the first contributions point-
ing directly to the relevance of wage drift and its implications.
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He concludes from this that the economic models may respond sensibly to
non-economic factors (which are often neglected in economic models). Of
course, the model shows an impact of standard of effective wages, but the
relation is somewhat unorthodox. We should notice, that the model takes
standard wages as given, but not explain their determination. An integration
of standard wage setting procedures into the model is possible and realised
in the framework of the multi-level bargaining models which are discussed
briefly in the following section.
Multi-Level Bargaining Models
We choose a more formal analysis here, since the interpretation of multilevel
bargaining models hinges on details which can be demonstrated easily by
inspection of central formulas. Our presentation follows Holden (1998) on
the heels.
Basically, these models (e.g. Holden, 1989, 1990, 1998) are two-stage
Stackelberg games. In the first stage, central authorities (of unions and
employers’ associations) set a standard wage which serves as threat point (or
fall-back option) for the second stage lower level (local) bargaining. In the
second round of negotiations, work force (local union) and firm determine
the effective wage wl = w +D by maximisation of the Nash-product.
{pi(wl)− pi0(w)} {u(wl)− u0(w)}
with respect to the drift parameter D. w denotes the standard wage, u(w) ≡
U(w,N(w)) the utility function of the work force, which (after substitution
of the labour demand relation) can be written as a function of w alone, and
pi(wl) denotes the profit function. The threat points u0(·) und pi0(·) are to be
interpreted as utility of the workforce and profit of the firm during conflict.59
The dependence of u0 and pi0 on w is driven highly by institutional set-
tings. In the Nordic countries strikes are banned if a standard wages is fixed
(until the next central negotiation round takes place). This means that the
union threat reduces to work-to-rule practices which lowers profits (the effect
on u0 is ambiguous a priori).
60 The first order condition of the Nash-problem
is
0 =
pi′(wl)
pi(wl)− pi0(w) +
u′(wl)
u(wl)− u0(w) =: φ
59For a rationale of this interpretation see Binmore et al. (1986) or Booth (1995), p.
150–153.
60The formulation is not realistic here, since wages and productivity are reduced (by
mutual agreement) by 25 to 30% in many plants. See Holden (1990), p. 334.
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By implicit differentiation we obtain the derivative
dw
dw
= −∂φ/∂w
∂φ/∂w
∂φ/∂w ≡ ∂φ/∂D must be negative (by maximisation). Consequently the
sign of dw/dw is equal to the sign of
∂φ
∂w
=
pi′pi′0
(pi − pi0)2 +
u′u′0
(u− u0)2 ≥ 0
implying that local wages wl depend on standard wages w. The magnitude
of the drift depends on how costly work-to-rule is for the firm and the work
force. Clearly, if it affects only the firm, the resulting drift parameter must be
strongly positive. In the end – also this can be seen directly from the formulas
– all results are driven by the functions u0(·) and pi0(·). They simply hide
the efficiency wage core of the model. Therefore, a closer view at the issues
reveals explicit bargaining models rather as decorative embellishment around
the efficiency wage core. All the more it is surprising that the efficiency wage
component is not even spelled out directly in this strand of literature.
Empirical Relevance
The relevance of standard wages for the determination of effective wages
can be conducted as straightforward significance test of the standard wage
in wage regression of effective wages on standard wages and control vari-
ables. Holden (1998) estimates a wage equation61 with aggregated time se-
ries data for four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden).
Specifically, he explains the change of effective wages by unemployment rates,
changes of prices, productivity, the relevant tax rates, and a error correction
term. The coefficient of the standard wage must be zero (or insignificant) if
the effect of central wage setting is neutralized completely by local bargain-
ing, and unity if local bargaining does not matter at all. Both, OLS as well
as instrumental variable methods62 produce highly significant standard wage
coefficients (all t-statistics are between 2.92 and 10.85) close to unity. Earlier
investigations (e.g. Holden, 1989, 1990) deliver very similar results.63
61It is specified as error-correction model.
62Instrumental variable methods are applied in order to correct bias caused by endo-
geneity of central wages.
63Holden applied switching regression models to the data in order to account for possible
bias due to nominal wage rigidity. We do not look into the details of these procedures
here, since the mainly confirm the evidence of the simpler specifications reported above.
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Wage Drift and Wage Dispersion
Since wage drift mark-ups differ between firms, regions and industries, they
create possibilities for wage flexibility and (moderate) wage differentials.
Though the negative correlation between centralisation and wage dispersion
seems to be the most stable stylised fact from the empirical literature (see
section 2.5.5), regional, firm size, and industry wage differentials are signifi-
cant also in Germany64 and seemingly cannot be explained by heterogeneity
of workers or compensating differentials alone.
Characteristics mean std. dev
By formal qualification
Less than completed occupational training 1.0 7.3
compl. occupational training, no Abitur 1.6 7.3
Abitur, no occupational training 3.1 8.3
compl. occupational training and Abitur 4.1 8.6
Technical College∗ 3.0 6.6
College∗ 2.9 7.8
By employment continuity
continuously employed 1.5 6.8
with employment interrupts 1.7 8.9
By occupational status
blue collar (Arbeiter) 1.1 7.3
white collar (Angestellte) 2.3 7.4
By nationality
Germans 1.6 7.3
foreigners 1.1 8.0
Source: Pfeiffer (2003)
∗: results for these qualification groups may be biased significantly since a large share of
wages is censored from above in the social security data.
Table 2.2: Wage drift and its standard deviation by several characteristics,
measured as relative deviation between effective and standard wages in per-
cent.
The most current descriptive evidence for Germany, Pfeiffer (2003) con-
firms the significance of wage drift. The author computes wage drift rates
by several worker characteristics (qualification, employment continuity, oc-
cupational status, and nationality) for the time period 1975-1995, based on
64For example Wagner (1997) reports maximum firm size wage effects of more than 20%,
cf. also Oi & Idson (1986), Wagner (1991, 1997).
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a social security data subsample (IABS), which was merged with the Ger-
man statistics of standard wages (Tariflohnstatistik des Statistischen Bun-
desamtes). As in many other cases, a closer look at the issue reveals several
data problems and limitations. The most severe one is that some thousand
(4892 in 1995) collective wage agreements exist for Germany, and that a good
deal of the regional and sectoral heterogeneity is not captured in the official
statistics. For example, 16 of 63 industries (mainly from the services sector)
could not be assigned in the sample since the official standard wage statistics
does not record them. The fact that the share of workers employed in these
sectors increased from 16% to 28%, indicates noteworthy bias.
Under these reservations, Pfeiffer’s results show (see table 2.2) significant
wage drift, especially for the qualified, white collar workers, and job movers.
An interesting detail of the analysis, which will be relevant in the sections
below, is that wage drift is negative for about 40% of the sample. This may –
perhaps even to a great deal – be due to the mentioned data problems. Never-
theless, the share is large enough to indicate significant downward flexibility
in several industries and regions.
By this, also central negotiations seem to provide considerable flexibility
for wage adjustment.65 Nevertheless, the resulting wage structure may be
inefficient. We will discuss some aspects of the issue in more detail in section
2.5.5.
2.4.13 Matching and Informational Efficiency
An argument that attracted less attention in the literature relates to the in-
formational efficiency of local and centralised wage setting. Empirical stud-
ies suggest that workers in centralised labour markets are better informed
on wages and working conditions. Bewley (1998) reports that workers in
the USA possess less systematic knowledge on wages payed by other firms
while Agell & Lundborg (1999) stress the importance of wage comparisons
for Swedish workers.
If one is willing to believe in these results (despite the questionable com-
parability of the polls and the usual precision and semantics problems of
questionnaires), a seemingly inconsistency appears: If wages are more com-
pressed (because of eqalitarian union policies), Swedish workers had less in-
centives to gather information on wages than American workers where wage
differentials are greater on average.
Two explanations suggest themselves: The first, in the vein of section
2.4.10, is that Swedish workers are more envious than US-American ones
65Wage drift is procyclical, for example.
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and that higher centralisation is simply a response to this. An alternative
explanation could be based on the observation that wage agreements regulate,
in addition to compensation matters, many other aspects of labour relations,
for example working conditions, working time, overtime restrictions, breaks,
holiday duration, dismissal notice periods etc. Since a worker’s net utility
depends on compensation as well as all other utility implications of the labour
relation, ‘wage’ comparisons are much more easy in an environment where
all other components are standardised or similar.
Standardisation creates two effects with opposed welfare implications. On
the one hand, it restricts possibilities to exploit firm and worker heterogeneity
by creation of favourable matches. On the other hand, it increases competi-
tion on the labour market by improving comparability of jobs and lowering
information costs. The price jungle prevailing in the German telecommu-
nication market may serve as an illustration. Extremely complicated and
heterogenous telephone charge schemes are apparently not created to match
particular preferences of customers, but rather to differentiate products and
to raise information (price comparison) costs. High information costs in turn
decrease search activities and alleviate competitive pressure from firms.66
A one-to-one transfer of this example to labour markets seems problem-
atic. Firms apparently do not differentiate working conditions in order to
gain competitive advantages, because standardisation implies productivity
gains. Nevertheless, externalities may be present, and it is unlikely that
uncoordinated actions of employers internalise them.
Empirical Relevance
An empirical evaluation of the significance of search costs seems to be ex-
tremely difficult. Manning (2002) and Manning (2003) contain some evidence
on the relevance of search costs, but it is almost impossible to distinguish
the advantages and disadvantages of these costs.
2.4.14 Effects of Centralisation on Investment
Capital is treated as constant or disregarded in most studies on centralisation
of wage setting (in order to simplify the models). However, capital allocation
may be of high importance in the long run (and dominate other short run
effects). There are some rare studies in the literature. But they do not deliver
unambiguous results.
66For a comprehensible presentation of the topic see Tirole (1995), chapter 7.
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Static Models
Grout (1984) and Hoel (1990) show that capital allocation is distorted in
local bargaining. The reason is that a high capital stock weakens the bar-
gaining position of the firm by rising losses (opportunity costs of capital)
during conflict. In centralised wage setting this effect does not arise since
the investment decision of a single firm has no impact on wage setting of
the central bargaining authorities (see also Hoel et al., 1993). The effect
does, however, not imply higher investment in centralised bargaining since
employment may be higher with local wage setting, and higher employment
raises the productivity of capital. The only unambiguous effect of the model
is that centralisation decreases investment per capita.
Dynamic Models
Moene & Wallerstein (1992) and Moene & Wallerstein (1997) investigate
effects of centralisation in wage setting on investment in a vintage model.
In such models, productivity of capital (plant) depends only on the time of
its installation (vintage). Productivity of an installed plant remains then
constant until it is aborted. Nevertheless, plants may be closed down due
to the availability of newer more productive capital. The number of newly
installed and closed plants in one point of time depends on wages and is
therefore endogenous: A plant is built if the required setup costs are less or
equal to the expected (discounted) present value of profits. And in remains
in operation as long as it delivers positive profits.
With decentralised bargaining, workers of plants with the same vintage
obtain equal wages. Nevertheless a non-degenerate wage distribution results
since plants with different vintage pay different wages. In contrast, a cen-
tralised union sets equal wages for all workers, independent of plant age.
Though the details of the model are somewhat involved, it is intuitively clear
that centralised wage setting yields a larger average productivity and lower
average age of plants than the decentralised. The reason is that equal wages
favour new installation of capital and put older plants out of business. The
relative efficiency of centralised and decentralised wage setting depends on
the share α ∈ [0, 1] of the value added received by workers.67 ( In order to
concentrate on the central effects, α is assumed to be independent of the bar-
gaining level.) The range of α can be divided in three (disjunkt) subintervals
which characterise the relative efficiency of centralised and decentralised wage
setting. If α is small enough, central wage setting is efficient. In the next
interval above, centralised wage setting leads to lower employment, higher
67α in turn depends on bargaining power.
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investment and higher output than decentralised wage setting. If α is close
enough to unity, decentralised wage setting is efficient, i.e. yields higher em-
ployment, investment and output. Without reference to the parameters of
the model, no more specific prediction can be made.
Empirical Relevance
Moene & Wallerstein’s model fits neatly to stylised facts: capital equipment
is higher and the capital stock is younger in economies with centralised labour
markets. Also the empirical investigation of Hibbs & Locking (2000) suggest
that the reduction of wage dispersion in the period 1963–1993 lead to higher
productivity growth68 However, the ambiguity of the results of Moene &
Wallerstein’s model do not allow a definitive assessment regarding relative
efficiency. If one agrees to the common-sense opinion (which ist not backed up
by clear evidence) that unions are strong in countries with highly centralised
bargaining institutions and weak in the others, he has to conclude that the
economic world is upside down with respect to bargaining institutions, and
that the inferior institutional settings prevail. This admittedly na¨ıve conclu-
sion points to a highly relevant aspect of the debate on centralisation: to the
endogeneity problems, i.e. the question whether an to what extent central-
isation of wage bargaining depends on the economic environment. We will
come back to this issue below.
2.4.15 Centralisation and the Allocative Function of
Wages in an Environment with Heterogenous
Firms and/or Workers
Heterogeneity of Firms, Regions and Industries
A central argument against centralisation of wage setting rests on the fact
that collective wage agreements put certain restrictions on wage differen-
tiation between industries, firms and workers. According to this argu-
ment, centralisation generates inefficiencies by ‘lumping together’ heteroge-
nous firms (or sectors or regions) and workers. Let us consider two quota-
tions from the literature which seem to be representative for several vari-
eties of the argument. The first one, from the yearly report of the German
Council of Economic Experts (Sachversta¨ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der
Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung), stresses problems involved by hetero-
geneity between firms, regions, and industries (sectors).
68A more detailed summary of the study will be given in section 2.5.5.
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“In bargaining rounds – at least in the last ones – the tradi-
tional convoy procedure [‘Geleitzugverfahren’] can be observed:
agreements are concluded in the strong pilot-regions of a branch,
this bargaining outcome is then transferred – more or less – to
other regions, and even then, if the economic conditions are sig-
nificantly worse there, and unemployment is much higher. Fur-
thermore, the agreement in one sector serves as an orientation
for agreements in other sectors. Both, aggregate and regional un-
employment are not accounted for sufficiently in the wage agree-
ments.” Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2003), §461, page 259 [translation
by Johannes Ludsteck]69
We will try to discuss the argument implicit in this quotation using two
stylised theoretical models in sections 4.2 and 4.3. If these models capture
relevant aspects of centralisation, we find no confirmation to this position,
but ambiguous effects of centralisation on employment. Unfortunately, the
quotation above does not state the relation between centralised and locally
determined wages directly. The experts seem to suppose that the bargaining
parties in the strong regions do not account for other regions, i.e. centralised
bargaining parties in the strong regions behave as if they conducted purely
local negotiations. If we assume – as it is done in the theoretical models in
sections 4.2 and 4.3 – that bargaining is coordinated between regions, cen-
tralisation produces lower wages for the strong regions as local negotiations
did. With coordinated wage setting, gross employment effects may be pos-
itive. Furthermore, it is difficult to find an obvious purely economic reason
why rational local unions and employers from a weak region (or industry or
firm) should adopt agreements from strong regions if this agreement did not
– at least partially – account for its worse conditions.
Basically, there are four possible reasons. Firstly, expected costs of re-
gional bargaining were too high to justify renegotiations or wage adjustment.
Secondly, union members are motivated by envy (see section 2.4.10 above)
or loss aversion,70 i.e. a relative wage significantly below unity would imply
69The original German text reads: “In den Tarifrunden – so in den letzten – kann
das traditionelle Geleitzugverfahren beobachtet werden: In der oft wirtschaftlich starken
Pilotregion einer Branche wird abgeschlossen, dieses Verhandlungsergebnis wird auf an-
dere Tarifbezirke mehr oder weniger u¨bertragen, und dies selbst dann, wenn dort die
wirtschaftliche Basis deutlich schwa¨cher und die Arbeitslosigkeit erheblich ho¨her ist. Zu-
dem stellt der Abschluss in einem Sektor eine Orientierung fu¨r die Abschlu¨sse in anderen
Sektoren dar. Der Arbeitslosigkeit, sei es der gesamtwirtschaftlichen oder sei es der re-
gionalen, wird in den Tarifabschlu¨ssen zu wenig Rechnung getragen.”
70See Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler (1991). The loss aversion argument requires that
workers from the inferior regions consider the wage in the high region as reference point.
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a significant loss of utility due to utility interdependence. (Note that we had
to account for transaction costs and utility implications of envy in an wel-
fare comparison of bargaining structures if these two reasons were relevant.)
Thirdly, unions do not account for the fate of unemployed workers. In this
case, we have to explain why local unions put greater weight on utilities of the
unemployed in decentralised bargaining. (The argument put forward by Hoel
et al., 1993 claims just the opposite, see 2.4.16 below.) Fourthly, unions (and
employers) might simply show herd behaviour, have too a high ‘preference’
for rules of thumb, or suffer from biased perception, i.e. forget low labour
demand in their region when they hear about high wages in other regions.
By the way: Even if unions are not rational, employers can improve their
fates, i.e. can get rid of general collective wage agreements by simply leaving
the employers’ association and bargaining individually or founding another
association (see Hagermeier et al. (1984), p. 84 and pp. 400-411). Even if
we take irrational behaviour of unions for granted, it is unclear whether and
why these anomalies should disappear in the transition to more decentralised
bargaining. If perception bias does matter, decentralisation could improve
things, since then wages might become more dispersed and loose their ‘focal
point’ nature. Unfortunately, we found no explicit discussion of this inter-
esting issue in the literature. If the ‘irrationality’ and ‘biased perception’
arguments were relevant, economists should try to discuss them in more de-
tail (or consult psychologist) and search for conclusive evidence. Currently,
these arguments seem to be used as gap-fillers – in face of missing empirical
evidence.
By the way, the statement quoted above is not backed up by data or ref-
erences to empirical studies. Even the attempt to retrieve the fuzzy remark
“that the agreement in one sector serves as an orientation for agreements
in other sectors” in descriptive data is not successful. Lesch (2001) com-
pares the growth rates of standard wages (‘Tariflo¨hne’) between industries
for the period 1991-1999. We find the private banking, insurance, and whole-
sale branches at the bottom with 28.1, 28.8 and 33.4 percentage increases.
The ‘top ranks’ are occupied by the chemical industry, the textile indus-
try, and metal- and electrical industry with 44.0, 48.9, and 61.0 percentage
increases. (Yes, the losers had to be content with less than half of the win-
ners’ increases.) Though it is really difficult to consider these differences as
negligible, it remains – in face of lacking structural evidence – a matter of
subjectivity to interpret them as too high or too low.
This seems a little bit heroic.
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Downward Wage Rigidities An issue often stressed in the context of this
debate concerns the question whether and to what extent centralised or de-
centralised collective wage agreements are more flexible in the sense that they
allow for (downward) wage adjustment to cyclical fluctuations. There exists
now a considerable strand of empirical research on wage rigidity. Most con-
tributions focus, however, exclusively on the existence and extent of nominal
rigidities, but only some studies try to identify possible causes of rigidities.
Unfortunately, also the latter are related only loosely to the centralisation
debate. At the theoretical level matters are complicated significantly by the
fact that several reasons may be responsible for wage rigidity: collective wage
agreements (long term contracts), implicit contracts, efficiency wage consid-
erations, or insider-outsider aspects (see Campbell & Kamlani, 1997 for a
survey). Even worse, these factors are not mutually exclusive but may com-
plement and enforce one another. For example, efficiency wage problems may
facilitate the foundation of a local union. Finally, even if it were possible to
attribute wage rigidities precisely to the existence of collective wage agree-
ments, this would be of less help since the rigidity is created intentionally by
the bargaining parties – at least if they are rational and bargain voluntarily
as in Germany – and therefore may be an efficient arrangement.
Empirical studies follow two main approaches. The first one is simply to
ask managers for the reasons why they resist to wage cuts in (more or less)
representative surveys. The second one is to inspect large micro datasets and
to compare the factual distribution of wages with a counterfactual one which
would result if wages were flexible.
Let us start with the first approach. Such surveys were conducted (among
others) by Akerlof & Yellen (1996) and Bewley (1998) for the USA, Agell &
Lundborg (1999) for Sweden, and Franz et al. (2000) for Germany.71 A com-
parison of the results for Germany and the USA in Franz et al. (2000) suggests
that rigidities due to collective wage agreements are somewhat more impor-
tant for German managers than for their US colleagues. However, though
the questionnaires contain identical items, the differences in the answers are
likely to be caused by differences of the sampling procedure and a lack of
representativeness in the US study. (The German survey is based on 801
answered questionnaires, the US on 185. Response rates for the surveys are
15.5% and 18.5%, respectively.)
Micro data studies (the second approach), e.g. Altonji & Devereux (1999)
for the USA, Beissinger & Knoppik (2001), and Pfeiffer (2003) for Germany
find significant nominal wage rigidities in Germany as well as in the de-
centralised USA. However, Beissinger & Knoppik (2003) find no systematic
71For a listing of further studies see Beissinger & Knoppik (2003) and Pfeiffer (2003).
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differences between Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries in a
comparison of seven studies. Furthermore, even the results of studies relat-
ing to the same country or dataset differ significantly and depend highly on
the used estimation approach. For example, Beissinger & Knoppik find in
an analysis based on a subsample of German social security data that 90%
of white collar and 70% of blue collar workers are protected against nomi-
nal wage cuts. Pfeiffer, who does not differentiate between blue and white
collar, finds (with the same dataset) that at most 60% of all workers are
protected against nominal wage cuts. Surprisingly, Pfeiffer finds that higher
sectoral wages have a negative effect on firm coverage, i.e. firms in industries
which pay above-average wages have a lower probability to apply general
collective wage agreements (see Pfeiffer, 2003, p. 203). Besides that, several
methodological problems indicate that precision and stability of the results
are insufficient for cross-country comparisons.
Franz & Pfeiffer (2001) appears to be the only study which tries to at-
tribute reasons for nominal wage rigidity to the competing theories (collective
bargaining, implicit contracts, efficiency wage considerations, and insider-
outsider aspects) in an econometric analysis. They run several ordered pro-
bit regressions which explain the managers’ agreement to statements on the
reasons for rigidity by firm characteristics. For example, the agreement72 to
the statement ‘Collective Wage agreements inhibit wage cuts’ is regressed on
a dummy for membership in an employers’ association, on a dummy for the
presence of a company collective agreement, a dummy on voluntary applica-
tion of a general collective wage agreement, and several control variables.73
Surprisingly, the coefficient of the company collective agreement dummy is
significantly positive and even larger than the membership dummy, i.e. agree-
ment of managers of firms with company collective agreement is even more
likely than that of managers of firms being members of an employers’ as-
sociation. However, the difference between the two coefficients is highly
insignificant. Besides that, the explanatory power of the probit regression
is extremely poor: The pseudo-R2 is 5.1%, placing the result under strong
reservations. Franz & Pfeiffer conclude that collective wage agreements are
more important reasons for wage ridigity (than the other theories mentioned
above), since probit regressions relating to statements on other theories have
even less explanatory power. We think, however, that also this conclusion is
heroic in consideration of the vagueness of the concepts. From comparisons
72Agreement can be expressed in four degrees: ‘Not important’ (‘trifft nicht zu’), ‘of
minor importance’ (‘trifft eher nicht zu’), ‘moderately important’ (‘trifft eher zu’), and
‘very important’ (‘trifft voll zu’).
73Control variables are industry dummies, a dummy on the presence of a work council,
firm size dummies and a dummy indicating employee recruitment problems.
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of separate answers for low, medium, and high qualified workers, they find
that collective wage agreements are a more important obstacle to wage cuts
for the low and medium qualified. This is, of course not surprising (and
conveys little information) since the high qualified are hardly represented by
unions.
To summarise, also a closer look at the empirical evidence on wage rigidi-
ties delivers no clear answers.
Wage Differentials, Fluctuation and Structural Change
An argument, sometimes used implicitly in the literature, appeals to the
function of wages as signals for structural change. According to this hy-
pothesis, wage differentials provide incentives for workers to move from the
less productive firms/industries to more productive ones. A related ques-
tion concerns fluctuation of workers between firms in centralised and local
bargaining.
Basically, the argument presupposes imperfect competition in the labour
market, since wage differentials are eliminated instantaneously under perfect
competition. Union wage policy, dictating equal wages in all firms/industries
is in this sense74 equivalent to perfect competition. Though wage differentia-
tion and wage compression (as implied by centralisation of wage bargaining)
may yield similar results, they do this by different mechanisms. Local wage
setting ‘pulls’ workers from the less productive firms to more productive ones
by higher wages, central wage setting ‘pushes’ them to the high productive
ones, since the less productive firms are induced to fire workers while the
more productive ones obtain opportunities to hire workers.
A significant difference between local and central wage setting exists
only under imperfect competition in the labour market, for example due
to fluctuation- or mobility costs or due to asymmetric information (regard-
ing wages and working conditions). Then it is unclear a priori whether wage
differentiation or wage compression is more suitable to eliminate productivity
differentials.
A simple ad hoc comparison of the incentives gives no clear result. Cen-
tral standard wages induce ‘bad’ firms to dismiss workers. The incentive to
move to a ‘good’ firm amounts to the (utility) difference between the central
wage75 wc and the unemployment benefit b,
76 formally u(wc,m) − u(b, 0).
74Of course, the wage level in a unionised labour market is different from the competitive
solution. This is an important difference between true competition and union wage setting.
75Of course, our comparison had to be based on expected lifetime incomes instead of
‘wages’. We use the sloppy terminology because of its simplicity.
76More precisely, b should to be defined such that it covers the utility or disutility of
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Respectively, the incentive to move in a local wage setting environment
amounts to the difference between wages in ‘good’ (wh) and ‘bad’ (wl) firms
u(wh,m) − u(wl, 0). The relative size of the both differences is a priori
unclear and depends heavily on the mark-up of wages over unemployment
benefits. If it is large or workers dislike unemployment per se, the push-effect
of centralisation is more effective than the pull -effect of wage differentials.
The simple comparison of mobility incentives is misleading (or too sim-
ple) in an important respect. Mainly, it does not account for the fact that
wage setting affects labour demand of firms, i.e. that labour demand of
the highly productive firms is lower with local than it were with centralised
wage setting. Bertola & Rogerson (1997) construct a model with mobility
costs where productivities of firms are subject to stochastic changes, and
show that fluctuation increases unambiguously with centralisation (because
of the wage adjustment argument). This result seems to be unambiguously in
favour of decentralisation since fluctuation is costly. Fluctuation costs have,
however, to be weighted against positive productivity effects of wage equali-
sation (leading to an adjustment of marginal productivities). Therefore, the
net welfare effect is unclear a priori. Unfortunately, we are not aware of
models answering this question in a dynamic setting.
Note that Bertola & Rogerson’s fluctuation result leaves us with an empir-
ical puzzle. At least, the numbers in table 2.1 on page 33 do not confirm it.77
Bertola & Rogerson find no systematic differences in job turnover attributable
to labor market regulation and explain this by the fact that the higher job
turnover caused by wage compression in the more centralised countries is
neutralised by employment protection and other job-security provisions in
the more centralised countries.78
Similarly, Burgess (1999) conducts regressions explaining mean job tenure
by country dummies79 and control variables (sex, sector dummies, education,
and age-groups). With base category UK (i.e. the UK-dummy is omitted
from the set of regressors) he finds that mean job tenure relative to UK is
considerable higher in Japan (3.7 years) and Italy (3.0), but only somewhat
higher in Spain (1.7), Germany (1.3), Sweden (1.1), Poland (0.8), and the
leisure.
77Furthermore, we realise that we exploit the same data now in a different context –
by (implicitly) assuming the opposite causal direction. In search of empirical evidence on
union mergers, we considered worker mobility as exogenously given and the level of wage
bargaining as the endogenous (dependent) variable. In the present context, the direction
of causality has to be reversed to make the data informative.
78Their descriptive data include only Italy, Germany France, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and the United States.
79The data set covers Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Japan, Poland, Spain,
Sweden, UK, and USA.
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Netherlands (0.7), and slightly lower in the USA (-0.2). The rank correlation
between wage dispersion (dispersion is, for example, large in Japan) and
tenure does not show a clear pattern.
By the way, even the commonplace that wages in Germany respond gen-
erally less to demand shocks than wages in the USA is not confirmed unam-
biguously in the empirical literature. Mertens (1998) compares German and
US workers with respect to mobility in a micro data study (using the IABS
for Germany and for the USA), and finds that – according to expectations
– wages are regionally more flexible in the US than in Germany, but that –
surprisingly – German wages respond more to industrial shocks. Her results
are, however, under the disclaimer that comparability of German and US
data is poor because of quite different data collection procedures.80 Further-
more, the meaning of the shock variable is quite unclear – it is generated as
the residual from a regression of (log) employment on a constant and a linear
and squared trend.
What to conclude from the raw descriptive evidence? Either wage com-
pression caused by centralisation is not strong enough to induce higher levels
of fluctuation, or mobility costs are so much larger in some countries that
centralised wage setting cannot offset them, or industry structure is much
more stable in some centralised countries. The descriptive empirical evi-
dence leaves us with a large number of degrees of freedom, and structural
evidence (i.e. econometric models delivering partial effects of centralisation
on job and worker fluctuation) does – to the best of our knowledge81 – not
exist.
Finally, we remind that wage differentials prevailing in decentralised bar-
gaining represent relative scarcities of labour correctly only if they are erected
by the highly productive firms exclusively in order to attract workers. Though
the empirical literature on firm wage differentials (cf. also section 2.4.11) is
far from being conclusive, it gives rather rise to a rent-sharing interpretation
of wage differentials.82 In this insider-outsider or efficiency wage interpreta-
tion, wage differentials coexist with rationing of high wage jobs. Despite of
rationing, wage differentials may keep allocative functions (they increase the
80The IABS is a 1% sample of the German social security data, the CPS (Current
Population Survey) is based on voluntary participation of the respondents.
81We traced a survey on job and worker flows (Davies & Haltiwanger, 1999) but found
no hints no centralisation effects.
82Blanchflower, Oswald, & Garret (1990) draw a decisive conclusion from their empirical
investigations: “...these results, when taken together, appear to favor the idea that British
wage determination may be seen as a kind of rent-sharing in which workers appropriate a
portion of profits...” The empirical works of Holmlund & Zetterberg (1991) and Nickell &
Wadhwani (1990) produce similar conclusions.
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size and mean quality of the queue of applicants). Their size may, however
be far away from an optimum value, since they are created by insider power.
Information Asymmetries
Berthold & Fehn (1996) mention several arguments concerning the allocative
function of wage differentials in a concise summary.
...“The structure of production is moving away from a largely
standardised, fordistic mass production to more flexible, differ-
entiated “high-tech” products. This post-fordistic mode of pro-
duction is distinguished by a flexible specialisation in production
technology... In such an environment, qualified tasks and con-
sequently firm-specific human capital gain in importance, such
that the question arises, how to motivate and to train workers by
suitably devised contracts. Therefore it becomes more and more
important to use flexible skill and industry wage structures and
a high wage dispersion as an incentive device... If one wants
to avoid severe agency-problems, workers have to be remunerated
more output-oriented.” [translation and emphasis by Johannes
Lusteck]83
Apparently, the authors use the term ‘incentives’ in at least two seem-
ingly different contexts. The first one concerns incentives for the acquisition
of human capital, the second one relates to general agency problems, caused
by private information of workers. We will start with a discussion of general
agency problems here since an important aspect of the human capital acqui-
sition problem (the further training problem) turns out to be a special case
(or instance) of information asymmetries, and the framework developed for
agency problems can be applied then directly.
83The original German text reads: “... Die Produktionsstruktur entwickelt sich
[vielmehr] u¨berall weg von einem weitgehend standardisierten, fordistischen Massenpro-
dukten hin zu flexibler einsetzbaren, differenzierten “High-Tech”-Produkten. Diese post-
fordistische Produktionsweise zeichnet sich durch eine flexible Spezialisierung in der Pro-
duktionstechnik aus... In einem solchen Umfeld gewinnen qualifizierte Ta¨tigkeiten und
damit vor allem das unternehmensspezifische Humankapital an Bedeutung, so dass sich
versta¨rkt die Frage stellt, wie man Arbeitnehmer auch durch entsprechend gestaltete
Lohnkontrakte motivieren und weiterbilden kann. Daher wird es immer wichtiger, flexi-
ble qualifikatorische und sektorale Lohnstrukturen und eine hohe Lohndispersion als An-
reizinstrumente einzusetzen... Will man gravierende Agency-Probleme vermeiden, mu¨ssen
Arbeitnehmer versta¨rkt erfolgsorientiert entlohnt werden.
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General Agency Problems
Berthold & Fehn (1996) and Lindbeck & Snower (2001) identify efficiency
problems caused by information asymmetries as the main reason against
centralised wage setting. They start with the observation that team work,
knowledge- and technology- intense and flexible production of small lots be-
come increasingly important. According to their view, such production pro-
cesses require especially that workers disclose private information and knowl-
edge, and adapt to changing demand and production requirements on their
own authority. In such an environment, private information of employees re-
garding their effort, knowledge, productivity, and preferences may exert more
detrimental effects than in traditional tayloristic production. According to
the central hypothesis, incentive-compatible contracts replace an expensive
system of monitoring. Lindbeck & Snower go on to show that centralised
collective wage agreements are not able to represent the extreme variety of
incentive-compatible remuneration schemes. We try to show in chapter 5.1
that their model contains a crucial inconsistency, that their view of flexi-
ble production processes is biased in several respects, and that incentive-
compatible wage schemes may be very simple or not useful at all.
An empirical study seemingly in line with the argument is Lazear (2000).
He investigates the effects the transition of hourly wages to a piece-rate pay
scheme in a large US firm (Safelite Auto Glass Corporation) in 1994/1995
and finds that (1) this raised productivity significantly (by 44%!), and that
(2) productivity gains are shared between firm and workers. Unfortunately
Lazear’s example does not fit the description of human capital- intense flex-
ible production processes. Installation of auto glass appears to be rather a
perfect example of ‘good old’ tayloristic production (where piece rates are
standard). It does not require much training, measurement of output is
easy, and quality problems can be detected and attributed to single workers
without difficulty (or at low cost).
We will sketch now an approach from institutional economics which in-
terprets wage compression and standardisation of job definitions as solutions
to agency problems.
Contract-theoretic and Institutional Approaches to Incentives
within Firms The neoclassical view of unions is based exclusively on their
function to create and exert market power (to raise wages above the com-
petitive level). This ist contrasted by the view from institutional economics
which interprets collective wage agreements (or collective agreements in gen-
eral) as solution to contract problems in labour relations. Unions possibly
provide (or, at least, are compatible with) a structure for the implementation
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of collective agreements. The question whether this contrasting view implies
an different assessment or interpretation of centralisation suggests itself. We
base our discussion (rather a sketch) on the important contribution of Harris,
Wachter, & Williamson (1975).
The authors compare the contract modes spot markets, sequential spot
markets, authority relations and collective action (often manifested as inter-
nal labour markets) with respect to the viability and efficiency for labour rela-
tions in firms. The starting point of their investigation are contracting prob-
lems resulting from job idiosyncracies (dubbed ‘small numbers problems’) in
conjunction with bounded rationality and opportunism. Job idiosyncracies
are characterised by firm specific knowledge (or firm-specific qualifications
and capabilities in Becker’s 1965 terminology) and economies of scale aris-
ing from cooperation in teams.84 Firm-specific knowledge is not relevant
only with respect to production but also with respect to the transmission
of knowledge to new workers (since on-the-job training depends highly on
incumbent worker’s willingness to disclosure information.)
Idiosyncracies generate crucial contract problems by reducing the ex-
changeability of workers. Because of this, they suspend spot markets and
give individual employees a privileged bargaining position which can be ex-
ploited and implies detrimental consequences for all other contracting part-
ners.85 A solution of the problem by contingent claims contracts fails because
of risk, high transaction costs, and bounded rationality: contingent claims
specify actions and payouts for all conditions which are potentially relevant
for the labour relation, and consequently necessitate a complete enumeration
of them. Even if this were possible, the approach fails because of bounded
rationality of the parties (who have to represent and evaluate the abundancy
of information). The authors show that also the authority relation (anal-
ysed by Simon, 1957) suffers from the same problems als spot markets and
contingent claims contracts. This is so because the authority relation pre-
sumes that the instructions given to the worker do not differ significantly
with respect to their utility implications.86
According to the authors, only collective action and social contracts re-
84The authors differentiate further between equipment idiosyncracies (incomplete stan-
dardised equipment), process idiosyncracies, informal team accommodations, and commu-
nication idiosyncracies.
85This is, of course also the basis for insider-outsider theories.
86In Simon’s own words (1957, S. 185): “W [the worker] will be willing to enter into
an employment contract with B [the boss] only if it does not matter to him ‘very much’
which [action] x (within the agreed upon area of acceptance B will choose, or if W is
compensated in some way for the possibility that B will choose x that is not desired by
W (i.e. that B will ask W to perform an unpleasant task).
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main a solutions to the small numbers problem. Collective action reduces
bargaining power of individual workers by rationalising the internal wage
structure in terms of objective job characteristics. (Internal labour markets,
as described by Doeringer & Piore, 1971, are a typical manifestation of this.)
If compensation is tied to jobs/positions, reasons for bargaining over individ-
ual wages vanish. Unfortunately, the authors do not discuss (or mention) the
problem that bargaining incentives are not abandoned completely by collec-
tive action. They seem to be shifted only to other issues, for example to the
definition of tasks or the appointment to positions. Nevertheless, job spe-
cific remuneration transforms the conflicts since the number of positions is
exogenously given and bargaining then relates mainly to discrete structures
(instead of continuous compensation). We suspect that a game-theoretic an-
swer to the question how and to what extent collective action is a solution to
job idiosyncracy problems will be impossible or awkward. A helpful answer
has to be based on empirics, i.e. on an analysis of the behaviour of work-
ers in different organisational settings. Social organisations apparently limit
opportunistic behaviour of individuals and small groups, but they may also
provide additional opportunities to such behaviour (rent seeking).
An important question remains: the collective-action solution to agency
problems can be implemented within firms, centralised agreements are ap-
parently not required. (Apparently, Harris et al. had the firm-level solution
in mind.) We offer two answers. The first one is defensive: Centralisation
may not improve collective agreements at the firm level, but is rather neu-
tral in this respect. If wage differentials are not suited to solve most agency
problems, they cannot be used as a cause against centralisation (especially,
since unions do not set maximum wages).
The second answer is less neutral. We argued above that the attachment
of compensation to jobs may only shift the bargaining problem from wage
setting to the definition of tasks or job profiles. This reservation vanishes if
job descriptions (they are dubbed ‘Leistungsgruppen’ in German collective
wage agreements) are fixed at the industry level, since all negotiations are
conducted by representatives there and it becomes impossible for individu-
als to influence job descriptions according to their personal advantage. Of
course, even if responsibility for the definition of jobs is shifted away from
the firm level, it remains to interpret abstract and general definitions from
centralised agreements and to determine who obtains the favourable posi-
tions. Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical matter to determine whether
job-specific remuneration solves agency problems.
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Further Misunderstandings with Incentive Compatible Remuner-
ation Schemes Here we point to two problems with the application of
incentive-compatible wage schemes to labour relations and the centralisation
debate. The first one concerns the relevance of incentives in labour relations,
the second one concerns the na¨ıve assumption that incentive-compatible con-
tracts provide exact optimal solutions.
Profit sharing and output-dependent compensation are interpreted as in-
centive schemes in the mainstream information economics literature. Ex-
perimental evidence, e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl (1993), Fehr, Ga¨chter,
& Kirchsteiger (1997)87 refute the incentive interpretation in favour of Ak-
erlof’s (1982, 1990) gift-exchange- hypothesis. The experimental design of
their study allows employers to offer wages above the market-clearing level.
These wages are not incentive-compatible (i.e. depend neither on effort nor
on output), because wage levels are determined before employees choose ef-
fort levels. Employers offer indeed non-incentive-compatible wages and the
employees respond to this by choosing effort above the enforceable minimum
level.88 Fehr & Gachter (2000) show that conventional incentive schemes
may hamper voluntary cooperation so much that they are dominated even
by contracts without incentives.89 Nevertheless, they are preferred by em-
ployers (principals), since they allow them to capture a larger share of the
smaller cake (profit).90
What are the implications of these results for the assessment of centrali-
sation? We think that the role of unions and centralisation depends heavily
on the interpretation of incentive schemes. Centralised wage setting may
compromise the application of incentive schemes if profit sharing is a neces-
sary means to control strategic behaviour of opportunistic employees. This is
not the case if profit sharing is a condensate of reciprocity between manage-
ment and employees and markups dominate over penalties in wage setting.
Then worker solidarity (i.e. solidarity between workers of different firms) may
compete with or substitute intra-firm fairness considerations and cause no
detrimental effects on motivation. If crowding out of voluntary cooperation
by incentive schemes (as found in Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2001) matters empiri-
87Introductory surveys to the topic provide Fehr & Falk (2001) and Fehr & Schmidt
(2000).
88In a variant of the experiment employers can punish ‘shirking’ employees at the end of
the game. Employers show moral aggression by imposing costly punishment (which would
not be used by rational players).
89For survey on abundant related evidence see Frey & Jegen (2001).
90Schlicht (2001) stresses that the effect of incentive schemes depends highly on the
interpretation by the employees. They have positive effects if they are perceived on the
basis of a gift-exchange frame. This turns to the opposite, if they are viewed as means to
extract information are as substitute to monitoring.
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cally, centralisation may increase efficiency by reducing the applicability of
such contracts.
A second crucial misunderstanding of incentive schemes is that they pro-
vide exact optimal solutions for individual incentive problems. Everyone
acquainted with these models knows that they are based partially on heroic
assumptions regarding rationality and ability to process information of the
agents. Formal models are good devices to show that dependence of wages on
output creates incentives. However, it would be na¨ıve to compute concrete
exact compensation schemes for real problems with these models. In practice,
near-optimal and approximate incentive schemes are found by trial-and-error
search on markets. Practical problems with lacking information and bounded
rationality are avoided by extensive usage of rules-of-thumb and standard-
isation – but standardised and simplified incentive schemes can represented
also in centralised collective wage agreements.
What to conclude from our discussion? Our presentation here is not
aimed to deny the relevance of incentive problems in labour relations. Some
arguments in favour of decentralisation appear sensible. We do not claim
that the theories sketched above provide a clear argument in favour of cen-
tralisation, but we think that the catch phrases put forward by Berthold &
Fehn (and others) has no save grounds too.
Acquisition of General Human Capital and Skill Premia
A quite intuitive argument against wage compression is based on the fact
that acquisition of general human capital (e.g. college education) is costly.
Consequently, skill premia are required to provide individuals with incentives
to bear these costs. Application of this logic to wage compression by unions
delivers the result that egalitarian union wage policy hampers the creation of
efficient skill premia in two ways: Directly, by evening out wage differences
between qualification groups represented by them, and indirectly, by raising
their member’s wages relative to more qualified groups which are usually
not organised in unions. The argument fits neatly into the explanation of
high unemployment of the unskilled in (continental) Europe, put forward in
the literature on skill biased technical change (SBTC).91 According to this
theory, technical progress shows (at least in the last two decades) ‘bias’ in
favour of high skilled workers by raising their marginal productivity more
than that of the low skilled. Labour markets without restrictions on wages
(as for example the USA and the UK) respond to this with increasing skill
91It was put forward first by Krugman (1994), see Acemoglu, 2000; Topel, 1997;
Gottschalk, 1997, and Autor & Katz, 1999 for surveys of the theoretical and empirical
literature.
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premia (i.e. decreasing relative wages of the low-skilled), whereas labour
markets with rigid relative wages generate an unequal distribution of em-
ployment risks, i.e. greater relative unemployment of the unskilled. Though
this explanation for high unemployment of the low skilled in Europe is sound,
a closer look at the issues reveals that an application to the centralisation
debate deserves several qualifications.
Direct application of the SBTC argument implicitly assumes that central-
isation in wage bargaining is responsible for the compression of skill premia
in the continental European and Nordic countries. Though the literature on
the impact of unions on the dispersion of wages (see e.g. Freeman, 1980;
Freeman & Medoff, 1984 or Lewis, 1986) shows that unions in decentralised
bargaining environments exert considerable within-plant wage compression
too, the cross-country evidence reported in section 2.5.5 establishes a stable
positive correlation between wage compression and centralisation. However,
Atkinson (2000) put forward a difficulty with the SBTC argument. Wages
have not risen significantly at the top of the skill and earnings distribution in
continental Europe though unions don’t play a role in wage determination of
this group92 and legal maximum wages do not exist. There exists, however,
one situation where centralisation necessarily leads to a compression of skill
premia: If fairness considerations between colleagues and union wage com-
pression policy is eluded by segregating skill groups into different plants or
firms. It were interesting to inspect differences in such outsourcing practices
between centralised and decentralised countries. Unfortunately, we are not
aware of evidence on this.
A closer look at the literature on SBTC shows that there exists no agree-
ment on the reasons for different development of skill wage premia in con-
tinental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Acemoglu (2001) list three
competing explanations: (1) that intensified international trade played a
larger role for the Anglo-Saxon countries,93 (2) that technical change has
been less skill biased in Europe, and (3) “that the growth in the proportion of
the labor force with higher or middle-level qualification did slow down in the
United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980’s but did not so in Ger-
many.” (see Bell & Nickell, 199694 and Card & Lemieux, 2001). Though the
92This is the case simply because the high skilled and high income earners are hardly
represented by unions.
93The trade explanation, advocated by Wood (1995) among others, argues that inten-
sified international trade increases skill premia by lowering wages of the unqualified in
advanced industrial countries trough increased competition from huge supply of unquali-
fied labour from underdeveloped countries.
94Their conclusion is based on data in OECD, 1993 and Abraham & Houseman, 1994,
1995)
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different development of the relative skill supply in the Anglo-Saxon and the
continental European countries may be caused by other exogenous factors,95
these stylised facts make it at least difficult to conclude that centralisation
is a clear obstacle to sufficient supply of skills.
Alternative Explanations Based on Union Density and Coverage
An alternative explanation for greater within-firm skill premia in the decen-
tralised countries is based on differences with respect to union density and
coverage rates. Indirect evidence on this issue contains Gerlach & Stephan
(2003). The authors analyse effects of firm-coverage (Tarifbindung) on the
qualification-specific wage structure.96 They find that wage dispersion and
skill premia are lower in firms covered by collective wage agreements than
in uncovered ones. Their data do not compare decentralised and centralised
labour markets, however, but highly unionised and less unionised ones. Con-
sequently their results should be interpreted rather as general effects of union-
isation. Furthermore the analysis may suffer from considerable endogeneity
bias. Since coverage (derived from membership im employers’ association)
is not compulsory in Germany, firms apply industry wage agreements only if
they gain by doing so.97
What to conclude from this argument? We observe a strong positive
correlation between centralisation of wage setting and union density. This
induces many economists to lump both phenomenons together and to at-
tribute all skill premia effects to centralisation. Despite the popularity of
this ‘approach’, we did not find empirical studies disentangling these effects.
Other Forms of Worker Heterogeneity Bertola, Blau, & Kahn (2002)
analyse the effects of labour market institutions on the employment of typical
95There exist obvious differences in migration policies.
96The analysis is based on a linked data set of the ‘Hannoveraner Firmenpanel’ and
the ‘Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung’ (GLS) of the German Federal Statistical Office.
The data relate to the federal state Niedersachsen.
97For a short discussion of the legal conditions see Ruoff (1999). Strictly speaking the
endogeneity argument is not correct, since wage agreements can be declared generally
binding by the Federal Minister of Labour in Germany. Such declarations have become
rare in the near past, however (Bundesministerium, 2001, 2002). Furthermore they are
endogenous too, since the declaration requires an unanimous petition of unions and em-
ployers’ associations. According to a approximately representative survey, conducted by
the ZEW Mannheim in 2000 (see Pfeiffer, 2003, p. 67), only 8 percent of German firms
were restricted by generally binding agreements. Since the declaration of generally bind-
ing wage agreements presumes unanimous requests of unions and employers’ associations,
the number of firms urged to obey wage agreements against their will may be overstated
significantly by this share.
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outsider- groups (female, younger and older workers; characterised by elastic
labour supply) using a cross-section data set of 17 OECD countries. They
show that unions crowd out these groups of the labour market. In regressions
explaining the relative employment opportunities of middle-aged men (25–
55) to employment opportunities of female, and younger and older workers,
union density has a significant positive impact. However, the effect of a
measure of union coordination98 is insignificant in all regressions.
Compensating Differentials Another argument against centralisation
may be derived from compensating differentials. If jobs differ with respect
to working conditions (accident risks, health damages, overtime work, noise
pollution), compensating differentials are efficient solutions to heterogene-
ity (even with homogenous workers).99 Though centralised wage agreements
contain differentiations for special working conditions, local wage agreements
may fit more to idiosyncracies. Again, it is an empirical matter of whether
special working conditions play a significant role for compensation. After
an assessment of a large number of empirical studies relating to US data,
Smith (1979) concludes that “Tests of the theory of compensating differen-
tials, to date, are inconclusive with respect to every job characteristic except
the risk of death.” That this indeterminacy is not only due to data problems
is suggested in the study of Brown (1980), who uses informative longitudinal
data. Sometimes, inconvenient working conditions have even the ‘false’ sign
in wage equations, i.e. they even lead to a reduction of wages, as in Lorenz
& Wagner (1991). False signs (though insignificant ones) arise also in at-
tempts to find ‘risk premiums’ for temporary workers. Hagen (2001) finds
that ‘wrong’ signs stand even up to the attempt to account for unobserved
differences between temporary and non-temporary workers by application of
sophisticated matching and prospensity score methods.
Further Training and Firm-Specific Human Capital
Human capital acquisition occurs in two considerably different ways (we will
explain this below) which demand special treatment in the economic analy-
sis. General training (its implications for centralisation were discussed above)
generates skills which raise productivity in many employment relations, e.g.
schooling. Since it is provided either by the state or acquired in training
98They use an indicator from Belot & Ours (2000). For problems with such measures
see 2.5.1.
99The issue is already discussed in Smith (1776). Rosen (1986) provides a survey on the
theory of compensating differentials.
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markets, it generates ex ante heterogeneity between employees. If the qual-
ification level can be observed, no further information or agency problems
arise in the labour relation. On the contrary, information problem prevail
with firm-specific training, and that this has several important economic
implications. We will discuss them in the following paragraph
Arguments against Centralisation When Berthold & Fehn (1996)
stress the role of wage differentials as incentives, they apparently appeal
to the role of firm-specific skills: “...In such an environment, qualified tasks
and consequently firm-specific human capital gain in importance, such that
the question arises, how to motivate and to train workers by suitably devised
contracts.” To appraise their conclusion that the implied economic problems
can be solved better in a decentralised bargaining environment, we have to
take a swing.
Pigou (1912) pointed almost hundred years ago to the fact that firms
loose part of their investment in the human capital of their employees if
these quit after training has taken place. Then the poaching firm will create
an externality by capturing a share of the human capital revenues and cause
too a low level of training. This implies that high competition for workers
and high mobility of workers may generate severe efficiency problems in the
labour market.
Becker (1962, 1965) tried to dissolve the externality in a seminal contribu-
tion by the important distinction between firm specific and general training.
He argued that general training raises (by definition) productivity of an em-
ployee in each employment relation and thus provides him with the right
incentives to bear the required costs.100
Firm-specific training does not create poaching incentives (since specific
training does not raise the employee’s productivity in other firms by defini-
tion), but the firm has to incur losses also if the employee quits for some other
reason. Employees equipped with specific human capital can therefore claim
a share of the productivity effect of the training with the strategic threat of
quit and generate an externality too. Becker suggests that it can be (and is)
internalised if costs and revenues of specific training are shared between firm
and employee. He argues that this investment sharing is realised in practice
if apprentices/trainees accept lower wages during the training and obtain a
wage above their marginal productivity in other firms thereafter.101
100The argument is based on the (partially problematic) assumptions that competitive
markets for general training exist, that employees have complete information or at least
rational expectations on the revenues of training, and that there is no credit rationing.
Existence of credit rationing is, however, likely since employees have private information
on expected revenues and their trainability, cf. Waldman (1990).
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Hashimoto (1981) formalises Becker’s argument and shows that an (im-
plicit) training contract is efficient only with complete symmetric informa-
tion. It is not viable if the firm holds private information on productivity
gains from training and the employee holds private information on his out-
side option. In this case firm and employee construct a second-best contract
by computing an optimal sharing ratio (for costs and revenues) in order to
approximate separation decisions (for dismissal and quit) to the first best
solution.
The second-best contract may be far from the optimal solution in prac-
tice because the determination of the optimum sharing rule requires that
firm and employee understand the problem. In many other applications of
incentive contracts, agents need not to understand the problem in order to
find a good solution. They can find the optimum solution in a trial-and-
error search. Trial-and-error search is here not applicable, however, since
firm-specific training is idiosyncratic by definition.102
Stevens (1994, 1996) shows that Becker’s separation of skills into general
and specific ones is not possible in many cases. She analyses the case of trans-
ferable training, i.e training yielding productivity effects in other firms with
positive probability and shows that transferable training generates external-
ities too. A current alternative explanation of skill idiosyncracies widening
the externality problem is advanced by Lazear (2003). The obvious idea is
that a worker’s human capital endowment becomes specific (even if all skill
components are perfectly general) if firms require these skills in different
proportions.103
Consequently, Becker’s attempt to explain externalities away appears to
have failed and we have to ask whether decentralisation is a suitable so-
lution to inefficiencies caused by specifity of human capital (as suggested
by Berthold & Fehn). Hashimoto’s training contract requires wages below
collectively agreed standard wages during the training period and above af-
101The reader may ask why firm and employer don’t solve the problem by simply writing
a contract specifying that the worker has to stay with the firm a certain time. Becker
argued this were not possible since it amounted to a reintroduction of slavery. A more
realistic rationale seems to be that private information (e.g. on productivity effects of
training) make it impossible to write an efficient contract. Such a contract had to specify
a fine to be payed by the worker to the firm in the case of a quit. Too a high or too a low
value of the fine renders the contract inefficient.
102Manning (2003) points to the fact that Hashimotos model assumes imperfect competi-
tion (an increase of the after-training wage reduces the probability of quits) and thus does
not solve the problem for the case of perfect competition which was assumed in Becker’s
original treatment.
103For example, though LATEX typesetting and basic secretary skills are highly general,
secretaries equipped with both tasks are rare.
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terwards. If collective wage agreements do not allow for such exceptions,
centralisation decreases efficiency. However, if wage drift is present (and
large enough), average wages exceed standard wages. Then investment shar-
ing can be realised by reducing wages to the standard rate. Additionally, a
closer inspection of collective wage agreements reveals that they leave indeed
some space for adaptions to special needs.
Finally, Hashimoto’s separation of training and ‘harvesting’ period (in-
troduced for sake of simplicity) and the implied step-shaped wage profile
play a minor role in reality, since training is typically a continuous process.
The implied continuously increasing wage profiles can be (and apparently
are) approximated well in collective agreements. Wage compression seems to
improve the situation in such cases because a mean decreasing spread of the
worker’s alternative income reduces the information problem in Hashimoto’s
model.
If we go back to the institutional approach set out by Harris et al. (1975),
we find an additional case against wage differentiation. A passage from
Thurow (1976) can be read as a direct application of their arguments to
our current topic. Note that Thurow’s description of training problems and
their solution is just contrary to Berthold & Fehn’s.
“If... we live in an economy where laborers acquire many of their
cognitive skills through informal training from other workers or
from their immediate supervisors, we need a differently structured
labor market than we would if the only purpose of the labor mar-
ket were to allocate skills and establish equilibrium wages. A
labor-training market must be so structured as to maximise the
willingness of existing laborers to transmit their knowledge to
new workers and to minimize every worker’s resistance to acquir-
ing new skills and accepting new technology. Eliminating direct
wage competition and limiting employment competition to entry
jobs is a necessary ingredient in the training process. If workers
feel that they are training potential wage or employment competi-
tors every time they show another worker how to do their job,
they have every incentive to stop giving such informal training.
In that case each man would seek to build his own little monopoly
by hoarding skills and information to make himself indispensable.
Wage and employment security also means that every man has
a vested interest in resisting any technical changes that might
reduce his wages or employment opportunities. To encourage
training, employers must repress wage competition and build em-
ployment security. [Emphasis by Johannes Ludsteck]
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What about the empirical evidence? A glance at the descriptive empirical
evidence is not very informative, but provides little support against central-
isation. With respect to further training, countries with centralised labour
markets seem to do better in cross country comparisons (see e.g. Franz &
Soskice, 1995; Soskice, 1994; OECD, 1994). Standards of occupational and
further training are quite high in the centralised countries.104 The differences
in training standards, however, may be caused by other factors than centrali-
sation of wage setting. In a comparison of Germany and the USA, Acemoglu
& Pischke (1998) attribute the eye-catching differences to lower mobility in
Germany. Harhoff & Kane (1997) suspect that German employers’ associa-
tions were able to implement normative obligations for firm-based training.
Though the descriptive evidence cannot explain the source of differences in
further training between the more and less centralised labour markets, it does
not produce any clear indication that the centralised labour markets are less
capable to provide training incentives than the decentralised ones.
If we trace the literature for some more structural empirical approaches,
we find indirect and weak evidence in favour of centralised solutions. Agell
& Lommerud (1997) show in a theoretical model that minimum wages may
exert positive effects on the acquisition of human capital in labour markets
with imperfect information, and Acemoglu & Pischke (2002) suggest in a
microeconometric study that the model is relevant in reality.105 In line with
this, Booth et al. (2001) find that the introduction of a national minimum
wage caused an (admittedly insignificant) increase of work related training
(for workers affected by the minimum wage).
Unfortunately, all this evidence is inconclusive, leaving many empirical
aspects of the issue in the dark. The ‘proposition’ that centralisation gener-
ates severe externalities or obstructs their internalisation, however, appears
to be questionable and unfounded. Its popularity seems to come from the
fact that ‘incentives’, ‘decentralisation’ and ‘flexibility’ have become magic
spells whose meaning has not to be explained any more.
104For example, Beicht, Feher, & Bardeleben (1995) report that firms spend some thou-
sand Deutsche Mark per apprentice.
105We should note here that also negative effects of minimum wages were found in earlier
studies, which (according to the Acemoglu & Pischke’s remarks) possibly can be attributed
to data and specification problems. For example Hashimoto (1982) finds a negative ef-
fect of minimum wages on wage growth of the affected workers and concludes from this
that minimum wages reduce training. The conclusion is, of course, neither direct nor
compelling. Acemoglu & Pischke (2002) contains a detailed discussion of the involved
issues.
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2.4.16 Viability of Cooperation and Endogeneity of
the Bargaining Level
Despite the extensive use of the lighthouse example in the lit-
erature, no economist, to my knowledge, has ever made a com-
prehensive study of lighthouse finance or administration. The
lighthouse is simply plucked out of the air to serve as an illustra-
tion... This seems to me to be the wrong approach. I think we
should try to develop generalizations which would us give guid-
ance as to how various activities should be best organized and
financed. But such generalizations are not likely to be helpful
unless they are derived from studies of how such activities are ac-
tually carried out within different institutional frameworks. Such
studies would enable us to discover which factors are important
and which are not in determining the outcome, and they would
lead to generalizations which have a solid base. They are also
likely to serve another purpose by showing us the richness of the
social alternatives among which we can choose.”
This paragraph closes a contribution of Ronald Coase (1974), investi-
gating (on the basis of historical sources) the financing and maintenance of
lighthouses in the seventeenth century in England. Background of his in-
vestigation is the prominent role of lighthouses as an example in economic
theory and rationale for government intervention. Contrary to expectations
and the predictions from economic reasoning, he finds that many lighthouses
were financed and maintained by private cooperatives of shipowners.
Following Coase’s advice, it seems reasonable to put an explanation of the
dominant level of wage setting on the beginning of the centralisation debate,
or to combine the analysis of the determination of bargaining levels and their
efficiency properties. If, for example, the analysis reveals that the bargaining
level is determined mainly by technology (as in the models of centralisation
with respect to occupation), or that the level of bargaining emerges as ef-
ficient response to transaction costs and market imperfections, there is no
ground for recommendations on how to change bargaining structures. Inter-
national differences between bargaining levels can then be attributed simply
to different environments.
The dominating economic approach seems to put the cart before the horse
by isolating and analysing certain aspects of centralisation without regard to
the economic environment.106 Many researchers stop after an assessment of
106Of course, isolation and ceteris paribus clauses are often a necessary prerequisite which
open the view to the interesting effects and make models tractable. Thus our critique is
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the employment or efficiency properties of bargaining levels and conclude
with rather abstract advice. A search (in the economic literature) for the
reasons why unions and employers’ associations show certain organisational
structures, yields at most some hints and marginal notes. For example, in
the literature research for this work we found only two (book-length) con-
tributions (from political scientists, Gladstone & Windmuller, 1986; Sisson,
1987) focussing on the objectives, role, and organisational structure of em-
ployers’ organisations.107 Empirical contributions to industrial relations for
Germany come mainly from sociologists (Streeck, 1984; Mu¨ller-Jentsch &
Ittermann, 2000) and political scientists (Thelen, 1991). Newer empirical
studies on actual prevalence of and compliance to collective wage agree-
ments were conducted by sociologists (Artus, 2001) und jurists (Oppolzer &
Zachert, 2000).108 That these contributions are mentioned at best in marginal
notes but not received, may come from significant differences of methods and
paradigms between economics and other social sciences. Though economists
may not be responsible for these communication problems, a considerable
hole in our knowledge of these topics remains.
After the obligatory and necessary hint that the minor theoretical con-
tributions of this work (in sections 4.2-6) conform to this tradition by con-
sidering highly stylised problems and abstracting from institutional and or-
ganisational aspects of bargaining, we will sketch now some results regarding
endogeneity of bargaining institutions.
Formation of Coalitions
Centralisation of wage bargaining generates winners and loosers, especially if
firms and workers are heterogenous. For example, workers of highly produc-
tive firms loose from centralisation since it hinders them to exploit their in-
sider power to some extent. (Typically the centrally negotiated wages will be
smaller than local ones for this group.) Similar consequences result for work-
ers with different qualification. The stylised fact that unions compress also
qualification wage differentials ist stressed repeatedly in the large literature
on skill biased technical change (SBTC). This argument takes cooperation
between skill groups for granted but does not explain it.109
not levelled at the isolation principle in general.
107we have to notice that Soskice (1990) stressed and explained the role of employers’
associations in his critique of Calmfors & Driffill’s hump-shape hypothesis. We will come
back to this in section .
108Though we do not want to belittle Coase’s contribution we have to mention that he
does not explain how shipowners managed to overcome the prisoners dilemma arising in
the open good allocation problem.
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Centralised wage setting presupposes coordination among unions and
employers: An industrial union representing several skill and qualification
groups has (at least in non-trivial cases) to set wages for each group. This
may generate significant conflicts between the groups. The same problem
arises in employers’ associations with heterogenous firms. Unfortunately, the
analysis of multilateral bargaining appears to be much more involved than
the simple voting mechanisms (sketched in section 2.3.1) and bilateral bar-
gaining (see section 2.3.3). This is so because the small number of members
and heterogeneity give them market power and such generates strategic inter-
actions. The question ‘why and how achieve individuals cooperative solutions
despite of significant clashes of interests?’ suggests itself.
An (rather abstract) answer provides the theory of coalitions. Johansen
(1982) contains a discussion of the issue which is applied to centralisation by
Hoel et al. (1993). Consider a coalition game for the set N = {1, . . . , n} of
players. A coalition is represented as set of indexes of its members. Maximum
utility that can be obtained by a coalition S (no matter how other coalitions
behave110) is represented by the characteristic function v(S). Complete cen-
tralisation (i.e. a grand coalition) of a union (or employers’ association) is
possible only if the game has a core. The core C(v) is defined as a sequence
of payouts {x1, . . . , xn}, with
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S ≥ v(S) for all
coalitions S ⊂ N . In words: the core is a grand coalition dominating all
other possible coalitions. It is easy to construct games (or payout sequences)
with an empty core, though the characteristic function v is superadditive, i.e.
v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T ) for all S, T with S∩T = ∅. In words: a grand coalition
may not even exist if it is efficient for all pairs of coalitions to merge. The
grand coalition breaks if at least one coalition S exists which can increase its
utility by separation from the grand coalition. A more narrow concept of the
core, defined by Johansen (1982) is based on the idea that each coalition (or
single player) demands what it could obtain outside the grand coalition plus
a share of the surplus it creates by joining the grand coalition.111 Formally
the Johansen-core is defined by∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)+
{
v(N)−v(S)−v(N\S)}λS for all S ⊂ N,
109Even theories focussing on the effects of cooperation between skill groups in unions
(e.g. Barth & Zweimu¨ller, 1995; Gregg & Manning, 1997, and Akerlof & Yellen, 1990) are
quiet about the viability of cooperation.
110In a formally more accurate definition v(S) is maximin utility, i.e. the maximum
utility obtained by coalition S if other coalitions choose a combination of actions exerting
maximum harm to S.
111The outside value is the maximum utility the coalition (player) could obtain by sepa-
rating from the core.
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where λS is the share claimed by coalition S. If the shares λS and λN\S are
determined via the Nash bargaining solution, we obtain (by efficiency of the
solution) λS + λN\S = 1. Therefore the Johansen core is empty in almost all
cases.112
All in all, the formal analysis shows that grand coalitions are highly un-
likely. Though the model is highly abstract, it helps us to structure thinking
about centralisation. All models predicting positive centralisation effects pro-
vide reasons for cooperation. If we observe decentralisation, this does not
necessarily imply that positive centralisation effects are absent or that they
are outweighted by negative effects. It is possible that short run gains of
deviation from a cooperative strategy are too high for certain groups, and
that side payments from other groups are not possible. Nevertheless, there
is no reason for political intervention as long as we do not know the exact
reason for the observed decentralisation trend.
Cooperation in Repeated Games
While the theory of coalitions tries to examine the conditions for the viability
of cooperation at a very general level, disregarding concrete strategies of the
agents, the game theoretic analysis of repeated games puts focus on the
strategies. This gain in concreteness is made possible by simplifying many
other details. Particularly, sub-coalitions are assumed away by the rules of
the game (or payout vector definition). Players then have to choose only
between two strategies (‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’).
Holden & Raaum (1991) analyse cooperation of independent decentralised
unions in a repeated game by application of subgame perfect trigger strate-
gies.113 The not surprising results (which are analogous to the results from
the industrial organisation literature, e.g. Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986), can
112The results of the game theoretic literature on multilateral bargaining (extensions of
the Rubinstein game to more than two parties) are not unique and seem to respond sensibly
to small changes of the rules. We mention only two examples here: In the unanimity game
(described by Sutton (1986)) each division of the cake can be an equilibrium. The rules
are (in the case of three players): player 1 proposes a division of the cake. 2 and 3 then
simultaneously choose to agreement or to disagree. The game ends (with the division
according to 1’s proposal) if both agree. Otherwise 2 obtains the right to make a proposal
in the next round and so on.
Krishna & Serrano (1996) analyse a game with slightly different rules: Again 1 makes a
proposal and the other two players decide simultaneously on agreement. The game end as
Shaked’s game if both agree. However, if only 2 agrees, he obtains his share according to
1’s proposal and the game goes on as the 2-player Rubinstein game in the next round. If
the discount rate is close enough to unity, all players receive equal shares of the cake.
113Pohjola (1990) contains a similar analysis within a survey article.
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be summarised in two sentences. Cooperation prevails if the gains of de-
viation from cooperative behaviour are small enough and the players are
patient enough (i.e. the discount rates for future consumption/profits are
large enough). Private information generates additional hurdles to cooper-
ative behaviour.114 A possible consequence of the existence of concludent
cooperative solutions is that the organisational structure of unions and em-
ployers’ associations does not matter (or plays a minor role) for bargaining
outcomes: “An interesting conclusion drawn from this extension of the basic
one-shot game: bargaining structure may not matter at all, but the ‘mode
of play’ is important. If the unions possess complete and perfect information
and if they are not too myopic, then they should be able to reach consensus on
wage policies and obtain efficient outcomes without any binding contracts.”
(Pohjola, 1990).
We conclude this section with a disclaimer. Game theoretic models of
coordination explain the existence of cooperation and coalitions exclusively
by rules of the game and preferences of the individuals and don’t allow for any
repercussions. On the contrary, experimental psychological investigations
suggest forcefully that groups exert a strong impact on the behaviour of their
members, even if they place no formal constraints on their behaviour. The
experimental research on this issue (dubbed minimal group studies) started
about 20 years ago with the intention to find the minimal conditions required
to make people feel to belong to a group. The research, however, gathered
quickly momentum by its own since the results were surprising even to the
investigators (for an introduction to the issue with application to organization
theory see Haslam, 1995).
In the seminal study of Taifel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy (1971), school-
boys were assigned according to an apparently arbitrary criterion to two
groups. The both criterions were the schoolboy’s estimates of the number
of points on a screen or the preference for the abstract painters Klee and
Kandinsky. Surprisingly, even this minimal form of agreement shaped per-
ception and action of the group members. For example, if the boys had to
distribute (small) amount of member to anonymous member of the own and
the other group, in-group members were favoured. Doise et al. (1972) report
that – in spite of the lack of additional interaction within groups, in-group
members were perceived as more flexible, kind and fair. The bias prevailed
even if investigators indicated the arbitrariness of group assignment to the
test subjects.
114A typical example for private information in this context is that only local workforces
know their deviation gains since only the have good information on the situation of the
firm and their working conditions.
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It is not clear, whether these findings would prevail in ‘high stake’ ex-
periments where test subjects can gain large amounts of money. If they are
relevant, however, they point to a blind spot and significant limitations of
several economic models on centralisation effects.
Demand for Insurance
Agell & Lommerud (1992), Burda (1995), and Agell (2002) discuss the
worker’s demand for insurance as rationale for egalitarian wage policy and
centralisation. Wage compression (e.g. elimination of firm and industry wage
differentials) can be interpreted as insurance against wage income risks. This
argument, of course, relates only to ex ante identical workers, implying that
it applies only if worker have equal abilities and human capital endowments
when entering the labour market. Consequently, it cannot be used to explain
compression of wage differentials related to qualification.
At an abstract level, a problem with the insurance argument arises: Egal-
itarian union wage policies can be substituted by governmental redistribution
and other public and private income insurance. Therefore egalitarian pub-
lic policies may crowd out unions from the ‘insurance market’. (Apparently
Bismarck aimed his compulsory insurance policies as an bulwark against the
upcoming labour movement.) The crowding-out hypothesis lends itself to a
empirical test. Bivariate correlations between centralisation of wage setting
or union density and the size of public redistribution point strongly to a
positive relationship, i.e. social policy is more egalitarian in countries with
strong unions. Thus the evidence is against the hypothesis. The argument
of Gruber et al. (1993), sketched in section 2.4.3 above, may serve as an
alternative explanation of this fact.
Agell (2002) provides alternative indirect evidence on the issue with cross-
section country data (from OECD countries). He uses the openness to in-
ternational trade (measured as the sum of export and imports, divided by
GDP) to proxy how much population is exposed to income risks (caused by
macroeconomic shocks). The openness index is used (together with control
variables115) to explain several dimensions of labour market institutions and
social insurance systems. He finds a positive impact of the openness indicator
on the unemployment replacement ratio, on union density and the (Calmfors-
Driffill-) index of centralisation. If the population size is added to the set of
regressors, however, the openness indicator becomes insignificant for union
density. Despite of appropriate reservations against cross section/cross coun-
try regressions,116 the study delivers some evidence in favour of the hypothesis
115Control variables are GDP per capita, an index for linguistic fractionalisation, and
population size. All variables enter the regression equation as logs.
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that union wage policy is driven by insurance motives.
Utility Interdependence, Envy and Fairness
The models sketched in section 2.4.10 deliver effects of centralisation on the
level and dispersion of wages together with a prediction of the degree of
centralisation. Note that, while wage compression may be an unintended
‘accompanying symptom’ of collective wage agreements in the institutional
approach (Harris et al., 1975), these approaches declare it as an intended re-
sult, caused by preferences for fairness, envy or altruism. Of course, there are
no grounds for institutional reform if utility interdependence is a dominant
factor for the determination of the bargaining level. Nevertheless, we have
to remind that all evidence on the relevance of interdependencies is highly
indirect.
Endogeneity of the Membership Definition
Hoel et al. (1993) argue that centralised unions apply a broader concept of
membership. If dismissed workers leave the union, this leads to a decline of
membership of local unions and a change of the union objective (as stressed
in insider outsider models, e.g. Blanchard & Summers, 1987; Lindbeck &
Snower, 1988b). The ties of workers to centralised unions may, however,
be closer since the boundary of a firm is not the boundary of the union
there. If this is the case, unemployed members’ utility functions obtain higher
weights in centralised bargaining. Unfortunately, direct evidence regarding
this point does not exist. Farber (1986) and Dertouzos & Pencavel, 1981 are
probably only studies trying to estimate the weights of employment in union
utility functions. Since both studies use data from the United Staates, it is
impossible to make a comparison between different levels of centralisation.
Efficiency Wages, Technology and Reorganisation
Ramaswamy & Rowthorn (1993) explain the prevailing level of centralisation
in wage setting by heterogeneity of production technologies in an economy.
The basic idea is simple. Since the ‘law of one price’ does not apply in effi-
ciency wage models, wage differentials exist – even with homogenous workers
– if the effort functions (damage potential, monitoring technologies etc.) dif-
fer between firms or industries.117 In their model, the level of bargaining
depends simply on the heterogeneity of the effort functions. If they differ
116The main problem of such studies are the unclear direction of causality and the low
number of observation imposing severe restrictions on choice of control variables.
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significantly from one another, employers will prefer decentralised solutions.
The authors attribute the reasons for increasing heterogeneity to the increas-
ing relevance of the services sector in gross employment: The services sector
seems to show the most heterogenous structures of production and employ-
ment.
At a glance it is not clear why efficiency wage models with unilateral wage
setting can provide any contribution to explain the behaviour of unions at
all since union behaviour is not considered there. Models integrating union-
firm bargaining into an efficiency wage framework, (see Pichler, 1993; Layard
et al., 1991; Hoel, 1989; Garino & Martin, 2000) show, however, that this
does not change the qualitative behaviour of the efficiency wage relation.
In a less formal, but more accessible manner Soskice (1990) argues that
technical change leads currently to an increasing share of employment in
the services sector, a decrease of firm sizes, a more heterogenous pool of
firms, and a more flexible production structure. Furthermore, it increases
bargaining power of the highly qualified employees to the disadvantage of the
less qualified and, by this, undermines solidarity. Soskice does not conclude a
dissolution of coordination networks, but rather a shift of power in favour of
employers. “The mistake of the decentralisation hypothesis is the belief that
economy-wide coordination no longer exists... What has in fact happened is
more interesting. In economies in which co-ordination was well established in
the 1960s and 1970s it still exists (and for reasons connected with changing
industrial relations structures has even developed in the case of France and
Italy). But unions now play a less important role and employer organizations
and networks a more important one. In part, indeed, this accounts for the
lack of fanfare: for employer organizations are more reticent than unions.”
(Soskice, 1990, S. 53). Soskice stresses a point often underexposed in the
literature. Decreasing union density, coverage, and bargaining power can be
interpreted as decentralisation (Katz, 1993). We find Soskice’s explanation
of decentralisation and deunionisation by structural change in favour of the
services sector highly plausible. However, we have to emphasise that Soskice
is careful to interpret these shifts not as long run tendencies or as efficient
developments. Soskice’s reasoning might be extended by the hypothesis that
employers are gaining temporarily because they are more capable to exploit
heterogeneity of workers and less structured new developments of market
and working conditions (for example, small firm sizes and the dynamics of
establishment formation assigns unions to new tasks). Unfortunately, we
117Further causes for the heterogeneity of effort functions are differences in the impor-
tance of firm-specific human capital, differences in the capital equipment, differences if
fluctuation costs etc.
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have found no empirical evidence on this issue.
2.4.17 Strikes
Theoretical Models
Relatively low strike activity in highly centralised labour markets is con-
sidered as a stylised fact by many economists (Hoel et al., 1993, p. 103.
Berthold & Fehn, 1996, p. 82). (This is somewhat surprising, since that
empirical evidence is poor. We will present an explorative empirical investi-
gation in section 3.) Unfortunately, economic explanations of strike activity
turn out to be rather involved. Therefore we have to take a swing.
For a long time it seemed to be impossible to explain the occurrence of
strikes with economic models based on rational agents. Hicks recognised
already in (1962) that strikes cannot occur in bargaining models based on
perfect symmetric information, since rational agents can agree ex ante on the
outcome resulting after a strike and thus avoid costly a harmful/costly strike.
The Nash bargaining solution excludes strikes by definition and the solution
strategy to the Rubinstein game (proposed by Shaked & Sutton, 1984) shows
explicitly that rational agents come to an agreement instantaneously.
Consequently, current game theoretic models of strikes are based on pri-
vate information of firms/unions.118 Strikes serve as screening devices in or-
der to extract private information (regarding profits, strike fund, willingness
to strike of the work force) of the opponent. Unfortunately the predictive
power of these models is restricted since minor variations of the rules can
lead to significant changes of the outcomes (as in many other game theoretic
models). In screening models proposals are possible only within fixed time
intervals, while the length of a bargaining round is a variable of choice in sig-
naling and attrition games. (see e.g. Kennan & Wilson, 1989, 1990, 1993).
Stylised facts on real world strike activity are explained only partially by the
models.119
The models provide, however, a plausible explanation of effects of cen-
tralisation in wage setting in strike activity. Central wage setters base their
negotiations on aggregate (average) parameters (profits, productivity etc.)
published by neutral outside parties (e.g. statistical offices). This impartial
118An exception is Fernandez & Glazer (1991). They show that strikes may result even
with complete symmetric information if three actions are possible in every bargaining
round: (1) agree, (2) strike (wait), and (3) prolongation of an existing agreement.
119For example, the otherwise plausible attrition models predict that profits are ‘burned
down’ almost completely. This contrasts the low strike incidence and the relative low
duration of strikes in reality. Furthermore the models predict a negative relation between
strike duration and wages. Empirical research gives no conclusive confirmation of this.
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information, available symmetrically to both parties, should reduce the in-
formation asymmetry problem significantly. A problem with the argument
is that negotiators are concerned mainly (a) with predicted values of these
variables and (b) parameters of profit and utility functions which are not re-
ported by statistical offices. Nevertheless, relevant information in centralised
bargaining appears to be more symmetric.
Alternative Explanations: Self-Serving Bias and Transaction Cost
Arguments
Self-Serving Bias A way out of the problem to explain strikes with ra-
tional agents is simply to modify (or abandon) the rationality assumption.
Everyone who participated personally in tough negotiations is likely to share
the reservations against completely rational behaviour. Babcock & Loewen-
stein (1997) explain strikes by self serving bias and claim support of reliable
experimental evidence. They hypothesise that direct involvement in nego-
tiations biases perceptions (of fairness) in favour of the own position. As
a consequence, the sum of claimed shares in the whole cake (the sum in
dispute) is greater than one.
In an experiment conducted by Babcock, Issacharoff, Camerer, & Lowen-
stein (1993), 80 law students were assigned randomly to the role of plaintiff or
defender in a virtual tort case (with whole sum in dispute equal to $100000).
Though all participants obtained identical case materials, the sum of claimed
shares was greater than 100%. More surprisingly, when participants were
asked to write down a guess of what a (virtual) independent judge, the bias
prevailed though they were told to receive a bonus of $1 if their predic-
tion was within $5000 of the actual judge’s award. Babcock, Lowenstein, &
Wang (1996) show that this bias does not disappear if the test persons were
pointed explicitly to the problem of self-serving bias. Self serving bias seems
to remain significant even in high stake experiments, i.e in experiments with
considerable monetary awards (Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996).
The self-serving bias argument is supported by several results from ex-
periments on cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger’s (1957) theory,
individuals try to reduce internal inconsistencies between action and percep-
tion (or between opinions regarding different objects) by ignoring information
challenging their behaviour/actions or irreversible decisions. In Aronson &
Mills’ (1959) impressive experiment, girl students were randomly assigned to
two groups. While members of one group had to pass an unpleasant test as
prerequisite for attendance of a seminar, members of the control group were
admitted without restrictions. Before the seminar started (it was ‘simulated’
by the investigators but never took place), the test persons were confronted
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with a tape recording of an intentionally boaring and trivial seminar session.
Only the control group members unmasked the low quality of the seminar.
Several later studies show that subjects unconsciously (but systematically)
search for information reducing dissonance and suppress information increas-
ing it.
A possible conclusion from these theories with respect to the relation
between centralisation and strike activity is that specialisation and profes-
sionality of the negotiators my reduce self serving bias. Furthermore, motions
should play a lower role for the negotiators since they are less directly affected
by the outcomes (their wages are not fixed by the negotiations).120
The Transaction Cost Argument It is surprising that a very simple
and quite intuitive argument, applying not only to strikes but to efficiency of
centralisation in general, does not appear in the literature.121 If similar wage
setting problems appear in several firms, it is efficient to solve the problem
once instead of repeating the bargaining problem in every firm. Economists
are used to stress gains of designing custom solutions to special needs. The
argument, however, applies only if the gains of ‘made-to-measure’ solutions
pay for their costs. In face of the observation that wage setting is an ex-
tremely complex task in reality and market forces are rather weak because
of small numbers problems and the high importance of human capital, it
appears to be worthwhile for many firms to adopt wages set in other firms
instead of bearing the costs of plant level bargaining. This argument is
implicit in statements of managers pursuing the strategy to obey collective
wage agreements exactly or to pay above standard wages in order to ‘keep
unions out of the plant’. An testable implication of the argument is that
centralisation implies concentration of strike activity in large firms, or (more
general) that strike activity is more evenly distributed over firms in decen-
tralised labour markets. To the best of our knowledge this issue has never
been addressed in empirical research.122
Social Peace
Strikes are an eye-catching aspect of bargaining conflicts. There exist, how-
ever, several other implications of conflicts, for example on productivity.
These are sometimes subsumed under the label ‘social peace’.
120However, Eisenberg’s (1994) poll, addressed to professional lawyers and judges, shows
that also professional negotiators are not immune against self serving bias.
121Ekkehart Schlicht stressed this argument repeatedly.
122Our attempt to conduct an empirical study on this matter was frustrated by the fact
that firm level strike and union density data are not available in Germany.
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Practical persons refer sometimes to this broader notion of ‘peace’ when
they point to conflict-reducing effects of centralisation in wage setting. The
simple argument is that cooperation (and productivity) at the plant level is
affected negatively if management and workers have to solve distributional
conflicts personally. Rare marginal notes in the economic literature appear
not very valuable. Instead the reveal a lack of competence to make simple
semantic differentiations.123 Also a search in the psychological literature
ended without success. Therefore we have to close this section with the
confession that we know almost nothing about the issue.
Empirical Relevance
The lack of direct evidence on the relation between centralisation and strike
incidence is surprising in face of the large number of empirical contributions
to the centralisation debate in general. The only exceptions from this seem
to be Cameron (1984) and Schnabel (1993). Cameron finds positive (bivari-
ate) correlations between strike activity (measured as lost days due to strikes
per year and thousand workers) and the macroeconomic indicators inflation,
unemployment and growth rates of earning. Schnabel (1993) obtains signifi-
cant negative rank correlations between strike activity and the centralisation
indicators of Calmfors & Driffill (1988) and Bruno & Sachs (1985) for a cross
section data set of OECD countries.
Two further contributions provide rather indirect evidence. Lesch (2002)
computes bivariate correlations between strike incidence and an index of in-
stitutional regulations on bargaining (peace clauses, compulsory arbitration,
statutory work councils, legal admissibility of lockouts and general strikes)
but fails to detect significant effects, and Ochel & Selwitschka (2003) point
to a decreasing trend in strike activity for OECD countries.
In order to close this gap, we will report results from some explorative re-
gressions explaining strike activity in section 3. The presentation was shifted
to that section since it requires some concepts and definitions explained in
123Freter (1998) sketches a caricature of the argument in order to defeat it. “Die
Sonderordnung des Arbeitsmarktes wird ausserdem damit begru¨ndet, dass erst eine
u¨berbetriebliche Regulierung den sozialen Frieden im Sinne der Abwesenheit von Ar-
beitska¨mpfen als positiven Standortfaktor gewa¨hrleiste. Die These unterstellt großen
Teilen der Bevo¨lkerung eine latente Bereitschaft zur Unfriedlichkeit, die durch Kartel-
lierung des Arbeitsmarktes gezu¨gelt werden mu¨sse und ko¨nne. Bei funktionierendem
Wettbewerb gibt es keinen Anreiz fu¨r irgendeine Art der unfriedlichen Austragung von
Interessensgegensa¨tzen... Da dem gro¨ßten Teil des deutschen Volkes daru¨ber hinaus die
behauptete Tendenz zur Gewaltbereitschaft wohl nicht immanent ist, kann die These,
eine umfassende Arbeitsmarktregulierung sei no¨tig um den sozialen Frieden zu sichern, als
widerlegt gelten.
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the following sections. The simple central result can, however be anticipated
here. Also our empirical investigation shows that strike activity is signif-
icantly lower in countries with more centralised bargaining. However, the
results are not very robust with respect to the choice of the functional form
of the regression relation.
2.4.18 Conclusion
It is extremely difficult to provide a short summary of the theoretical debate
on centralisation in wage bargaining because of a large number of extremely
heterogenous models with antithetic results. The literature provides strong
cases in favour of centralisation (e.g. models dealing with the internalisation
of externalities), and strong cases against centralisation (e.g the monopsony
or SBTC arguments), and several models with ambiguous effects, (e.g. mod-
els explaining effects of centralisation on investment).
Unfortunately, the considerably large strand of empirical literature (to
be surveyed in the next section) cannot disentangle the arguments or rank
them with respect to their relevance or – at least – select the most relevant
arguments, but gives only a summary- indication on positive or negative
employment effects of centralisation.
The most visible lack of our theoretical knowledge on centralisation seems
to regard the dependence of bargaining structures on their economic and
social background. Game-theoretic models of cooperation and the formation
of coalitions give a rough clue of the conditions required for the feasibility
of centralised bargaining, but they neither are able to explain the extreme
differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Nordic countries, nor the high
persistence of institutions.
If one tries to ‘optimise’ institutions with respect to economic efficiency,
he should, however, have a clear conception of their functions and structure.
Thus research on the functioning of bargaining institutions and the parties
involved of bargaining should be put on the top of the research agenda.
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2.5 Empirical Evidence on Centralisation Ef-
fects
2.5.1 Operationalisation Issues
Wie ist denn der Begriff des Spiels abgeschlossen? Was ist noch
ein Spiel und was ist keines mehr? Kannst du die Grenzen
angeben? Nein. Du kannst welche ziehen: denn es sind noch
keine gezogen. (Aber das hat dich noch nie gesto¨rt, wenn du das
Wort “Spiel” angewendet hast.) Wittgenstein (1990), § 68
Empirical tests of centralisation theories and estimation of centralisation ef-
fects pose a considerable number of problems, mainly because it does not
allow to abstract from particularities of the economic environment. Mixing
all special case consideration and econometric problems with the theoreti-
cal argumentation would overload the presentation. Therefore we decided to
shift some empirical aspects of the debate to a separate section.
The considerations in the theoretical part above show that centralisation
may influence the level as well as the structure (distribution) of wages.124
The effects are transmitted through wages to employment (unemployment)
and inflation. Most empirical studies estimate and test the indirect rela-
tion between centralisation and unemployment for two reasons. Firstly, it
is much easier to obtain internationally comparable data for unemployment
than for wages125. Secondly, wage levels and the distribution of wages de-
pend on other economic conditions, as for example investment and technol-
ogy (productivity growth). These other effects have to be eliminated in order
to obtain pure (partial) effects of centralisation on wages. This is difficult
especially if centralisation effects are computed by comparison of different
countries. But cross-country comparisons are the main source of empirical
evidence since centralisation levels are extremely sticky (i.e. change slowly
over time – if they change at all).126 These problems drop to a good deal if
instead the relation between centralisation and employment/unemployment
rates are analysed, since markets should clear (at least in the medium and
long run) independently of technology and other factors.127 Expressed in a
124The analysis of synchronisation in section 2.4.6 suggests also influences on the dynam-
ics (speed of adjustment to shocks). We will streak this issue in some marginal notes.
125The main points are that wage data are available only for manufacturing in many
countries and that international differences of labour income taxation my hamper compa-
rability significantly.
126Rare exceptions, i.e studies exploiting time-variation of bargaining levels (Hibbs &
Locking, 2000 and Bell & Freeman, 1988 are reported in section 2.5.5.
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more technical way, specification problems are sailed around by estimating
reduced forms.
Nevertheless, heavy hurdles remain on the way to an identification of cen-
tralisation effects, because it requires an operational definition and measure-
ment of centralisation. As sketched already in section 2.2.2, centralisation is
a multidimensional phenomenon. We will explain this in more detail in the
following section.
2.5.2 Dimensions and Modes of Centralisation
In the simplest case centralisation can be measured as the level of bargaining.
Possible levels are occupation, plant, firm, region, branch, industry, sector,
and the nation.128 Of course, this scheme suffices only if all bargaining is
conducted exclusively at one level and there are only one union and one em-
ployer/employers’ association at this level. (Note that ‘centralisation’ is used
both as generic term summarising all dimensions of centralisation, and in a
special meaning denoting the bargaining level.) Otherwise, if bargaining is
conducted at more levels simultaneously, a considerable number of combi-
nations results. A typical combination in Germany is to partition collective
wage agreements into umbrella agreements (Manteltarifvertra¨ge) and special
agreements. Umbrella agreements, usually negotiated at the industry level,
settle general issues of the labour relation as dismissal notice periods, work-
ing time, length of payed leave etc., while special agreements fix wage rates at
the regional or firm level. Besides that, bargaining levels may differ between
industries.129
In negotiations not taking place at the lowest level, workers and employers
may be represented in principle by more than one union/employers’ associ-
ation. In the United Kingdom firms bargain often with several occupational
unions. Even in Germany some professions were represented by compet-
ing unions, for example the Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft (DAG) and
the Gewerkschaft O¨ffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr (O¨TV).130 The
number of unions/employers’ associations is captured by the term ‘concentra-
tion’, ‘coordination’ captures the degree to wich competing unions coordinate
127The market clearing argument is challenged by some economist. We do not want to
step into that discussion here.
128In some countries, e.g. Italy and France, unions are split furthermore at ideological
or religious dimensions. To the best of our knowledge there exist no attempts to explain
this in the economic literature.
129E.g. Sisson (1987) reports that national level bargaining was established in France in
the 1950s only in chemicals and clothing.
130The situation changed when both unions merged (together with other unions) to
VER.DI.
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their bargaining strategies. The measurement of coordination appears much
more challenging than the measurement of centralisation and concentration.
This is so because coordination can be realised either by writing binding con-
tracts, or tacitly, and tacit collusion detracts itself from observation. Even
visible forms of coordination appear in manifold forms. Vertical (creation
of umbrella organisations) as well as horizontal forms (associations) are pos-
sible. Even similar forms do not necessarily imply a similar distribution of
power. While umbrella organisations in the highly centralised countries pos-
sess sweeping powers, i.e. are able to sign binding contracts on behalf of
their member organisations and have control over strike funds, their func-
tions in decentralised countries (e.g. the USA) are reduced to services for
and exchange of information between the member organisations. The term
‘centralisation’ bears a third meaning special meaning. If it is related exclu-
sively to unions or employers’ associations, it indicates the power of umbrella
organisations .
Finally, the union and employer side show different degrees of concentra-
tion. Unions membership is (in principle) atomistic. employers’ associations
are dominated by large firms since financial contributions depend on the wage
bill.131 A fact often neglected in empirical research is that unions and employ-
ers’ associations may show different levels of centralisation or coordination.
for example, Calmfors & Driffill (1988) neglect coordination/centralisation
at the employer side to a large extent in the definition of their centralisation
index by arguing that high coordination/centralisation on the union side
provokes matching degrees on the employer side. Soskice, 1993 and Layard
et al. (1991) show that this logic does not apply for Japan and Switzerland.
In these countries (especially in Japan), loosely coordinated unions face a
tightly coordinated cartel of employers.
Even this lengthy list does not exhaust all relevant aspects of centralisa-
tion. Already at the beginning of the centralisation debate in the eighties
especially contributions from political science (Schmitter, 1981; Lehmbruch,
1984; Crouch, 1993) pointed to the importance of social partnerships be-
tween unions and employers’ associations. Also governments participate in
various ways directly (e.g. by compulsory arbitration/settlement or indexa-
tion) or indirectly (by providing a legal framework)132 in bargaining. Burda
(1997) tries to formalise the point that inconspicuous details of the interac-
tion between government and the bargaining parties may have considerable
influence on the outcomes. He sketches a simple game where the strategies of
131This does not imply always that voting rights are weighted by contributions. Never-
theless the exit threat of large firms is more powerful.
132The legal framework comprises (inter alia) legal regulations of work councils, peace
clauses, and legalisation of lock-outs and political strikes.
82 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
unions and government are interrelated via unemployment benefits financed
out wage taxes. More specifically, the union determines wages given unem-
ployment replacement ratio and tax rates, and the government determines
the replacement ratio and (implicitly) the tax rate. It is clear that the out-
comes depend on the structure of interaction between the parties, i.e. on
whether they play a Cournot game or a Stackelberg game or optimise their
goals jointly. Burda concludes that the level of bargaining alone delivers
no sufficient information. Newer contributions (Skott, 1997; Cukierman &
Lippi, 1999; Iversen, 1999) put also central banks into the set of relevant
agents.
A further aspect, making the measurement of centralisation more diffi-
cult, regards the relation between organisational structures and goals: They
can be largely independent, i.e. centralised organisations may settle flexible
wage agreements in highly centralised negotiations. A often cited example
are the bargaining institutions in Austria which generate a significantly more
dispersed wage structure than several countries with intermediate levels of
bargaining. In the last decade also German wage setters reduced (in a co-
ordinated manner!) the tightness/frequency of regulations in collective wage
agreements. Bundesministerium (2001, 2001) and Freter (1998) report a sig-
nificant increase of opening and hardship clauses as well as lowered wages for
entrants (Einsteiger-Tarife) in German collective wage agreements. Oppolzer
& Zachert (2000) observe a more subtle form of passive but ‘intentional’ de-
centralisation: Their poll under work councils members and managers reveals
intentional undershooting of wage standards in firms which known to local
union representatives, but not punished. This form of decentralisation is
not captured by indicators of centralisation covering only the structure of
bargaining and bargaining organisations.
2.5.3 Indicators of Centralisation and Coordination
In face of the large number of facets of bargaining, it appears sensible to
record all potentially relevant aspects, to include all these indicators (simul-
taneously) in one regression model, and to select the actually relevant of
them in a ‘horse race’ by applying individual significance tests. Unfortu-
nately, this strategy is not practicable because of small observation numbers
in cross-country studies and high correlation of these indicators (leading to
severe collinearity problems). The first studies (McCallum, 1983; Bruno &
Sachs, 1985; Tarantelli, 1986) are based on 15-20 observations, significantly
larger numbers of observations in current studies (e.g. over 200 in Elmeskov,
Martin, & Scarpetta, 1998) may be misleading since the centralisation indi-
cators show small variability in the time dimension. Furthermore, common
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trends in centralisation (towards decentralisation) cannot be identified by the
(in most cases) ordinal indicators.133 The dominant solution of the dimen-
sionality problem in the literature was to create one-dimensional aggregate
indicators by combining several basic indicators.This introduces some ar-
bitrariness and subjectivity since selection of the relevant basic indicators
and weighting is carried out by the researchers. (Surprisingly, none of the
researchers tried to reduce the number of dimensions by application of factor-
analytic methods. Though also factor-analysis is not free of methodological
problems, it removes subjective evaluations from the construction process.)
We give a rough (but nevertheless tiring) survey of some indicators with
the less ambitious goal to convey an impression of their variability and to
point to the problems implied by them. table ?? gives an impression of the
rankings of bargaining institutions in OECD countries according to some
important centralisation indicators.
More detailed comparisons provide Calmfors & Driffill (1988), OECD
(1997), Kenworthy (2001) and Aidt & Tzannatos (2002). Kenworthy con-
centrates on newer indicators,134 whereas Aidt & Tzannatos (2002) ignore
some newer ones. Unfortunately, a really thorough detailed comparison does
not exist.135 A typical problem with a comparative assessment of the indi-
cators is that (especially if they contain subjective components) the authors
do not indicate exactly why certain countries obtain certain ranks.
The first indicators were created by Blyth (1979), Schmitter (1981),
Crouch (1983), Cameron (1984), Bruno & Sachs (1985), and Tarantelli
(1986). They are based mainly on qualitative information. Blyth (1979) con-
centrates on the dominant level of bargaining and the degree of integration
of unions and employers’ associations via umbrella organisations. Schmit-
ter (1981) and Cameron (1984) build their indicators upon Heady (1970).
Heady’s index aggregates four dimensions: (1) the role of government in bar-
gaining, (2) decision-making of umbrella organisations over strike action, (3)
the relation between staff in umbrella and member organisations, and (4) the
share of funds controlled by umbrella organisations.
Cameron extends this by information on the involvement of umbrella or-
133We will come back to the issue later. It is clear that ordinally scaled indicators cannot
capture common trends if they do not lead to a change of the ranking.
134Some older ones are not even mentioned, though the article is devoted mainly to
a comparison and evaluation of the indicators. Unfortunately, the comparison is some-
what mechanical and less reflective. Kenworthy favours the indicators Iversen (1999) and
Blaschke et al. (2001), failing to recognise that they concentrate on certain aspects of
centralisation.
135All studies sketch the indicators and report the implied country rankings, but do not
report the exact definition of the indicators.
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OECD (1994,1997) CD TAR JLN
CENT COOR COMB UCO ECO
Austria 2 3 3 1 1 3 3
Belgium 2 2 2 8 7 2 2
Germany 2 3 3 6 2 2 3
Denmark 3↘ 2 3 3 4 4 3 3
France 2 2 2 11 9 2 2
Finland 3↘ 2 2 3↘ 2 5 6 3 3
Italy 1, 3 (92) 2, 3 (92) 1, 3 (92) 13 12 2 1
Netherlands 2 2,3 (82) 2, 3 (82) 7 6 2 2
Sweden 3↘ 2 3↘ 1, 2 (91) 3↘ 2 3 4 3 3
UK 2↘ 1 1 2↘ 1 12 11 1 1
Switzerland 2 2 2 15 3 1 3
Norway 3 3 3 2 4 3 3
Australia 2, 1 (88) 2, 1 (88) 2, 1 (88) 10 6 2 1
Canada 1 1 1 17 7 1 1
Japan 1 3 1 14 3 2 2
New Zealand 2,1 (91) 1 2,1 (91) 9 8 2 1
USA 1 1 1 16 7 1 1
Sources: OECD (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Layard et al.
(1991).
Note: Since we present the OECD indicator values as reference for our strike incidence
estimations, we report here the recoded values from Elmeskov et al. (1998) instead of the
original indicator values from OECD (1994,1997). The reason is that the OECD tables
show intermediate values (e.g. 2+) in some cases which ‘cancel out’ after recoding into
three dummy variables.
Legend:
The notation x ↘ y indicates a gradual change of the indicator value from x to y. The
notation x, y(z) indicates a ‘jump’ change of the indicator value from x to y in year 19z.
Shorthands
CD Calmfors & Driffill ranking (1988)
TAR Tarantelli’s (1986) corporatism indicator
JLN Jackman et al. (1991)
CENT centralisation indicator
COOR coordination indicator
COMB combined indicator (CENT ∪ COOR)
UCO union coordination
ECO employer coordination
Table 2.3: Synopsis of some centralisation indicators
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ganisations in wage bargaining, veto power of umbrella organisations, and
union density. All information contained in these indicators is restricted
almost exclusively to the worker side. Crouch (1985) accounts also for coor-
dination of employers.136
The indicator most often used in empirical studies seems to be Calmfors
& Driffill (1988). It is defined as sum of two basic indicators: The first one
represents the (dominant) level of bargaining and takes on values 1,2, and
3 for the firm, industry, and national level.137 The second one captures the
number of dominating unions in each level and the extent of coordination
between them (Calmfors & Driffill, 1988, p. 53). Layard et al. (1991) modify
the index by accounting for Soskice’s objection that informal coordination
on the employer side is hardly taken into account.
In the nineties the list was extended by some indicators representing cen-
tralisation in a very detailed manner. For example, Golden & Wallerstein
(1996, 2000) distinguish 15 categories of government involvement in bargain-
ing. Iversen (1999) constructs a metric index by combining union concen-
tration measures (similar to the Herfindahl index) for three bargaining levels
(firm, industry, nation).138 Though this strategy generates a highly objective
measure, it is confined exclusively to union concentration, which also may
be biased significantly. For example, the (mainly descriptive) literature139 on
union mergers documents 143 trade union mergers over the period 1900–1978
in the United States (Chaison, 1986). This tendency has increased: alone
57 mergers are observed in the much shorter period 1980–1994 (Chaison,
1996). Nevertheless, in many cases this seems to reflect rather union struggles
against declining membership and administrative cost increases rather than
the longing for stronger bargaining coordination and bargaining power.140
Besides that, attempts have been made (e.g. OECD, 1994, 1997) to iso-
late individual dimensions (barganing level, coordination, and potential of
conflict). Several studies (e.g. OECD, 1997) use also union density and cov-
erage as separate indicators. The rationale for this is based on the distinction
between the structure of institutions/organisations and their significance for
labour market outcomes: A highly centralised bargaining system does not
136Other used characteristics in his indicator are: centralisation of unions, autonomy of
plants in negotiations, and existence/importance of work councils.
137They do not comment the neglect of other levels (occupation, region). Calmfors &
Driffill denote this index as ‘coordination level within central organizations’. Main sources
for the classification are Flanagan et al. (1983) und Faxen (1986).
138A detailed description of the index can be read fromIversen (1999) on page 83
139For a short survey see Michelson (2000).
140Only micro-econometric studies were able to disentangle these effects. The macro-
econometric studies just convert the direction of causality, i.e. explain union mergers by
changes of wage rates, and are therefore less useful.
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matter much if the wage agreements cover only a small share of gross employ-
ment in a country. E.g. Katz (1993) interprets the drop of union density as
decentralisation. A nice feature of union density and coverage are that they
are more suitable to capture continuous changes of centralisation, whereas
other institutions change only in discrete steps. However, also these mea-
sures are flawed.141 Firstly, the impact of a collective wage agreement of one
industry/branch on others does not necessarily depend on its size. A small
industry with highly productive firms may – under high competitive pres-
sure on the labour market – exert considerable influence on wages in other
industries. Secondly, the meaning of these indicators depends on the institu-
tional framework. In some countries (statutory) unemployment insurance is
administered by the government directly, in others it is managed by unions
or by union-dominated administrations with support of the government. The
first type is dubbed Non-Ghent, the second Ghent system.142 Clearly union
density is biased by workers entering unions only in order to obtain un-
employment insurance. Furthermore union density may depend directly on
labour market conditions in Ghent systems since unemployment insurance
requires membership in some countries. Because of this workers enter unions
if they expect a downswing. Furthermore, the insurance provision put unions
in a good basis for the recruitment of members. It is clear that this biases the
information contained in union density and coverage. Surprisingly, empirical
studies do not try to account for this by interacting union density measures
with a Ghent-dummy.
Though aggregated indicators emphasise different aspects of centralisa-
tion, they show considerably high correlation among themselves. Teulings &
Hartog (1998), Table 1.1, and OECD (1997), Table 3.3 find correlation coef-
ficients between about 0.7 and 0.9 for the most commonly used indicators.143
Most indicators have effectively at most ordinal scale level.144 Because
141Flanagan (1999), p. 1172, is extremely pessimistic: “Union density captures neither
the scope nor the intensity of union influence and union coverage does not capture bar-
gaining power. Indexes of corporatism obscure more information than they reveal, and
should be supplanted by explicit modelling of and tests for institutional interactions.”
142Non-Ghent- systems prevail in the United Kingdom, Austria and Germany (Rothstein,
1992), Ghent systems in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. In Belgium (where it
was ‘invented’), Norway, and the Netherlands Ghent systems wer put under government
administration. In Belgium, however, unions kept some voice and duties. In Italy Spain,
Portugal and Greece, comprehensive compulsory unemployment insurance systems do not
exist. (Ferrera, 1996); see also Booth et al. (2001).
143Kenworthy (2001) obtains in a comparison of 14 indicators correlations between 0.22
und 0.94. (The minimum value 0.22 is an outlier; most other values are greater than 0.5.
Unfortunately Kenworthy does not indicate the type of the applied measure of correlation
(Spearman / Bravais-Pearson).
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of this, they can be used in regression models only after recoding them into
dummy variables.145 Besides the implied loss of information, recoding re-
quires a partition of the countries into groups and therefore introduces some
arbitrariness146 We will show in the following sections that significantly dif-
ferent estimation results can be produced with the indicators despite the
comparatively high correlation among them.147
We close this short discussion with the result that a definitive assessment
of the validity and reliability of the indicators is not possible in face of the
high dimensionality and complexity of centralisation. The treatment and
use of the indicators in the literature provokes some critique, however. Some
applications raise the suspicion that an indicator was tailored (unconsciously)
to obtain certain results, since the evidence found with the original indicator
vanishes if it is substituted by another one, which claims to capture similar
aspects of centralisation.148
There exist some attempts to compare the impact of several indicators
by including them alternately into regression equations. Unfortunately this
procedure has not become a standard. Several contributions (Calmfors &
Driffill, 1988; OECD, 1997; Booth et al., 2001; Kenworthy, 2001; Layard
et al., 1991) provide synoptical tables of indicators, but papers (e.g. Layard
et al., 1991; Golden et al., 1993) containing indicators together with all infor-
mation necessary to replicate the computation of index values are extremely
rare.
2.5.4 Empirical Studies on the Effects of Centralisa-
tion on Unemployment and Inflation
144This means that the give a unambiguous ranking of countries with respect to central-
isation but do not allow to interpret distances between positions of the ranking.
145The linear regression model requires metric or binary regressors.
146We will report some studies below which disregard the scale issue, i.e. they include
the indicators directly into regression models. This may render the interpretation of the
results worthless.
147Amusing but worthless result produces Kenworthy (2001). He compares several indi-
cators in a regression model explaining unemployment rates by an indicator of centrali-
sation, an indictor for central bank independence, and some control variables (the model
specification follows Franzese & Hall (1998)). He finds (and comments at some length)
that the effects of centralisation on unemployment depend highly on the choice of the
indicator. However, he includes some older ordinal indicators without recoding them, and
consequently should not be surprised to obtain senseless results. Nevertheless, an alarming
result of his investigation is that even the signs of centralisation coefficients differ in the
regressions.
148Soskice’s (1990) critique of Calmfors & Driffill (1988) serves as a good example. We
will come back to it below.
88 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
First Empirical Approaches
The first empirical attempts to compute macroeconomic effects of centralisa-
tion were confined almost exclusively to graphical analysis and computations
of bivariate correlations.
Crouch (1985) computes the correlation of indicators for macroeconomic
performance (inflation, Okun’s misery index,149 and the change of inflation
in the sixties and seventies) with union density. Tarantelli (1986) regresses
Okun’s misery index on a self-created indicator for corporatism150 and finds a
negative relation, pointing to positive effects of centralisation.151 The scatter-
plot in his paper suggests a linear relation between Okun’s misery index and
his indicator of corporatism.152 Bruno & Sachs (1985) and Crouch (1985)
obtain similar results with Crouch’s indicator of centralisation.
The only application using strike activity as a regressor variable is Mc-
Callum (1983). He finds that strike incidence (measured as log of days lost
per thousand workers, averaged over the period 1950–1969) has a highly pos-
itive significant impact on inflation rates (averages for the period 1973–1979).
Contrarily the indicator of centralisation (corporatism) of Crouch (1983) has
a negatively significant impact.153
All these early contributions suffer at least from one of two basic problems.
The are either confined to bivariate correlations (which do not deliver the
relevant partial effects) or they treat ordinal indicators of centralisation like
metric variables.
The direct strategy of studying relations between centralisation and wages
is pursued by Agell & Lommerud (1987). They estimate wage equations for
the period 1965–1983 with time series data for Germany, Japan, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the USA and find a positive effect of an indicator
for worker militancy on real wages. Unfortunately, the definition of the
militancy indicator (growth of world-wide union density) is not very specific
and appears to represent essentially a trend variable. Very general is also
their definition of a corporatism indicator, which has negative effects on wages
149The Okun index is defined as (unweighted) sum of unemployment and inflation rate.
150The index is used also in Layard et al. (1991).
151The used data set contains averages of inflation and unemployment rates for the
periods 68-73,74-79, und 80-83. Included countries are Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Germany, Finland, France, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Sweden,
and the USA.
152It is remarkable that Calmfors & Driffill (1988) did not include his index in their
synoptic table containing five other indicators.
153Further control variables are lagged inflation rates (1971–1972), mean per capita
growth rate of GDP (1972–1978), average growth rate of money supply (1972–1978), and
its standard deviation.
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in some countries. Additionally, replication studies of the paper show that
the outcomes respond sensitively to changes of the corporatism indicator.
Bean, Layard, & Nickell (1986) use a similar approach, splitting the anal-
ysis in two steps. In the first step they estimate wage equations. Then they
compute correlations between the coefficients (of the unemployment variable)
from these equations and Crouch’s indicator of corporatism, and find that
real wages respond faster to unemployment rate changes in countries with a
high degree of corporatism.
The Hump-Shape Hypothesis
The most influential contribution to the debate on centralisation seems to
be Calmfors & Driffill (1988). The authors test their hump-shape hypothesis
(sketched in section 2.4.1) by correlating several indicators of economic per-
formance (employment rate, unemployment rate, and Okun’s misery index)
with their own and Cameron’s (1984) indicator of centralisation.
According to the hump-shape hypothesis unemployment is higher with
intermediate levels of bargaining than with completely decentralised or cen-
tralised bargaining. (In a visualisation of the relation in a diagram with the
bargaining level on the x-axis and unemployment on the y-axis, the graph
is hump-shaped.) Consequently, we should observe a small and insignificant
rank correlation between the unemployment rate and an indicator of central-
isation which increases monotonically with the bargaining level. This should
change if the indicator is reflected at the center, i.e. if rank numbers increase
in the transition from decentralised to intermediate levels and decrease in
the transition from intermediate levels to full centralisation. The empiri-
cal rank correlations, computed with OECD data (averages for the period
(1974–1985) confirm this hypothesis.
Calmfors & Driffill account for the scaling problem by computing rank
correlations. This, however, forces them to restrict the analysis to bivariate
relationships, and thus solves one problem at the cost of the ability to obtain
partial effects by inclusion of control variables. It is clear (and often shown in
applications of regression analysis) that nonlinearity may appear spuriously
if relevant variables are omitted from a regression relation. Thus the hump-
shape may be simply an artifact, created by an reduction of the dimension.
Calmfors & Driffill’s work initiated a controversial debate and a large
number of empirical investigations. We will present and discuss important
arguments and results from this debate, but cannot claim to be exhaustive.154
154Other surveys dealing with the issue are Flanagan (1999), Aidt & Tzannatos (2002)
and Booth et al. (2001). Our presentation differs from the latter two works by greater
emphasis on the involved methodological problems.
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Evidence and Critique Concerning the Hump-Shape Hypothesis
The first critique regarding the construction of the index was formulated
already in the discussion following the first presentation of the paper. Gi-
avazzi (1988) argues that Italy and Switzerland were classified incorrectly
as decentralised.155 Additionally he demands to account for consent between
unions and employers as in Tarantelli’s (1986) indicator. As mentioned above,
Tarantelli’s Index shows a linear relation with unemployment.
Soskice (1990) provides a systematic investigation of Calmfors & Driffill’s
Index and shows in a suggestive scatter plot that the hump-shape vanishes it
the two ‘outliers’ Japan and Switzerland are removed from the sample. Calm-
fors & Driffill classify these countries as highly decentralised. According to
Soskice bargaining is well coordinated there because of a highly coordinated
network of employers’ associations and networks. In Switzerland coordina-
tion takes place in an employer-dominated arbitration system156, in Japan
through informal wage cartels consisting of a small number of large firms
(Shirai, 1984; Tachibanaki & Noda, 1996). As mentioned above, Calmfors &
Driffill neglect centralisation/coordination on the employer side arguing that
high centralisation on the union side provokes similar levels on the employer
side.
Soskice also does not agree with the classification of other countries (Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, and Italy) in the centralisation ranking.
Wage agreements are settled formally at the regional level in Germany and
the Netherlands. In practice, however, regional units simply adapt industry
level agreements without significant changes. Similar arguments apply for
Italy and France. Additionally, the Italian labour market shows a peculiar-
ity which may produce considerable bias. Soskice suggests that the Italian
labour market is effectively separated. Wages are set effectively in the North
while unemployment resides in the South. He constructs an alternative rank
indicator which combines several dimensions of centralisation in an eclectic
manner: Formal coordination is decisive in Austria, Norway and Sweden.
Employer coordination is decisive in Japan and Switzerland, and informal
coordination across regional and industry borders matter in Germany and
the Netherlands. Though he applies no unified ‘neutral’ definition, his cate-
gorisation is justified and explained in detail. This fact makes his index more
accessible than many other indicators (including Calmfors & Driffill’s).
Soskice’s critique is confirmed indirectly by Golden (1993). Using data
from Calmfors & Driffill (1988), she compares several indicators with respect
155We will explain the reasons below
156An interesting anecdote regarding the issue is that unions bound themselves by con-
tract to abstain from strikes and that these contracts are renewed in the last years.
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to their explanatory power (measured as coefficient of determination R2) in
a bivariate unemployment regression.157 In a first step she compares the
explanatory power of elementary indicators, measuring only union concen-
tration and coordination,158 with the composite Calmfors-Driffill- Index and
finds that they do better. Further comparisons reveal that Soskice’s index
dominates the elementary ones.
Jackman et. al. (1991) The results in Layard et al. (1991) can be in-
terpreted as further indirect critique of Calmfors & Driffill. In a structural
empirical model (estimated with cross section data of 20 OECD countries)
the authors find that measures of coordination are more significant than the
indicator of Calmfors & Driffill. In the first step (of a two step procedure)
they obtain the impact of unemployment on real wages in a wage regres-
sion. This coefficient is then (together with the unemployment replacement
ratio and the duration of unemployment benefits) sequentially regressed on
several indicators of centralisation: To the monotone and reflected indica-
tor of Calmfors & Driffill, to Tarantelli’s (1986) indicator, to an indicator
of employer coordination, to an indicator of union coordination, and to the
average durations of strikes. While the monotone indicator of Calmfors &
Driffill creates a significant effect, the reflected does not. Furthermore the
coordination measures produce more precise estimates that the Calmfors &
Driffill indicator. Of course the reliability of their results is questionable,
since they treat all ordinal indicators as metric variables in the regressions.
Fitzenberger & Franz (1994) The papers of Fitzenberger & Franz
(1994) and Fitzenberger (1995) relate to effects of centralisation in a more
general fashion.159 The value of their contribution seems to be derived more
from its methodological innovation rather than from the contestable and un-
clear results. The authors try to obtain empirical evidence on the effects of
bargaining institutions without usage of the problematic indicators of cen-
tralisation. To this aim they use the direct approach (mentioned in section
2.5.1) to estimate wage equations with time series data160 on industry level
data (13 industries) for 7 countries161 of the European Union. The change of
157The coefficient of determination represents the share of variance of the dependent
variable explained by the regressors.
158Die used measures are components of the indicators of Cameron (1984) und Schmitter
(1981). They represent the number and power of union umbrella organisations.
159Fitzenberger (1995) is, with respect to methodological issues, identical with Fitzen-
berger & Franz (1994), but is based on a larger and more reliable data set. We will discuss
only the earlier work, since it is confirmed by the later in almost every respect.
160Period lengths range between 10 and 27 (depending on country).
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wages is regressed to its lag, the change of unemployment rates, productivity,
prices, an error correction term (representing the long run relationship), and
several control dummies162
Within this framework two strategies are suggested to obtain evidence on
the effects of bargaining institutions (centralisation) on wage setting.
1. If the specification allows coefficients to differ between countries, it can
be tested whether the coefficients differ between countries. For exam-
ple, the impact of the lagged unemployment rate on wage changes is
negatively significant and similar across countries or not. Furthermore
– according to the authors – they show no clear relation with central-
isation levels. A similar result applies for the speed of adjustment to
macroeconomic shocks.
2. In an alternative specification coefficients are allowed to differ across
industries. This allows to check the significance of deviations of individ-
ual industry-effects from an average effect. The authors find that wage
setting is considerably uniform across industries in all countries and
interpret this as evidence against significant institutional differences.
Besides several methodological problems163 the indirect form of evidence
seems problematic. Especially the power164 (the authors keep the null hy-
pothesis!) of the joint tests of industry coefficient differences may be small
because of the high number of coefficients to be estimated.
Scarpetta (1996) A (methodologically flawed) rehabilitation of Calmfors
& Driffill’s position comes from Scarpetta (1996). He explains unemployment
rates by indicators of centralisation, the output gap,165 average unemploy-
ment replacement ratios, an indicator for employment security regulations,
161Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and United Kingdom.
162For example, a Thatcher-dummy for the United Kingdom or dummies for center-left
governments.
163The discussants Burda and Mo¨ller point to unresolved identification problems, ob-
ject that aggregated unemployment seem not be a valid regressor, and that (at least in
theoretical models) wages do not depend on unemployment if unemployment benefits are
proportional to wages (Manning, 1995). This may generate a severe identification problem
in the empirical application.
164The power denotes the probability, to reject a false hypothesis. The determination
of the power of a test is extremely involved in multivariate analyses, cf. Davidson &
MacKinnon (1993), chapter 12.
165defined as the relative deviation of actual output from potential output (i.e. the output
attainable with full employment of all production factors.)
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union density and expenditures for active labour market policy (as percent-
age of GDP). Indicators of centralisation are included in three alternative
specifications. The first one contains the both OECD indicators for union
and employer coordination. Both, employer as well as union coordination
reduce unemployment. However, only the employer effect is significant (sig-
nificance level below 1%). The second specification contains the sum of both
indicators. Not surprisingly, the ‘joint’ effect is again highly significant (sig-
nificance level below 1%). In the third specification – it contains Calmfors &
Driffill’s indicator both linear and squared, Scarpetta finds weak evidence in
favour of the hump-shape Hypothesis. The linear term is significant positive
(significance level below 1%), the squared term weakly significant (signifi-
cance level between 5 and 10%) negative. If unemployment is replaced by
long term unemployment, the squared term becomes insignificant. The inves-
tigation, however, suffers from inadequate treatment of the ordinal indicators
in regression analysis.
OECD (1997) This study holds an outsider position since it finds no sig-
nificant effects of centralisation on unemployment. It tries to present itself
as a replication of earlier contributions (mainly Calmfors & Driffill, 1988),
but does not fully meet this requirement. The researchers provide a synop-
tical table of the most important indicators166, proceed then, however, by
using exclusively their own OECD (1994) indicators: (1) an indicator for
centralisation, (2) and indicator for bargaining coordination, (3) a combined
index of centralisation and coordination, (4) union density, and (5) union
coverage. They point to high rank correlations between their own and other
centralisation indicators,167 but do not try to trace the reasons for the crucial
differences between the results of their predecessors and their own.
The study starts with computations of rank correlations between central-
isation indicators and measures of macroeconomic performance (unemploy-
ment rate, employment rate, inflation rate, growth of real wages, and wage
dispersion) separately for the time periods 1978–1982, 1988-1992 and 1992-
1996. Neither the monotone nor the reflected indicators show considerable
correlations.
Unclear are also the results from the regression studies, where the per-
formance measures are explained (in multivariate regressions) by the above
indicators. The researchers treat the scale-level problem of the indicators by
166See p. 73. It contains Soskice (1990), Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Bruno & Sachs
(1985), Blyth (1979), Schmitter (1981), Cameron (1984), Tarantelli (1986), Lehmbruch
(1984), Crepaz & Lijphart (1991), and Layard et al. (1991).
167the rank correlation measures between the indicators are about 0.8.
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sorting the countries into three groups (low, intermediate and high central-
isation) and defining dummy variables for intermediate and high centralisa-
tion. Although they include no further control variables except time period
dummies, an implicit elimination of cyclical fluctuations is realised by using
five-year averages (1978–1982, 1988-1992 and 1992-1996) of all variables.168
With this recoding of the centralisation indicators, the Calmfors-Driffill hy-
pothesis predicts a significant positive coefficient for the intermediate group
dummy. Furthermore, the high group dummy should have a insignificant
or negative impact. If its effect is significant positive, it must at least be
significantly lower than the intermediate group coefficient.
The only significant results from the regressions are, however, a signif-
icantly lower unemployment rate (significance level is 10%) of highly cen-
tralised countries and a significantly lower (level is 5%) inflation rate. None
of the five regressions is in favour of the hump-shape hypothesis. The only
really stable and highly significant findings (level less equal 1%) are negative
effects of centralisation on wage dispersion. Finally we should mention that
the results are checked for robustness by jackknife outlier search methods
and that they do not respond sensitively to small changes of the estima-
tion sample.169 The only noteworthy effect of the elimination of observations
with high leverage is an increase of the negative effect of centralisation on
unemployment becomes significant at the 5% level.
In a last very preliminary analysis changes of unemployment and em-
ployment rates are regressed on changes of union density, coverage, and a
dummy for decentralisation (i.e. a change towards decentralisation). Coun-
tries where bargaining institutions became more decentralised in the last
decade did worse than the rest, i.e. they had to accept a higher decrease of
employment rates than the base group (with constant degree of centralisa-
tion). However, the effect is only marginally significant (at the 10% level).
Further Studies Other investigations, basing on partially very similar
specifications, indicate on the whole positive effects of centralisation on em-
ployment, but give no conclusive evidence regarding the hump-shape hypoth-
esis.
Centralisation effects depend highly on the used centralisation indica-
tor in Bleany (1996).170 Significant negative (monotone) effects (of cen-
168Of course, the centralisation indicators are constant within periods, but may change
between. Changes are, however, rare.
169They apply studentised residuals test und leverage tests, see Annex 3.B of the study.
Introductions to the methods are contained in Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch (1980) and Atkinson
& Riani (2000).
170His regressions are based on 17 observations (17 OECD countries) for the period
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tralisation on the unemployment rate) result from the indicators of Bruno
& Sachs (1985) and an index combining Bruno-Sachs and Calmfors-Driffill.
This is not the case for a specification with linear and squared terms of the
Calmfors-Driffill indicator.171 Unfortunately, Bleany does not report whether
the monotone specifications of the both other indicators are found by statis-
tical tests or were simply imposed a priori. He also does not comment on
the treatment of the ordinal indicators as metric variables.
Nickell (1997) and Layard & Nickell (1999)172 regress the (log) unemploy-
ment rate on an indicator for union density173 the coverage rate, the sum of
two indicators on union and employer coordination, and several control vari-
ables174 The used data relate to the periods (1983–1988 and 1989–1994) and
20 OECD countries. Since cyclical fluctuation bias is eliminated by gener-
ation of 6 year averages, 40 observations remain for the estimations. The
authors find highly significant positive effects of density and coverage and a
highly significant negative effects of the coordination index. Unfortunately,
they do not find it worthwhile to tell the reader whether the monotonic effects
of centralisation indicators were tested or imposed.
Baker, Glyn, Howell, & Schmitt (2002) note that the effects of the indi-
cators are surprisingly high. For example, the unemployment rate increases
by 2.3 percentage points if the coverage index increases from low (values be-
low 25%) to high (values above 75%). The corresponding (highly significant)
effect in the OECD study is about 0.045 percentage points!175 Apparently
the log-linear specification was imposed. (Though it is a simple task to test
for its validity in the framework of a Box-Cox transformation.)
Elmeskov et al. (1998) and Haffner, Nickell, Nicoletti, Scarpetta, & Zoega
(2001) adopt the data and the sensible dummy variable recoding176 from
1983–1989 (all variables are averaged).
171Both coefficients have expected signs but are insignificant.
172Data and specifications in both papers are almost identical. Layard & Nickell (1999)
contains the owner occupation rate as additional regressor.
173the range of possible density rates [0, 1] is partitioned into 4 subintervals. Countries
with density in [0, 0.25] obtain indicator value 1, countries in [0.25, 0.5] indicator value 2
and so on.
174The coordination indicators are described in Layard et al. (1991), p. 419. Control
variables are the tax wedge, an indicator for employment protection regulations, the un-
employment replacement rate, an indicator for active labour market policy, and the change
of the inflation rate.
175Coverage enters the (linear) regression directly in the OECD study. Thus we have
multiplied the coefficient from 0.075 with the difference of coverage rates 0.8 − 0.2 to
obtain a comparable effect. If the means (0.875 and 0.125) of the high and low coverage
intervals are used, the effect increases slightly to 0.056. Interval means are, however,
no sensible approximations, since coverage rates are not distributed evenly within the
subintervals. cf. OECD (1997), table 3.3.
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OECD (1997) and extend the considered time period to 1983–1995 (1982–
1995 in Haffner et al., 2001). The studies differ mainly with respect to the
dependent variable. (Elmeskov et al. (1998) explain unemployment rates,
Haffner et al. (2001) employment rates), but the regressors are almost iden-
tical.177
Haffner et al. (2001) find a significant hump-shaped effect of the combined
(centralisation & coordination) OECD indicator. Countries with intermedi-
ate levels of centralisation have, ceteris paribus, a significantly lower (on
the 1% significance level) employment rate than decentralised ones, highly
centralised countries have a weakly significantly higher (at the 10% level)
one. The evidence in Elmeskov et al. (1998) is less clear. A hump-shape ap-
pears for the combined OECD indicator and (less significant) for the OECD
centralisation indicator. unemployment is 0.66% higher in intermediate and
0.79% lower in highly centralised countries (each coefficient significant at
the 10% level) with the centralisation indicator. The respective coefficients
for the combined indicator are 0.61 (10% level) and -1.39 (1% level). But
the coordination indicator generates a monotone and significantly negative
effect on unemployment. Both papers contradict the results from the ear-
lier OCED study. This is surprising since the authors apparently know the
OECD study178
An eye-catching cause for the differences might be the higher observa-
tion numbers in the later studies. OECD (1997) is based on 57, Elmeskov
et al. (1998) and Haffner et al. (2001) on 238 and 223 observations, respec-
tively. The explanation that the insignificance of the OECD results comes
from lower observation numbers is nevertheless conclusive. All studies cover
the same period (1983–1994) and the same sample of countries (19 or 20).
The later studies gained observation numbers simply by abandoning period
averaging (i.e. using yearly data). Of course, the increase in observation
numbers is in a bad relation to the increase of information, since the cen-
tralisation indicators show minor variation in the time dimension179 (i.e. are
almost constant over time). Furthermore, averaging appears as a sensible
176Centralisation indicators are taken directly from OECD (1997).
177The following regressors appear in both publications: unemployment replacement rate,
an employment security indicator, output gap, and the tax wedge. Elmeskov et al. (1998)
additionally contains an indicator for active labour market policy, Haffner et al. (2001)
additionally contains the share of public sector employment in gross employment (private
and public).
178Two of the authors (Elmeskov and Scarpetta) are (or were) employed at the concerned
OECD department! Unfortunately we have no access to the data and can therefore only
suspect about the reasons for the different findings.
179According to the tables in Elmeskov et al. (1998), only 6 changes of centralisation
indicator values occurred in the 12 year period with 19 countries
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method to remove cyclical fluctuation. Nevertheless it may leave some bias
if averaging ranges do not match business cycle turning points, and it may
shallow information. The alternative to averaging (used in the latter studies)
is to capture business cycle effects by including a proxy for cyclical fluctu-
ation (the output gap) into the regression equation and/or application of
the Prais-Winsten transformation. All methods may leave serial correlation
in the residuals. Though a test for serial correlation of the residuals were
possible (and straightforward), both latter studies fail to check for this.180
A further econometric problem not dealt with concerns contemporaneous
correlation between countries. This form of correlation appears if certain
macroeconomic shocks (or relevant variables which are not included in the
estimated equation) hit some countries symmetrically. Beck & Katz (1995)
show in a simulation study that standard errors may by underestimated by
more than 200% in small samples if one fails to correct for contemporaneous
correlation when computing the covariance matrix of the regression coeffi-
cients.181
A further possible reason for the differences is the use of additional control
variables in the latter studies. This extension is, of course, in favour of the
latter studies. Again, we can make no clear statement regarding this point
without inspection of the data.
Evidence on Extensions of the Hump-Shape Hypothesis: Interac-
tion Effects
We sketched some models extending the Calmfors-Driffill framework by
analysing interactions between unions and the government (via taxation and
the legal/institutional environment), and between unions and central banks
in sections 2.4.3, 2.4.5, and 2.4.4 above. Some of these extensions have cru-
cial implications for the empirical estimation and testing of the hump-shape
hypothesis. This is the case because they imply that the sign and/or the
shape of the relation between decentralisation and unemployment (or real
wages etc.) depends on further economic variables, e.g. monetary policy
and the institutional framework. Consequently, regression equations are not
specified correctly if they do not account for these interactions. At best,
the centralisation coefficients from non-interacted specifications represent a
180Once serial correlation is detected, it can be eliminated by inclusion of a lagged en-
dogenous variable or (more easy and robust) by application of the Prais-Winsten trans-
formation.
181Elmeskov et al. (1998) apparently do not compute correlation-corrected standard er-
rors (though the procedures are straightforward and meanwhile have found their way into
econometrics textbooks e.g Greene, 2000, section 13.9).
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‘mean’ effect for different regimes.
Econometric Measurement of Interactions All applications in the fol-
lowing sections use interaction terms in regressions, making it worthwhile to
introduce the concept briefly for readers not acquainted with it.
Interaction terms are simply products of two182 regressors. Consider the
regression equation
u = b0 + b1 z1 + b2 z2 + b3 z1 z2 + x β + 
where x denotes a vector of other regressors and  denotes a residual. The
interaction term z1 z2 allows for interaction effects, i.e. the effects of z1 and
z2 on the dependent variable u depend on the coefficient of the interaction
term b3 and the value of the other regressor, e.g ∂y/∂z1 = b1 + b3 z2. Now
let z1 represent a (metric) indicator of centralisation in bargaining, and z2
a (metric) indicator of central bank independence. Then, if the signs of b1
and b3 differ) the effect of centralisation on unemployment may change its
sign, depending on the level of central bank independence. A hump-shape
effect of centralisation on unemployment for a given monetary regime can,
of course, be identified only if an interaction term containing the square of
z1 is added (i.e. · · ·+ b4 z21 z2 + . . . ).
If only a categorial or ordinal centralisation indicator is available, it has
to be recoded into dummy variables. Then at least three dummies (corre-
sponding to low, intermediate and high degrees of centralisation) are required
to identify a hump-shape. Consider the equation
u = (blo dlo + bm dm + bhi dhi) τ + x β + ,
where dlo, dm, dhi denote dummies for countries with a low, intermediate, and
high level of centralisation,183 and τ denotes the tax rate. In this case, the ef-
fect of taxation on employment is hump-shaped with respect to centralisation
if blo < bm and bm > bhi.
Gruber, Summers, & Vergara (1993) Their model, sketched in section
2.4.3, predicts that the distortionary effect of wage taxes on labour supply
decreases with increasing levels of centralisation. This prediction is directly
testable. The authors conduct a test by regressing the log of relative labour
182In general, more than two regressors may be involved. Since all applications considered
below use only interactions between two regressors, we confine ourselves to this case here.
183More precisely, dlo takes on value 1 if centralisation level is low, and on value 0
otherwise. dm and dhi are defined analogously.
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supply (measured as hours worked divided by potential hours of work) on the
wage tax rate (measured as labour income tax revenues divided by GDP),
the centralisation indicator of Calmfors & Driffill (1988), an interaction term
of the tax rate and the indicator, and a control variable.184 An estimation
of the model with OECD country data for the period 1980–1984 and 1965–
1984 delivers moderately significant interaction terms (at the 5% significance
level) for the second period, but not for the first and for the pooled (both
periods) data.185 In order to eliminate bias due to the ordinal scale of the
centralisation indicator, they define one centralisation dummy, taking on
value 1 for Austria, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and 0 for the other
countries in the sample (Canada, United States, Switzerland, and Japan),
and find a significant coefficient for the interaction between this dummy and
the tax rate. On the whole, their findings are far away from being robust or
stable.
Alesina & Perotti (1997) Alesina & Perotti’s model implies a hump-
shaped relationship of taxation on wages with respect to centralisation, i.e.
effects of taxation on wages are most pronounced in countries with interme-
diate bargaining levels. The authors test their theoretical model with a panel
of 14 OECD countries for the period 1965–1990. They regress unit labour
costs on interaction terms between the share of tax revenue in GDP and three
dummies indicating the level of wage setting.186 Total factor productivity, the
ratio of government consumption and the ratio of nonwage government con-
sumption serve as control variables. (Country specific individual effects are
eliminated since all variables enter the model log-differenced.) In accordance
with their theoretical predictions, only the intermediate bargaining level in-
teraction term is significant and of considerable size. (coefficients relating
to the centralised, intermediate, and decentralised countries are about 0.2,
0.7, and 0.5187). Furthermore, it is statistically (1% level) different from the
coefficient relating to decentralised countries and marginally different (10%
level) from the centralised countries.
184Union density, the share of public employment and the output gap enter the regression
in different specifications.
185To eliminate bias, only data relating to manufacturing were used, since unions play a
dominant role in manufacturing.
186They use the index of Calmfors & Driffill (1988). The dummy indicating a high
degree of centralisation takes on value unity for Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland.
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands build the intermediate bargaining level group, and
the low level countries are Canada, Japan, Italy, France, Australia and the USA.
187Especially the coefficients for the decentralised countries differ considerably between
specifications. The minimum value is -0.19, the maximum value is 0.11.
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Daveri & Tabellini (2000) Daveri & Tabellini (hereafter D & T) find sim-
ilar evidence in regressions of the unemployment rate on interaction terms of
labour tax rates and centralisation dummies, and control variables.188 They
arrange countries with respect to centralisation in three groups, Anglo-Saxon
(Canada, Japan, USA, and UK), continental-European (Australia [!], Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain) and nordic countries
(Finland Norway, Sweden),189 and find again that effects of tax rates on un-
employment are highly significant only for the continental European coun-
tries. The size of the effects is relatively large, between 0.3 and 0.5 (depending
on the specification). Since tax rates are measured in percent, this means
that an increase of the tax rate by one percentage point leads to an increase
of unemployment by 0.3 - 0.5 percentage points.
The stability of their estimation coefficients with respect to estimation
methods is intriguing. They estimate specifications with levels and differ-
enced variables, apply moving average correction, allow for country-specific
constants, and add lagged policy variables. However, the standard errors
reported in their tables may be biased significantly. Firstly, they use FGLS
estimation procedures which may be biased severely in small samples (as was
shown by Beck & Katz (1995) in a simulation study). Secondly, they appar-
ently do not apply a correction procedure (accounting for contemporaneous
correlation) for the standard errors.
In the ensuing discussion Bentilola (2000) stresses that the coefficients
in D & T’s estimations exceed the effects found by Blanchard & Wolfers
(1999)190 by a factor of about 15. It is hard to explain this by the fact that
Blanchard & Wolfers (hereafter B & W) do not interact the tax rate with
a centralisation index and thus restrict the coefficients to be equal across
all countries. This should produce an effect ranging somewhere between the
maximum and minimum effects obtained by D & T. He agrees to the ex-
planation put forward by D & T, that B & W do not exploit time series
variation since their estimation is based on time-averages over the whole pe-
riod. He objects, however, that the time series correlations may not identify
the true causal effect of tax rates and centralisation on unemployment (the
188The used control variables are unemployment benefits, an employment protection
index, and an index for the duration of benefits. Data relate to the period 1965–1995 and
are averaged over (five-year) subperiods
189This classification scheme for centralisation differs somewhat from other studies. The
authors pretend to have used information on union density, coverage and measures of
centralisation and coordination from OECD (1997). Unfortunately they do not report the
criteria for the classification.
190We do not report the details from this study here since it focuses on the interaction
between labour market institutions and macroeconomic shocks.
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causal effect may go just the opposite direction) but rather capture effects
from other missing institutional control variables. Furthermore, he argues
that the correlation between taxes and unemployment may be a short or
medium run phenomenon, and that it may be impossible to detect this even
with 30-year observation periods. Finally, Bentilola complains that D & T
do not account for the heterogeneity with respect to the progessivity of wage
taxes between countries.
Huizinga (2000) adds that the interpretation of the tax-centralisation
coefficients as partial effects were valid only if capital income tax and other
taxes were integrated into the specification.
It is difficult to evaluate the relevance of Bentilola’s and Huizinga’s ob-
jections without access to the data. The point that causality may go from
unemployment to tax rates seems to be refuted by the D & T’s data, since
the effects are hardly affected by inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable
and instrumental variable estimation. Elmeskov et al. (1998) found reverse
causality for the relation between unemployment and wage taxes (i.e. un-
employment causes tax wedges) for Austria, Ireland, and Norway in explicit
Granger causality tests. This contradicts D & T’s results not directly, how-
ever, since Ireland is not in their sample and Norway belongs to the nordic
group where interaction effects are insignificant. Finally, the high robustness
of D & T’s results is questioned by the findings in Elmeskov et al. (1998).
They found a highly significant but much smaller interaction term coefficient
of 0.15 for the intermediate countries and a marginally significant interac-
tion term of 0.12 for the highly centralised countries in a similar regression
(exploiting time variation too in a data set of yearly data for the period 1983–
1995). Unfortunately, direct comparison of the results is hampered by the
problem that the tax rate variables used in the regressions may differ from
one another.191 A possible explanation for the significantly smaller coeffi-
cients is that they added non-interacted centralisation dummies to the set of
regressors. Inclusion of the (almost) time invariant centralisation dummies is
not possible with the differenced equations in D & T, but it would certainly
put light on the issue to include them in the level equations.
A last – and possibly severe – criticism of the paper is that D & T did
not perform the relevant tests. They emphasise that the interaction terms
191Elmeskov et al. (1998) use the tax wedge, defined (on page 244) as total value of
employer’s and employee’s social security contributions and personal income tax paid
divided by gross earnings plus employer’s social security contributions. D & T use the
effective tax rate, defined (on page 101) as the ratio between total taxes on labour income
(= an imputation of taxes on wages and salaries from the individual income tax + social
security contributions + payroll taxes) and the labour tax base (= wages and salaries +
employer’s contributions to social security).
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are highly significant mainly in the continental European countries. How-
ever, the critical question to be answered here is whether the interaction
terms coefficients differ significantly between the country groups ! The co-
efficients corresponding to the Anglo-Saxon countries are only marginally
significant (in some specifications) and insignificant for the Nordic coun-
tries, but the coefficients are positive and of considerable size for both
groups. Unfortunately, we cannot compute the relevant tests (because co-
variances between the coefficients are not reported by D & T). Neverthe-
less, the standard errors from the table give rise to the suspicion that the
differences of the relevante coefficients do not differ significantly. As an
example consider the coefficients for a specification with ‘medium’ coeffi-
cient sizes and ‘medium’ precision, the OLS regression on differenced vari-
ables. The coefficients of the continental European and the Nordic coun-
tries are 0.54 and 0.12, the respective standard errors 0.12 and 0.194. If
both coefficients were independent, the (standard approximation) 95% con-
fidence interval for the difference of both coefficients would include 0, since
0.54 − 0.12 ± 1.96√0.122 + 0.1942 .= [−0.027, 0.867]. A similar comparison
with the larger coefficient for the Anglo-Saxon countries produces an even
larger confidence interval: 0.54−0.27±1.96√0.122 + 0.222 .= [−0.223, 0.763].
To conclude, it may be a useful information that coefficients are highly
significant only for the continental European countries, but this does not
imply that response of unemployment to taxation differs between the country
groups.
Cukierman & Lippi (1999) As discussed in section 2.4.4, models of the
interaction between centralisation and the monetary regime claim that the
employment (and inflation) effects of centralisation depend highly on the
prevailing central bank policy.
The first class of models (Cukierman & Lippi, 1999, among others), bas-
ing on inflation-aversion of unions, predict a hump-shape only if inflation-
aversion of unions is strong enough and the central bank pursues an accom-
modating monetary policy. The second class (Iversen, 1998, 1999, among
others), considering real effects of monetary policy, predict even a u-shaped
relationship between centralisation and unemployment if central bank pol-
icy is non-accommodating, which contradicts the unconditional hump-shape
hypothesis.
Let us start with Cukierman & Lippi’s model. They test their model by
interacting three centralisation dummies with a (time-variable) indicator of
central bank independence,192 in the unemployment regressions from OECD
192The indicator is adopted from Cukierman, Neyapti, & Webb (1992) and takes on
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(1997).193 Formally, the estimated specification has the form
u =
3∑
j=1
(βj + γj I)Dj + x β + 
with centralisation dummies Dj, (D1 : decentralised, D2 :, intermediate, D3 :
centralised), central bank independence indicator I, control variable vector
x, and residual . The point estimates of the interaction terms (γ1, γ2, γ3) in
the model with the largest number of control variables194 are (15,−4.8,−2.5)
with t-statistics (2.7,−1.2,−0.2).
predicted unemployment ratesa
centralisation level
I F-test decentr. intermed. centralised
0.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.0 10.7 8.3
0.2 ∗∗ 5.5 10.2 8.0
0.3 ∗ 6.9 9.7 7.8
0.4 - 8.4 9.2 7.5
0.5 - 9.9 8.7 7.2
0.6 - 11.4 8.3 7.0
Source: Cukierman & Lippi (1999), table 6.
a : Predictions are evaluated setting the levels of control variables to zero.
Asterisks indicate confidence levels of F-tests for the H0 : β1+γ1 I = β2+γ2 I = β3+γ3 I.
1, 2, and 3 asterisks indicate rejection of the hypothesis at the 10,5, and 1% level, minus
signs indicate rejection levels greater that 10%.
Table 2.4: Predicted values of unemployment for different centralisation lev-
els and central bank independence.
The authors compute predictions of the unemployment rate, using the
estimated coefficients in order to show that a hump-shape prevails for low
levels of central bank independence and a monotonous relation for high lev-
els. Table 2.4 shows these predicted values. They try to underpin this by
performing a joint F-test with null hypothesis
H0 : β1 + γ1 I = β2 + γ2 I = β3 + γ3 I,
values in the range [0, 0.7].
193They also use the data from that study.
194Control variables are a time period dummy, a dummy for Spain, the replacement ratio,
and labour taxation.
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and interpret the rejection of the hypothesis for low central bank indepen-
dence levels (see table 2.4) as evidence in favour of a hump-shape.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the false test. Additionally, the
authors give a false interpretation of the (false) test. For the hump-shape
hypothesis to be true, two tests are required: β1 + γ1 I < β2 + γ2 I and
β2+ γ2 I > β3+ γ3 I. The joint test on all three magnitudes is rejected if the
difference between any two of them is large enough, the ranking of the three
magnitudes does not matter. For example, the first data row of table 2.4
shows that unemployment achieves a maximum for intermediate centralisa-
tion levels, but the predicted unemployment difference between intermediate
and high levels of centralisation 10.7−8.3 = 2.5 is not large, if compared with
the magnitudes of the effects. Unfortunately, it is impossible to replicate the
test because the covariances of the involved coefficients are not reported in
the paper.
Similarly, they interpret the fact that the F-tests for high central bank
independence levels cannot be rejected as evidence in favour of a monotonic
relationship. Again this is (at least) misleading. The correct interpretation
of the test result is that unemployment rates do not differ significantly from
one another if central bank independence is high, i.e. information in the data
does not suffice to make any clear predictions at all. In consideration of the
severe problems with respect to the statistical tests, the interpretations of
the authors have to put under serious reservations.
Finally, the estimation results have to be taken with caution, since the
countries are distributed unevenly over the range of the central bank in-
dependence indicator. Inspection of the indicator (table 1 in their paper)
reveals that only two countries (Germany [0.66] and Switzerland [0.68]) have
indicator values greater than 0.6, whereas 10 countries (Australia, Belgium,
Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) are in the range
[0.14, 0.4], and 6 countries (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, and the USA) are in the range [0.4,0.6]. This does not necessarily imply
that the coefficients are less precise for high levels of central bank indepen-
dence, but they are more prone to outliers, because they depend heavily on
a small number of observations.
Iversen (1998,1999) Let us now compare this with the contrary evidence
in Inversen’s contributions. His model predicts a hump-shaped or monotone
relation between centralisation and unemployment for accommodating mon-
etary policy, but an u-shaped for a non accommodating one. He conducts
a careful econometric study of the model and finds compelling evidence in
favour of its predictions. However, a closer inspection of his results (which
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is possible since he put his data under public domain) shows that the over-
whelming high precision of the estimated interaction term coefficients does
not necessarily imply corresponding precision of the interesting effects.
He estimates an equation of the form
ui,t = b0+ b1Ci,t+ b2C
2
i,t+ b3Ci,t Ii,t+ b4C
2
i,t Ii,t+ b5 Ii,t+ b6 ui,t−1+β xi,t+ i,t
where ui,t denotes the unemployment rate of country i in period t,
195 Ci,t de-
notes Iversen’s metric indicator of centralisation,196 Ii,t denotes an indicator
of central bank independence, and xi,t a vector of control variables.
197 Both
indicators can (in a good approximation) be interpreted as metric variables.
The interaction terms Ci,t Ii,t and C
2
i,t Ii,t are intended to capture interdepen-
dencies between centralisation of bargaining and the monetary regime.
Iversen interprets the highly significant coefficients as strong evidence in
favour of the postulated interdependence. A closer look at the data shows,
however, that the highly significant coefficients translate only into moderate
significant effects. This is the case, since the impact of centralisation on un-
employment is a nonlinear function of several estimated coefficients and the
data (including the central bank policy). Therefore the statistical assessment
has to focus on the nonlinear relation, not on the coefficients. We will explain
this in more detail below. In our replication of the study we will compute
significance levels for this relation and show that it is estimated only with
moderate precision, despite of the high significance of the coefficients.
195The data set covers five periods: 1973-1977, 1978-1981, 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1990-
1993. Iversen computes period averages for all variables.
196The indicator combines a measures of union concentration (measured as Herfindahl-
index) for three bargaining levels (firm, industry, nation). Its construction is described in
Iversen (1999) on page 83.
197For short information on the control variables see the table with estimation results
below.
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Dependent variable: unemployment rate (u)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.65 -0.99 -0.74
(2.14) (2.38) (2.23)
C -5.92 12.47 9.95
(5.87) (13.21) (6.81)
C2 2.21 -43.73 ** -40.17 ***
(7.98) (19.15) (11.52)
C I - -57.19 *** -51.30 ***
- (26.94) (11.87)
C2 I - 142.66 *** 134.24 ***
- (46.46) (31.73)
I -1.51 0.94 -
(0.88) (3.97) -
u−1 0.7 *** 0.6 *** 0.6 ***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
u¯OECD 0.06 0.15 0.15
(0.2) (0.19) (0.18)
EXMAR -0.19 -0.20 * -0.20 *
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
TRADE 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LR 0.31 1.28 * 1.31 *
(0.57) (0.66) (0.64)
DENSITY 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
FIXITY - -35.14 -35.06
- (27.06) (27.20)
N 75 75 75
adj. R2 0.75 0.8 0.8
Notes: Consistent standard errors (accounting for heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous
correlation between panels, and serial correlation) are given below the coefficients in brack-
ets. Variable definitions:
C: Iversen’s indicator of centralisation, I: indicator of central bank independence, u−1:
unemployment rate (lagged one period), u¯OECD: average (over all countries) of unemploy-
ment EXMAR: growth rate of exports, LR: partisan (left/right) indicator of government
orientation, DENSITY : union density , FIXITY : indicator of fixity of exchange rates
Table 2.5: Prais-Winsten regression of unemployment rates on institutional
variables. Source: Iversen (1999), table 3.3, p. 66.
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Let us start with a look at Iversen’s estimation results. Column (1)
in table 2.5 contains results from a typical hump-shape regression without
account of the monetary regime. Columns (2) and (3) contain results for
his favoured specification.198 A striking ‘feature’ of the pure hump-shape
regression in column (1) is the insignificance of linear and squared coefficients
of the centralisation indicator C. Though the linear term of C remains
insignificant in columns (2) and (3), all other interaction terms are highly
significant.
By the way, the robustness of the coefficient estimates is surprising.
Iversen checks robustness by usage of a jackknife procedure, i.e. by removing
in each replication of the estimation exactly one country from the sample,199
or by removing exactly one period from the sample. The coefficient val-
ues (and standard errors) are quite similar over all replications. We applied
some other outlier detection methods and found no hints to noteworthy prob-
lems.200
Unfortunately, Iversen has not computed all relevant statistical measures
for an assessment of his theory. The crucial significance test relates to the
nonlinear relation of unemployment, centralisation, and central bank inde-
pendence. Iversen graphs point estimates of the relation in a diagram with
the centralisation indicator C on the x-axis and unemployment on the y-axis
for two different values (about 0.2 and 0.6) of central bank independence201
We have reproduced is in the upper left part of figure 2.1. The relation be-
tween centralisation and unemployment is u-shaped for non-accommodating
(independent) monetary policy and monotonous negative for accommodat-
ing monetary policy. The difference appears large, it amounts to about 4
percentage points for intermediate centralisation (C ≈ 0.2) and more that
10 percentage points for high centralisation (C ≈ 0.55).
The next two graphs in the figure complement Iversen’s representation
with 95% confidence intervals. The confidence bands are fairly wide and
overlapping, suggesting rather vague evidence on the difference between cen-
tral bank regimes. However, the figure in the down right block, containing
a graph and confidence band of the difference between the both regimes,
198Iversen gives three arguments for the elimination of I from the specification. Firstly,
the sign of this term is not unique from his theoretical model (a weak argument!), second,
its coefficient is insignificant, and third a collinearity problem exists. He substantiates this
by showing that a regression of I on C,C2, C I, and C2I yields a R2 of 0.96. This is not
convincing, however, since a regression of C on C2, C I, and C2 I yields the same R2.
199This means that each replications contains (N − 1)T observations when T denotes
the number of periods and N the number of countries.
200We used DFBETAS and DFITS (see Belsley et al., 1980 or Jeong & Maddala, 1993).
201The central bank independence ‘values’ amount to the mean value of the independence
index for the sample ± one standard deviation.
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Notes: The u-shaped graphs relate to non-accommodating (I ≈ 0.6), the other to accom-
modating (I ≈ 0.2) monetary policy.
Top left panel: point estimates,
Top right panel: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (10000 replications),
Down left panel: 95% monte carlo confidence interval (10000 replications),
Down right panel: 95% bootstrap confidence interval for the difference between the graphs
for accommodating and non-accommodating central bank policy (10000 replications).
Note that the confidence bands are nonparametric ones and therefore may not be sym-
metric.
Figure 2.1: Impact of centralisation on unemployment for accommodating
and non-accommodating monetary policy. Point estimates with confidence
bounds.
shows that the regimes differ significantly in two intervals. If one does not
care about the difference between regimes, but only about the u-shape in the
case of non-accommodating central banks, evidence is again not compelling.
The 95% confidence band is fairly wide. Therefore the minimum value of the
upper confidence limit is above the maximum of the lower limit. We should
add that the significance bands become even wider if two time dummies are
included into the set of regressors (p-value for a F-test for joint significance
of the dummies is below 1%). Our confidence bands presented in the graphs
are based on Iversen’s specification of the regression equation to preserve
comparability.
Finally, a glance at the distribution of central bank independence and
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Figure 2.2: Two-dimensional plot of the indicators of central bank indepen-
dence and centralisation used in Inversen’s regressions.
centralisation levels in the estimation sample raises the suspicion that the u-
shaped graph in Iversen’s plot is an out-of-sample prediction in the intervals
[0, 0.25] and [0.4, 0.64]. As can be read from 2.2, there is no country with
highly independent central banks (indicator value above 0.6) and a bargain-
ing centralisation level below 0.2 or above 0.4, implying that only the medium
branch, i.e. the range [0.25, 0.4], is based on information from the data! Now
cover the intervals [0, 0.25] and [0.4, 0.64] with a sheet such that only the win-
dow [0.25, 0.4] of the figure remains visible and try to detect clear evidence
in favour of an u-shape.
Despite these qualifications, Iversen’s estimation and testing procedure
appears somewhat more reliable and reflected than Cukierman & Lippi’s.
Again, we remind that Iversen’s result contradict Cukierman & Lippi’s. He
finds no clue for a hump-shape with accommodating, but an u-shape for
non-accommodating monetary policy. Furthermore, Iversen’s results refute
the conventional (unconditional) hump-shape hypothesis. In Calmfors &
Driffill’s world, German unions and employers have chosen the worst possible
bargaining regime. In Iversen’s world, they have taken just the right one
(with a mean centralisation indicator value of about 0.33).
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It remains to explain why we have computed three different (but similar)
confidence intervals. The reason: it is not trivial to compute them, and
some methods may be biased. To avoid errors or significant bias in the
computation, we have applied three different methods (only two are graphed
to show the similarity between them). We are happy to report that the
procedures yielded fairly similar results and shift the rather technical details
to an appendix.
Franzese & Hall (1998) Franzese & Hall (1998) do not present a formal
macroeconomic model of centralisation, but work with a verbal description
of the issues involved. Accordingly, their theory specifies only qualitative
interdependencies, i.e. it claims that centralisation has a stronger effect on
employment with independent central banks. They test the interaction hy-
pothesis with a regression of the unemployment rate on Soskice’s (1990)
centralisation indicator,202 an indicator of central bank independence,203 an
interaction term of the both indicators, and some control variables.204 The
data set relates to OECD countries and covers the period 1955-1990. They
find a positive effect of central bank independence, a negative of the coordi-
nation indicator, and a negative interaction term,205 and interpret the highly
significant interaction coefficient as confirmation of their argument.
As in several other papers discussed above, bias may be introduced by
usage of ordinal regressors. The bias is probably less severe as in some
other papers because they confine themselves to linear terms of the ordinal
regressors. The linear specification, however, does not allow to exploit their
evidence as a direct check of the hump-shape hypothesis.
Kittel & Traxler (2000) Kittel & Traxler’s ‘governability’-hypothesis
(presented in section 2.4.5) claims that the viability and effectiveness of cen-
tralisation requires an institutional background (e.g. wage bargaining leg-
islation). They test it in the regression framework by adding interacting
202The indicator is extended to countries not contained in Soskice’s original discussion
by usage of information in Layard et al. (1991). This may be a problem since Soskice’s
ordinal definition implicit (i.e. has to reconstructed from the classification of countries).
The index takes on values 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 und 1.0 an. Note that the scaling is different
from Soskice who defined only a ranking scheme Soskice (1990).
203They compute the average of five indicators from other authors.
204Control variables are the log of real GDP per capita, an indicator of openness to
international trade, the terms of trade, the share of seats in government occupied by
left-oriented parties, and trade union density.
205Because of the presence of the interaction term, coefficients (including their signifi-
cance) cannot be interpreted independently. The effects of these variables depend on the
interaction term and the covariance matrix of all three variables included in the interaction.
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terms between a centralisation index (constructed by themselves) and their
governability index to the set of regressors. The empirical implementation,
however, appears problematic in several respects. In a first step the authors
try to show that their interacted indicators have better predictive power
than the Calmfors-Driffill-Indicator – with a somewhat problematic regres-
sion. Firstly, they use growth rates of nominal unit labour costs.206 The
regression can hardly represent a long run relation, since the regressors are
levels (unless one accepts that unit labour costs of countries with different
levels of centralisation drift apart in the long run). Furthermore, reliable
measurement and interpretation of labour costs is difficult, especially in in-
ternational comparisons. Also the use of nominal unit labour costs appears
at least awkward, since real ones (or harmonised inflation rates as control
variables) are readily available from the OECD. That they include the growth
rate of money supply as a control variable in their regressions does not im-
prove things considerably: It is well known that money supply displays its
impact on prices with a considerable lag. Comparability of the specifications
is reduced further by the fact that only the specification with Calmfors &
Driffill’s indicator contains an endogenous lagged regressor,207 whereas alle
specifications with the Kittel-Traxler- indicators are static.
Traxler & Kittel find no significant effects for linear and squared terms
of Calmfors & Driffill’s indicator,208 but highly significant effects (at the
1% significance level) for their own indicator. Centralisation is significant
especially for countries with high governability. Highly significant effects
come out also in a regression with the rate of inflation as dependent variable.
However, the predictive power of their indicators vanishes if the try to explain
unemployment growth.
We abstain here from an assessment in face of several unclarified points
with respect to conceptual and methodological issues.
2.5.5 Empirical Evidence on the Relation between
Centralisation and Wage Dispersion
The most robust evidence produced from the empirical literature on cen-
tralisation of bargaining appears to be the relation between centralisation
and wage dispersion. It is documented in numerous descriptive summaries,
e.g. OECD, 1997; Flanagan, 1999. Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997), Autor &
206Unit labour costs are defined as total labour costs divided by GDP
207It is well known (see e.g. Beck & Katz, 1995 that this may create considerable bias in
estimations with even medium length samples (in the time dimension).
208As mentioned repeatedly, modelling with polynomial expressions of ordinal indicators
may generate senseless results.
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Katz (1999), Steiner & Wagner (1998) (among others) report – if at all – only
minor increases of wage dispersion in countries with centralised bargaining
institutions, but significant increases for the less centralised. Descriptive ev-
idence on the effects of changes in bargaining structures points to the same
direction. For example, Maloney & Savage (1996) attribute increasing wage
dispersion in Sweden (1984) and New Zealand (1991) to movement towards
more decentralised bargaining.
It is more surprising that only few papers address the issue directly while
numerous studies (many of them being based on the same data) repeat tests
of the hump-shape hypothesis again and again.
Rowthorn (1990,1992)
One of the first studies on the relation between centralisation and wage dis-
persion ist Rowthorn (1990). His study is based on international comparable
industry level data. He computes coefficients of variation for pre-tax209 wages
manufacturing industries210 as measure of dispersion. The Calmfors & Driffill
indicator is used as measure for centralisation.
Explorative correlation studies show a high correlation between the indi-
cator and wage dispersion. But the picture is confused somewhat by ‘out-
liers’: Austria, Italy and Switzerland. Austria and Switzerland show a rela-
tively high industry wage distribution. Wage dispersion in Austria (which is
the most centralised country according to the indicator) is even comparable
to the USA. Data from Italy should interpreted with care, however, because
of low data reliability.
Rowthorn finds also a significant positive relation in a regression of the
difference between the employment rate and the measure of dispersion on the
indicator. On the other hand, a regression of the employment rate on the
indicator and the measure of dispersion is insignificant. Analogous analyses,
where industry wage dispersion is replaced by gender wage dispersion, gen-
erate similar results. Rowthorn’s results are confirmed in later studies, e.g.
Holmlund & Zetterberg, 1991). A problem with the macro data approach
is, however, that industry and gender wage dispersion represent only part of
gross dispersion, i.e. they shadow intra-industry dispersion.
209This may generate some bias because of significant differences in tax rates between
countries. Rowthorn justifies his choice by data limited availability.
210Similar comparable data for the service sector are not available.
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Barth & Zweimu¨ller (1994)
Barth & Zweimu¨ller (1994) investigate a similar question with micro data of
Austria, Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the USA. They estimate a
static wage equation with the usual regressors schooling, experience, dummy
variables for sex and race.211 These specifications are extended by industry
dummies212
The first result from the estimations is that the structure of industry
wage differentials is similar across countries (in the sense that industries with
over-average and below-average wages are about the same in all countries).
There exists considerable heterogeneity, however, with respect to the size of
deviations from the mean. While, for example, the best and worst- wage
industries are 39% below (hotels) and 37% above (mining) average in the
USA, the respective maximum deviations in Sweden are only 14% (private
households) and 16% (insurance).
The authors try to obtain a more concise picture of the situation by com-
puting correlations of the industry wage differentials between all countries.
Inspection of the matrix reveals high similarities: 13 of the 25 entries in
the correlation matrix are larger than 70% and only 3 less that 50%. There
looms no pattern regarding centralisation of wage setting in the matrix. A
clear pattern evolves, however, with respect to dispersion: The standard
deviations of the industry dummies are considerably larger in Canada and
the USA (both greater than 0.16) than in Austria, Norway, Germany, and
Sweden (all below 0.07).
Wallerstein (1996)
Wallerstein (1996) finds also clear evidence for the equalising effects of cen-
tralisation on wages in a regression model of lagged adjustment based on
data from 16 OECD countries for the period 1980–1992. He uses the log
of the relative difference between the 90% and 10% quantile of the wage
distribution as dependent variable. It is regressed on a centralisation indi-
cator representing the bargaining level,213 a measure of union concentration
(Herfindahl-Index), union density, union coverage, an openness indicator, the
share of public sector employment in gross employment, the share of public
211The race variable shows that the specifications of the equations have to differ somewhat
in order to adapt to ‘local needs’. The authors explain that these differences of the
specifications, however, do not cause significant problems for their interpretations.
212Problems of comparability are present also in this respect since the classification of
industries differ somewhat.
213It takes on values 1 to 4 for firm level, industry level, national level without sanctions,
and national level with sanctions.
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spending in GDP and a partisan indicator (distribution of seats in parliament
among left and right parties). Wallerstein finds highly significant negative ef-
fects of the bargaining level (t-statistic 6.03), union concentration (t-statistic
3.75), and coverage (t-statistic 2.43) variables.
Blau & Kahn (1996)
The results of the above studies are not very specific, because they consider
only the entire distribution. Blau & Kahn (1996) provide more detailed in-
sights by decomposing the wage dispersion into dispersion due to measured
characteristics (schooling, experience, tenure, and marital status), disper-
sion due to valuation effects (i.e. ‘prices’ of measured characteristics), and a
residual category which cannot be explained by characteristics and their val-
uation.214 This decomposition is applied to international differences of (log)
wage dispersion, i.e. to the differences of (log) wage dispersion between the
USA and the other countries in the sample (Germany UK, Austria, Switzer-
land, Sweden, Norway, Australia, and Hungary).
According to their results, only 6% (on average) of the standard devia-
tions are due to differences in measured characteristics, while prices of the
characteristics account for 15–20% (on average) and 74–79% (on average) are
due to residuals.
In a further investigation they gain more detailed information on the lower
and upper part of the wage distribution by applying this decomposition to the
(log) wage percentile differences 50-10 and 90-50. (E.g. the 50-10 difference
means the difference between the 50% percentile and the 10% percentile of
the wage distribution.)
Firstly, international differences between the USA and the other coun-
tries are considerably small for the upper part (90-50 difference) of the wage
distribution, but large for the lower part. This is in line with the reasoning
that unions and centralised wage setting compress mainly the lower part of
the wage distribution. The most eye catching aspect of the separate decom-
positions for lower and upper part of the wage distribution is that measured
characteristics widen the gap between the US and other countries for low
wage workers but narrow the gap for high wage workers. For low wage earn-
ers, measured characteristics account for about 40% of the difference between
the other countries and the USA, meaning that greater heterogeneity of US
workers with low income is responsible for a good share of the international
differences. A possible interpretation for this observation is that collective
214One has to be careful with the interpretation of the residual term. It is not clear
whether is due to unobservable productivity differences or due to ‘errors’ and ‘arbitrariness’
in wage determination.
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wage agreements and wage standards in some of the other countries make
the low income worker group more homogenous with respect to qualification.
In a last step of the analysis, they try to gather direct evidence on the
impact of centralisation on wage dispersion by regressing several dispersion
measures on a centralisation indicator215 and control variables.216 All find-
ings are in line with expectations. (1) The standard deviation of the gross
wage dispersion decreases significantly with increasing centralisation. (2)
Centralisation exerts a large impact on the lower part of the wage distribu-
tion (represented by the 50-10 percentile difference), but only (3) a small and
insignificant impact on the upper part (represented by the 90-50 percentile
difference). A similar pattern appears if the measured characteristics are
eliminated from the dependent variables in the regressions (1)–(3).
All disclaimers of the interesting paper relate to data quality problems.
Data from several countries reached the authors in aggregated form, urging
them to use cell-midpoints instead of the raw data. Another (more cru-
cial) problem may be caused by the fact that the data of several countries
contain monthly or annual earnings and that they are not complemented
with exact/reliable information on working hours. Since and working hours
may differ significantly across the wage distribution and across countries,
the (hourly) wage measures computed from this information may be biased
severely.
Further Studies and Competing Theories
Indirect hints to dispersion-increasing effects of de-unionisation delivers the
study of Machin (1997). He investigates the impact of the drastic reforms
of bargaining institutions in the Thatcher era in the United Kingdom using
micro data (the General Household Survey 1983 and the British Household
Panel Survey 1991). The reforms generated institutional changes which can
– because the top-down nature of the legal changes – be considered exoge-
nous. The legal reforms included restrictions on picketing (1980), repeal
of statutory recognition procedures (1980), increased liability of unions for
damages (1982), increased requirements for the introduction of a closed shop
(1982)217, repeal of pre-entry union shops (1990), and prescription of secret
ballots before industrial action/strikes (1984)218 According to his empirical
215They use the average of the rankings Blyth (1979), Schmitter (1981), Cameron (1984),
Bruno & Sachs (1985), and Calmfors & Driffill (1988).
216Control variables are the relative female labour supply and relative net labour supply
of medium and low skilled workers.
217The minimum support to legalise the closed shop was raised to 80%.
218For a complete list see Machin’s paper.
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result both the reduction of minimum wages as well as decreasing union den-
sity and power (caused by the legal restrictions) lead to an increase of wage
inequality. Of course, his investigation is at most tangent to the centralisa-
tion debate, since it focusses mainly on effects of the legal frame on union
power.
Similar studies concentrating on wage dispersion effects of union power
are Card (1992), DiNardo, Fortin, & Lemieux (1996), Bound & Johnson
(1992), and Card, Lemieux, & Riddell (2003). According to Card’s results,
decreasing union power explains about 25% of the increase in wage dispersion
(of men) for the period, DiNardo et al. (1996) come to 14–20%. These results
are confirmed in a study with comparable data on the United Kingdom,
Canada and the USA.
We cannot conclude this discussion without some qualifying hints on com-
peting explanations of international differences in wage dispersion. Studies
focussing on centralisation effects share a summary view of wage dispersion,
i.e. reach at best the industry or gender level of analysis. The large strand
of literature on skill biased technical change (SBTC) has stepped deeper into
the details by analysing wage dispersion further into skill premia and resid-
ual dispersion (i.e. within-sector and within-firm dispersion which cannot be
explained by observable industry, technology, firm and personal characteris-
tics). We can only sketch the most important contributions of this literature
here because of its large scale.
Central explanations for different developments of skill wage premia in
continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries (USA and United King-
dom) put forward in this literature (cf. Acemoglu, 2001, surveys of the
literature give Acemoglu, 2000; Topel, 1997; Gottschalk, 1997, and Autor &
Katz, 1999) are (1) that relative skill supply increased faster in Europe (Card
& Lemieux, 2001), (2) that technical change has been less skill biased in Eu-
rope, and (3) that intensified international trade played a larger role for the
Anglo-Saxon countries219 Besides that, researchers working in this field are
apparently aware of the role of wage-setting institutions. Nevertheless, they
are hardly taken into account in empirical studies because of the lack of inter-
nationally comparable data. This is the reason why the intersection between
empirical contributions on SBTC and centralisation of bargaining is almost
empty though the most important answers to both strands of literature can
be expected to come from this intersection.
219The trade explanation, advocated by Wood (1995) among others, argues that inten-
sified international trade increases skill premia by lowering wages of the unqualified in
advanced industrial countries trough increased competition from huge supply of unquali-
fied labour from underdeveloped countries.
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Effects of Wage Dispersion on Productivity
All studies reported as far consider only the impact of centralisation in wage
setting on the dispersion of wages. To the best of our knowledge, only two
study considers the more interesting effects of wage dispersion on employment
and productivity. Surprisingly, they do not deliver averse effects of dispersion.
Bell & Freeman (1987,1988) The authors start their investigation with
a short theoretical discussion of the effects of wage dispersion on employ-
ment. It is clear that employment effects of wage flexibility (increasing wage
dispersion)220 are unambiguously positive in frictionless markets with full
symmetric information and perfect competition. This must not be the case,
however, in imperfect markets. Then the effects of wage flexibility on em-
ployment are unclear a priori, since adjustment may go in either direction:
downwards and upwards. Downward flexibility increases employment, up-
ward flexibility may represent the ability of employees to appropriate rents,
and therefore may decrease employment.
The authors try to obtain the net effect of wage flexibility by regressing
the (log of) the employment ratio on the (log of) GDP, a quadratic trend, and
the inter-industry dispersion of wages. They find a negative but insignificant
coefficient. Of course, their results are subject to an important disclaimer.
The direction of causation is assumed to go from dispersion (flexibility) to
employment. But they did not attempt to test for causality. Therefore,
the reverse direction is possible as well. All in all, a correct and cautious
interpretation of their results is rather that we cannot observe a clear relation
between wage dispersion (flexibility) and employment in a sparse ad hoc
regression model.
Hibbs & Locking (2000) The authors try to determine the signs of partial
effects of wage dispersion on productivity in a regression framework using
Swedish data for the period 1964–1993.221
They extend a Cobb-Douglas production function by an ‘efficiency term’
Ef which depends on within and between wage dispersion:
Ef = Ef(CV 2W , CV
2
B)
220The authors use the therm ‘flexibility’ instead of ‘wage dispersion’. By doing so, they
assume implicitly that a compression of the wage structure is caused by rigidities. This
must be not necessarily the case. At least their data do not allow to differentiate between
dispersion and flexibility.
221Swedish data are well suited for such studies since the bargaining parties changed wage
policy (and even the level of centralisation) several times. These policy-changes generate
high variation of the regressor variables.
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Within and between dispersion CV 2W CV
2
B are measured as (squared) co-
efficients of variation (CV 2i = σ
2
i /w¯
2
i ). From this production function, a
productivity relation is derived. Exogenous technical progress is represented
by linear time trends (linear spline functions) whose coefficients may vary
within time periods. The resulting specification has the form
ln(Qt/Lt) = b0τ + b1τ t+ b2 lnQt + b3 lnwt + b4 ln rt + b5 lnEft + b6 Lt−1
with output Q, employment L, wage w, and interest rate r. Subscript τ
displays possible changes of the trend coefficients in the periods 1964 −
1969, 1970 − 1982, 1983 − 1993. Ef is included both in a log-log as well
as in a log-linear form.
lnEf = β0 + β1 lnCV
2
W + β2 lnCV
2
B
lnEf = β0 + β1CV
2
W + β2CV
2
B
Hibbs & Locking find significant positive effects of within-plant and within-
industry dispersion on productivity but negative effects of between plant
and between industry dispersion.222 They interpret their results in favour of
the Rehn-Meidner theory, and against Akerlof & Yellen (1990) and Levine
(1991).
A weakness of Hibbs & Locking (2000) and Bell & Freeman (1988) (caused
by a lack of suitable data) is that they do not differentiate between ho-
mogenous and heterogenous labour. Of course, their results are unter the
same reservation as most econometric models: It is unclear whether the have
found causal effects or only less informative partial correlations. For ex-
ample, higher productivity of labour in times of stronger wage compression
could be explained by the capital allocation effect discussed in section 2.4.14.
It is clear, however, that their results cannot be taken as evidence against
centralisation in wage setting.
2.5.6 Summary
The discussion of the empirical contributions in the sections above urged us
to put several conceptual and methodological problems in marginal notes.
Because of their high importance, we start our concluding assessment of
empirical studies with a compilation of these problems.
222Effects of dispersion between plants and industries were obtained from separate re-
gressions.
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Summary of Methodological Problems
1. The high dimensionality of centralisation makes its operationalisation
and measurement extremely difficult. Several possibly important as-
pects of centralisation (e.g. tacit cooperation) cannot be observed at
all. In principle, many basic indicators are required for a sensible rep-
resentation of centralisation. Low observation numbers, especially in
cross-section studies, however, put tight limits on the number of indi-
cators as explanatory variables.
2. The definition and construction of many centralisation indicators is
(and must be) based on subjective evaluations, at least with respect
to weighting of their components or with respect to the selection of
relevant aspects. Blanchard & Wolfers (2000) are very decisive about
this point: “One must worry however that these results are in part
the result of economic Darwinism. The measures ... have all been
constructed ex post facto, by researchers who were not unaware of un-
employment developments... Also, given the complexity in measuring
institutions, measures which do well in explaining unemployment have
survived better than those that did not.” [p. 18]
3. Most available centralisation indicators are ordinal measures. This
requires recoding into dummy variables and leads to loss of informa-
tion. Regressions with polynomial terms of ordinal regressors are al-
most worthless.
4. ‘Horse races’ between centralisation indicators from different sources
(authors) are not possible because of high correlations between them.
On the one hand, these correlations are large enough to make ‘horse
races’ impossible, on the other hand they are large enough to produce
significantly different results in regression studies.
5. There is no simple way to test whether bargaining structures are only
manifestations of underlying social background norms or economic con-
ditions. In any case, empirical studies deliver no reliable causal rela-
tions, but only correlations.
6. Besides this, the general legal, social, and institutional environment
may have a considerable impact on the outcome of bargaining and the
measurement of control variables. For example, the interpretation of
union density depends heavily on the type of the unemployment insur-
ance system (Ghent/Non-Ghent). Therefore additional information on
the general environment should be added to the set of regressors.
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A simple solution to the problem of country-specific heterogeneity
(fixed effects estimation with panel data) which would reduce the num-
ber of control variables considerably, and in addition account for un-
observable heterogeneity, is not applicable due to low variation of the
indicators in the time dimension223
7. If the gains and costs of centralisation depend on the economic, social
and institutional environment, the effects of centralisation on macroe-
conomic indicators should change if parameters of the environment do.
If these parameters do not enter the empirical specification (a frequent
case), the coefficients of hump-shape regressions become time-varying,
and regression results, obtained by pooling over time periods, yield only
mean effects but cannot reflect and identify these institutional changes.
The solution to reduce estimation period lengths reduces the number
of observations and brings back the precision and degrees of freedom-
problem.
8. Though changes occurring in discrete jumps are eye-catching and sim-
ple to observe, they may nevertheless carry biased information. Con-
sider, for example a situation where large differences in productivity
between firms trigger the break of a bargaining coalition. These dif-
ferences will generate increasing wage differences prior to the break if
firms and workers try to elude the common agreement by biased inter-
pretation or clandestine deviation. A dummy variable indicating the
break will then convey ‘displaced’ information.
9. Several components or aspects of institutions change continuously and
slowly (e.g. the compliance with collective wage agreements by individ-
ual firms), others ‘jump’, (e.g. the dominant level). Small and almost
continuous changes are not captured by indicators representing rank
orderings if the changes follow a common trend in all countries.
On the whole, the experience with centralisation indicators suggests that
more coordination would be favourable to this strand of research. It has
produced a large number of indicators serving ‘special needs’ of applications,
but this confronts the reader with the additional burden of tracing the rea-
sons for differing and sometimes contradictory results. Attempts to compare
existing indicators or to use existing work in a systematic manner to cre-
ate better indicators are often hampered by the poor documentation of the
existing indicators.224
223Elmeskov et al. (1998) report only 7-9 changes of the centralisation level for a sample
for 19 OECD countries 1980–1995.
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General Assessment
Besides the unsolved methodical problems, we take the numerous contra-
dictions in the literature as main criterion for a general assessment of the
empirical evidence. The spectrum of results on centralisation results ranges
from insignificant to strong monotone and strong hump-shaped effects. It is
somewhat disappointing that the newer literature is often silent about these
contradictions. Apparently, there is no strong pressure to justify specifica-
tion choices which deviate from predecessors. Several authors do not even
comment on or try to explain the differences of their own results from previ-
ous ones (though it were possible to trace the differences by inspection of the
data: several studies use the same data set!). An example for a somewhat
laissez-faire and mechanical attitude is the survey Booth et al. (2001). The
authors summarise 13 results regarding the hump-shape hypothesis (in ta-
ble 5.2 on page 94)225 which find/specify hump-shaped as well as monotone
relations between centralisation and unemployment. A mentioning of the
OECD-study (which does not fit into the picture) is shifted into a footnote:
“A study not included in the table is OECD (1997), which had problems com-
ing up with any significant relationship. It found only some weak evidence
in favour of a monotonic relationship (and some weak evidence in favour of
the hypothesis that more foreign trade will lead to lower unemployment in
countries with intermediate coordination.” (Booth et al., 2001, S. 93). One
searches vainly for a hint on whether the monotonous relations in some of the
studies were imposed a priori or determined by statistical tests. Iversen’s
work (which contradicts the unconditional hump-shape hypothesis) is not
mentioned too here, but some pages below.
By the arguments put forward above, our assessment of the evidence re-
garding the hump-shape hypothesis is rather pessimistic. Though there is no
study establishing significant negative employment effects of high centralisa-
tion levels, all other results (especially regarding the hump-shape hypothesis)
are possible. Besides that, the somewhat careless use and abuse of methods
undermines the credibility of the results considerably.
Some theories dealing with interaction effects appear interesting and
promising. Nevertheless, the empirical results are full of contradictions (e.g.
Cukierman & Lippi, 1999 versus Iversen, 1999). Therefore it is unclear at
the current stage of analysis, whether the available data lend themselves to
a reliable identification of such effects. All these studies gain significant re-
224Of course, there are several positive exceptions, e.g. Soskice (1990) or Iversen (1999)
among others.
225The results come from Layard et al. (1991), Scarpetta (1996), Zetterberg (1995),
Bleany (1996), Layard & Nickell (1999), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Haffner et al. (2001).
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sults by an empirical application of the isolation principle: They consider a
certain interaction (e.g. central bank independence) and disregard all other
(e.g. taxation and the legal framework). The isolation principle is a sensible
tool for economic reasoning, but not valid in empirical research.
As regards the relation of centralisation and wage dispersion, we observe
more uniform and robust results in the literature. Though we cannot expect
that investigations of the relation are able to reveal the direction of causation,
some more effort appears worthwhile to gather more detailed information on
the dispersion effects of centralisation, especially because it is a central input
to the current (purely abstract and theoretical) discussion on the implications
of bargaining institutions for the design of incentives.
Attentive readers may have noticed that the theoretical section contains
many references to indirect empirical evidence from related or even seemingly
different fields of research. The body of indirect empirical evidence seems to
be much larger than the papers categorised under the ‘centralisation label’.
We have to admit that we did not check these ‘related’ studies with the
same precision as the studies from the empirical section above. But we have
to emphasise that we were not directed to many of them by the ‘official’
centralisation literature, but came up against them casually, simply because
they are hardly received. With hindsight, we regret that we followed the
less promising track in the empirical part of this survey by trying to give a
thorough summary of the existing empirical ‘official’ centralisation studies
instead of trying to reach the less investigated regions of the topic.
Chapter 3
An Explorative Investigation of
the Relation between
Centralisation and Strike
Activity
3.1 Introduction
As announced in section 2.4.17, we present here results from an own investi-
gation of the relation between centralisation and wage bargaining using data
on 17 OECD countries for the period 1973-2000.
We anticipate that our estimations suffer from many problems reported in
the sections above. Time restrictions imposed additional restrictions on the
data. For example, we ignore information on some possibly relevant aspects
of the legal framework of bargaining: statutory work councils, compulsory
strike ballots, allowance of lock-outs and political strikes, peace clauses, and
compulsory arbitration. Unfortunately, these data are readily available only
for European countries. Though they can – in principle – be gained by ac-
cess of national sources, the required effort deterred us from doing this. We
checked the relevance of these dummy control variables by including them
into estimations for the subsample of European countries and found (sur-
prisingly) neither individually significant effects nor joint (F-test for all these
dummies) significance. These checks do not allow us to give the clear-all,
however, since the sample for these estimations is restricted in the country
dimension, and additionally relates only to a relatively homogenous subsam-
ple of the data.
We explain lost working days per 1000 workers and year due to strike
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actions by indicators for the level of centralisation of bargaining and several
control variables (explained below). Our choice of centralisation indicators
is OECD (1997). The indicators CENT und COORD represent the level
and coordination of the bargaining parties. A third indicator, COMB is
obtained by combining both other indicators. Table ?? on page ?? lists
the values of the indicators for the countries in our estimation sample. All
problems and disclaimers from section 2.5.1 apply to these indicators too.
An advantage of the OECD indicators over several others is, however, that
it captures significant changes of centralisation in the last twenty years (i.e.
it is time-variant). Other indicators, e.g. Calmfors-Driffill, which are not
updated since their creation, would urge us to put hands-on and expose us
the criticism of subjectivity. However, we report that preliminary regressions
with the Calmfors-Driffill indicator produced qualitatively similar results.
All specifications contain the following control variables: standardised
unemployment rates (UN), the average of unemployment rates over all coun-
tries in the sample, ( ¯UNOECD), the inflation rate I, the output gap (GAP ),
and time-trend dummies. Unfortunately, output gap series provided by the
OECD and the IMF are not available for all countries and the whole pe-
riod of our sample. To fill this gap, we computed an output gap as the
relative difference between actual real output (GDP) and its smooth trend
(generated by the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, with smoothing parameter value
50 for all countries.) Unemployment rates, and especially average unemploy-
ment rates and the output gap serve as proxies to account for business cycle
effects. Though theory does not provide guidance on further relevant regres-
sors, union density, coverage, and openness indicators suggest themselves als
controls. Unfortunately these variables are not available for all countries and
the whole time period of our sample. We run some explorative regressions
with these control variables included in a smaller sample of countries and
found that only the union density variable was significant. The fact that
elimination of the union density did not lead to noteworthy change of the
centralisation coefficients, we have some clue that omission of these variables
does not cause severe bias.
A glance at a plot of the strike data reveals their main characteristics
and the implied problems. Figure 3.1 shows the high volatility of our depen-
dent variable and considerable differences between countries. A disclaimer
regarding the comparability if strike data is in order here. Lesch (2002) and
Schnabel (1995) point to the fact strike data are censored from below at the
firm level in the USA, i.e. only strikes with more than 1000 days lost are
reported. According to Lesch and Schnabel this may lead to an underesti-
mation of the true strike activity by 30%.
Both high volatility in the time dimension and huge international dif-
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Figure 3.1: Lost days due to strikes per 1000 employees, 16 OECD-countries
ferences pose several possible challenges to regression methods. The most
important one seem to be that individual outlier observations may exert a
high impact in the regression coefficients. We will explain these problems
and solutions to them below.
Before we step into the details, let us take a look at some descriptive mea-
sures in table 3.1. They suggest lower strike activity in the more centralised
countries: Both means as well as medians, and 25% and 75% percentiles are
less for the more centralised countries. The lower panel of the table points
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centr.-level mean median 25%-percentile 75%-percentile
indicator of centralisation (OECD)
low 353.4 176 40 429
intermed. 173.9 40.5 2 268
high 222.3 81.5 19 207
indicator of coordination (OECD)
low 332.8 245 89.5 447
intermed. 345.7 138 7 421
high 79.6 17.5 4 62
combined indicator (OECD)
low 369.0 189 41 437.5
intermed. 255.4 145 9 390.5
high 125.8 27 5 93.5
period strike activity by periods
1971–1975 393.4 227.0 16.0 417.0
1976–1980 343.0 146.0 23.0 482.0
1981–1985 229.3 101.0 8.0 322.0
1985–1990 155.3 71.0 6.0 210.0
1991–1995 68.4 34.0 8.0 85.0
1996–2000 63.8 17.5 2.0 61.5
sources: IW Ko¨ln, OECD (1997), own computations.
The combined indicator denotes the centralisation level according to the OECD centrali-
sation indicator (combining information on the level of wage bargaining and the degree of
coordination in wage bargaining
Table 3.1: descriptive measures of strike activity (lost working days per 1000
employees and year)
to a clear negative time trend in all countries. Since these effects may be
generated by spurious correlations (i.e. are not partial effects), we have to
apply regression techniques in order to disentangle matters. Let us start with
a description of central data and estimation problems.
3.2 Data and Estimation Problems
The explanation of strike action by regression techniques has to solve mainly
two problems. The first problem is present in all cross country studies. It
is caused by individual heterogeneity of the observational units (countries),
3.2. DATA AND ESTIMATION PROBLEMS 127
which cannot be eliminated because of lack of control variables,1 and by
contemporaneous correlations (i.e. correlations between panels). Contempo-
raneous correlations appear if countries are hit/affected by macroeconomic
shocks (or unobservable regressors) symmetrically.2 It is straightforward to
show that the standard OLS covariance matrix formula generates biased re-
sults then. If panel data are available (as in our case), a correct estimation
of the covariance matrix if straightforward, however (see Greene, 2000, sec-
tion 13.9). Though the estimated covariance matrix of the residuals could in
principle be used to compute an efficient GLS estimate, we do not follow this
approach here because of the warnings in Beck & Katz (1995). The authors
show in a simulation study that GLS estimates respond sensibly to minor
over- or underestimation of the residual covariance matrix. This may cause
severe problems, especially if the time dimension of the sample is small. Be-
sides this, we account for serial correlation by usage of the Prais–Winsten
correction.
The second estimation problem relates to the high volatility of strike data
in the time dimension. The eye-catching outliers from figure 3.1 may domi-
nate the determination of coefficients and thus generate biased and less robust
results. Two reasons for high volatility suggest themselves. Either is caused
by unobserved variables, or it is caused by highly nonlinear dependence of
strike duration on the regressors.
As regards the first reason, we guess that several unobserved variables are
good candidates for explaining outliers, e.g. reforms of the legal framework
affecting the strike power of unions, or other social reforms which provoked
general strikes. Unfortunately, we are not aware of exhaustive and detailed
data on such changes. Besides that, we expect that such a detailed list
would generate a very large number of control (dummy) variables.3 Here
we pursue two alternative strategies to the inclusion of control variables,
1An alternative way to deal with the heterogeneity problem, fixed effects estimation,
is not possible in our application, since the main important regressors (centralisation
indicators) show to less time variation.
2Note that contemporaneous correlations may be present also in microeconometric
studies. They are either ignorable in these applications, or cannot be accounted for because
of small observation numbers of the data sets in the time dimension.
3For example, Machin (1997) reports eight labour market acts delivered by the Thatcher
government in the period 1980-1993. Though this government seems to be more productive
regarding labour market reforms than others, we have to note that these acts relate directly
to bargaining, and that the list could be complemented by other social policy acts and
regulations which could have provoked strikes on general strikes (national minimum wage
policies, unemployment benefit changes, mandatory retirement regulation, social security
contribution acts, labour taxation etc). If we obtained 20 such dummies for each country,
a total of 340 additional variables would result.
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statistical outlier detection procedures and robust estimation.
The second possible cause for ‘outliers’ (nonlinearity) is tackled by appli-
cation of the Box-Cox transformation (it is explained below).
3.2.1 Outlier Detection Procedures and Robust Esti-
mation
Influential observations emanate in regression equations either by creating
large changes of the regression coefficients or (more less specific) by blowing
up residual variance and decreasing predictive power. The literature con-
tains several diagnostics algorithms and influence measures for the detection
of outliers (see e.g. Belsley et al., 1980 or Atkinson & Riani, 2000). They re-
late either to the (relative) change of individual coefficients after elimination
of a certain observation (as for example DFBETAS), or to the change of the
residual variance or predictive power (as for example studentised residuals or
DFITS). The DFBETAS statistic appears to be best suited for our applica-
tion since our focus is centered on two coefficients (centralisation dummies),
and the DFBETAS statistic provides the most specific information.4
DFBETAS(βk, i) represents the relative change of coefficient βk when
observation i is dropped from the sample. ‘relative’ means here: in units of
the coefficients standard deviation. (for example DFBETAS(βk, i) = 2 means
that βk changes by two standard deviations if observation i is dropped from
the sample.) Belsley et al. (1980) propose |DFBETA(βk, i)| > 2/
√
](obs.)
as criterion for highly influential observations. Unfortunately, this bound is
(asymptotically) valid only with homoscedastic residuals. Since tests reject
homoscedasticity in our specifications, this bound is rather to narrow and
can serve only as a raw rule of thumb in our application.
As an alternative to the elimination of outliers, we use a robust estimation
procedure, the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator. LAD estimators
minimize the sum of absolute deviations of the dependent variable from the
regression line and therefore attach lower weights to observations far away
from the regression line.5 The higher robustness of the estimator is traded
off by lower precision in many cases. A further disadvantage of the estima-
4We applied also the DFITS statistics to our estimations. As expected, the centralisa-
tion dummy coefficients showed even more stability with respect to this outlier detection
method. Therefore only the results of the DFBETAS detection procedure are reported in
the tables.
5In an alternative illuminating interpretation the estimator can be considered as a
regression model of the conditional median of the dependent variable. By analogy of
the unconditional and conditional median estimator it is clear that LAD coefficients are
insensitive to truncation or censoring at the tails of the distribution.
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tor is that procedures for the consistent estimation of the covariance matrix
in face of (contemporaneously or serially) correlated residuals are not devel-
oped. Nevertheless, consistent estimates can be computed by application of
moving-blocks bootstrap methods or residual based methods. We conducted
a standard bootstrap procedure here because of time restrictions. This may
allow for a better estimation of standard errors than the asymptotic ones but
still deliver biased results.6
3.2.2 Functional Form Considerations
The repertoire of semiparametric methods is small in our application be-
cause of relatively low observation numbers. Therefore, we use the Box-Cox
transformation which creates considerable flexibility but imposes less com-
putational burden and mild identification requirements. The model has the
form
yλ − 1
λ
= Xβ + u.
It allows – depending on the scaling parameter λ – a continuous transition
from the linear (λ = 1) to the logarithmic transformation (λ → 0) of the
dependent variable. The implementation used here obtains coefficients by
maximum likelihood estimation and is based on the (unrealistic) assumption
of homoscedastic and uncorrelated residuals. In order to obtain more reliable
inference, we decided to estimate λ by the maximum likelihood procedure,
to transform the dependent variable with this value, and to plug it into the
linear regression model and into the median regression. Also the standard
errors from this heuristic two-step estimation are biased, because it treats
λ as a deterministic variable. However, this bias seems to be less severe
than the other, since λ is estimated with high precision and is insensitive
with respect to outliers. We accept a further bias by using the parameter
λ, which is based on a conditional mean estimation procedure, to transform
the dependent variable for a median regression. Though an algorithm for
Box-Cox median regression is worked out in Powell (1991), we decided to
abstain from implementing it here because we expect a minor bias from this
minor inconsistency.
Finally, we have to note a minor censoring problem in the data. The re-
ported strike duration is exactly zero in 28 of 436 observations.7 In principle,
the censoring problem could be solved by application of suited estimation
6The bootstrap standard errors are considerably greater than the asymptotic ones in
our application.
7Contracting without strikes is distributed very unevenly above the countries: 14 zero
observations come from Switzerland, two from Sweden, and one from the Netherlands.
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procedures (ML-Tobit, Symmetrically Censored Least Squares (SCLS), Cen-
sored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD), Heckman-Selection). We abstain
from using such procedures, since two of them (ML-Tobit and Heckman-
Selection) require strong assumptions regarding the structure of error terms
and respond quite sensitively to violations. Beside this, the censoring prob-
lem (only about 6% of observations are censored) appears to be negligible.
Thus we simply drop the censored observations from the sample.
3.3 Estimation results
Our estimations are based on observations for the period 1973–2000 for the
OECD countries Austria (AUI), Australia (AUL), Belgium (BEL), Germany
(GER), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (UK), Italy (ITA),
Japan (JAP), Canada (CAN), New Zealand (NZ), the Netherlands (NL),
Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), and the USA (US). Let
us start with the results of the combined (centralisation and coordination)
indicator.
3.3.1 Results for the combined OECD indicator
Table 3.3 summarises all results for estimations with the combined indicator.
The upper, middle, and bottom panel relates to the linear, the Box-Cox,
and the log-linear specification, respectively. The left, middle, and right
block relates to (Prais-Winsten transformed) OLS estimates based on the full
sample, to (Prais-Winsten transformed) OLS estimates based on the outlier-
corrected sample, and the LAD (Median-Regression) results. The criterion
used for the elimination of possible outliers is DFBETAS = 0.1, i.e. all
observations causing a change of the medium or high centralisation dummy of
more that 10% of its standard deviation, are removed. We experimented also
with a less tight criterion DFBETAS = 0.25. The results are not reported
here, since they caused no noteworthy changes of significance levels.
As indicated by the low p-values of the centralisation dummy coefficients,
all specifications contain almost clear evidence in favour of strike-moderating
centralisation effects. The dummy COMhi, capturing highly centralised (and
coordinated) countries is significant in all specifications at the 5% level. From
the linear specifications we read that the effects are also of considerable
size: between 80 and 130 days per thousand workers (depending on the
specification). A eye-catching feature is their considerable difference between
columns. The difference between OLS regressions for the full and the outlier-
corrected sample tells us that the elimination of the 36 observations with the
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highest impact on the both centralisation dummy coefficients is considerable,
and thus put a small question mark on the robustness of the effect. On the
other hand,the OLS and the Median (LAD) regression coefficients cannot
be compared directly, since they measure different things: OLS coefficients
represent the impact of regressors on the conditional mean, LAD coefficients
represent the impact on the conditional median of the dependent variable.
They may differ considerably if the conditional distribution of the dependent
variable is skewed. Thus, an (in absolute value) higher coefficient of the mean
regression indicates that bargaining institutions exert stronger effects on the
upper quantiles, i.e. on countries with higher strike duration. Of course,
this interpretation presumes that the difference between both estimators is
not driven by outliers. Since we conducted the LAD regression mainly as
an indirect outlier and robustness check, we should be cautious with this
interpretation.
If one takes the results from the Box-Cox estimation seriously, only the
Box-Cox results should be considered as valid: χ2− Tests for H0 : λ = 1 and
H0 : λ = 0 are rejected at the 1% level, meaning that only the Box-Cox speci-
fication is correct. We report the linear and logarithmic specifications anyhow
because they are the ones employed usually in most macro estimations, and
doing without these ‘natural’ choices would raise suspicions. Additionally,
the specification changes can be taken as an additional (though very heuris-
tic) robustness check, since a really stable relation should not vanish due to
moderate changes of the functional form of the regression.
Besides the centralisation effects, some control variable effects deserve
attention. Unemployment (and all other control variables) are measured in
percent. Consequently, the coefficients of the linear specification give the
change in lost strike days due to a one percent increase of these variables.
Since the coefficient of the squared terms are quite small, the linear term
coefficients are good approximation to the marginal effects. Somewhat sur-
prising is the positive impact of unemployment which vanishes (because of
the negative squared term) only for considerably high levels of unemploy-
ment (above ca. 9%). The significant positive effects of inflation and the
output gap appear to be more in line with expectations. This is also the
case with the considerably high (but individually insignificant) time dummy
effect (not reported in the tables). They grow (in absolute value) from about
-50 in 1975 to about -150 at the end of the estimation period.
3.3.2 Results for the indicators CENT and COO
While the estimates for the coordination indicators are similar with the com-
bined index, the relation of significance levels is ‘crossed’ for the pure central-
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isation indicator, i.e. only intermediate bargaining levels bear a (marginally)
significant impact. In face of the numerous problems with measurement of
the centralisation indicators we do not try to create an intuitive explanation
for this, but are satisfied with the observation that the signs and sizes of the
effects remain stable after a change of the indicator.
3.4 Conclusion
Though our investigation leaves some uncertainties and question marks (like
many other empirical studies), we have shown that centralisation and coor-
dination of wage setting appear to have moderating effects on strike activity.
The findings are in line with several theories of strike activity and bargaining,
ranging from screening models to the simple transaction cost model.
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Variable Meaning
CENmed Dummy, = 1 for intermediate level of centralisation
CENhi Dummy, = 1 for high level of centralisation
COOmed Dummy, = 1 for intermediate level of coordination
COOhi Dummy, = 1 for high level of coordination
COMmed Dummy, = 1 if combined indicator takes on value 2
COMhi Dummy, = 1 if combined indicator takes on value 3
u Unemployment rate (source: OECD)
u2 Unemployment rate squared (source: OECD)
u¯ average of unemployment rate (over all countries in the
sample)
i Inflation rate (source: IMF)
i2 Inflation rate squared
GAP Output gap, computed as deviation of actual GDP
from smoothed GDP. Smoothing is performed with the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. value of the smoothing param-
eter is 50 for all countries.
Prais-Winsten OLS estimation of the Prais-Winsten transformed re-
gression equation
Obs. Number of observations in the sample
PV P-value
R2 Coefficient of Determination (R2); Pseudo-R2 in LAD
estimation
ρ estimated coefficient of the AR(1)-Process represent-
ing serial correlation of the residuals (used to build the
Prais-Winsten regression
All dummy variables with subscript med (hi) take on value unity if the respective OECD
indicators take on value2 (3), and zero otherwise. Ranges of all used OECD indicators
are {1, 2, 3}. Consequently decentralised/uncoordinated countries form the (omitted)
base category.
All estimations contain additionally a constant and 12 time dummies. The dummies are
for each two years unity (and 0 otherwise); formally:
Dx−1/x =
{
1 if t = x or t = x− 1
0 otherwise
All coefficients of the time dummies (not reported in the tables) are negative (omitted base
period is 1974–1974) and show a negative trend, but only some are individually significant.
F-Tests for common significance on all dummies always rejected the null hypothesis
H0 : D75/76 = D77/78 = · · · = D97/98 = 0 in the OLS and Prais-Winsten regressions.
The two-year coding was chosen because perfect collinearity occurred otherwise in some
regressions.
Table 3.2: Legend for tables 3.3 bis 3.5
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Dependent variable: days lost per thousand employees (y)
Estimator Prais-Winsten Prais-Winsten Median-Regression
DFBETAS < 0.1
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
COMmed -55.62 -1.16 0.24 -37.09 -1.50 0.13 -30.22 -1.65 0.05
COMhi -129.74 -2.49 0.01 -100.31 -3.43 0.00 -80.20 -4.60 0.00
u 66.54 3.15 0.00 51.47 4.63 0.00 33.11 3.71 0.00
u2 -3.33 -1.92 0.06 -2.36 -2.68 0.01 -1.45 -2.51 0.01
u¯ -33.42 -0.82 0.41 -4.60 -0.20 0.84 -0.15 0.06 0.48
i 31.88 2.82 0.01 7.42 1.13 0.26 5.02 0.78 0.22
i2 -0.43 -0.90 0.37 0.96 3.23 0.00 1.39 2.01 0.02
GAP 8.55 1.04 0.30 11.59 2.28 0.02 5.02 1.47 0.07
obs. 438 402 438
R2 0.24 0.42 0.25
ρ 0.36 0.37
Dependent variable: (yλ − 1)/λ, λ = 0.12
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
COMmed 0.05 0.18 0.85 -0.04 -0.17 0.86 -0.29 -1.10 0.14
COMhi -0.85 -2.37 0.02 -1.44 -4.51 0.00 -1.84 -4.33 0.00
u 0.87 5.86 0.00 0.85 6.31 0.00 0.96 4.70 0.00
u2 -0.03 -2.79 0.01 -0.03 -3.12 0.00 -0.04 -2.23 0.01
u¯ -0.03 -0.09 0.92 -0.09 -0.34 0.74 0.14 0.58 0.28
i 0.48 4.81 0.00 0.49 5.52 0.00 0.58 4.27 0.00
i2 -0.01 -2.62 0.01 -0.01 -3.15 0.00 -0.01 -2.04 0.02
GAP 0.20 2.90 0.00 0.23 3.42 0.00 0.21 3.11 0.00
obs. 438 404 438
R2 0.41 0.53 0.40
ρ 0.30 0.36
Dependent variable: ln(y)
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
COMmed 0.07 0.38 0.70 0.06 0.35 0.72 -0.09 -0.55 0.29
COMhi -0.46 -1.90 0.06 -0.81 -3.61 0.00 -1.06 -3.43 0.00
u 0.59 5.87 0.00 0.58 5.87 0.00 0.59 4.49 0.00
u2 -0.02 -2.81 0.01 -0.02 -2.90 0.00 -0.02 -2.00 0.02
u¯ 0.03 0.13 0.89 -0.12 -0.75 0.45 0.28 0.54 0.30
i 0.33 4.71 0.00 0.34 5.60 0.00 0.40 4.41 0.00
i2 -0.01 -2.77 0.01 -0.01 -3.73 0.00 -0.01 -2.55 0.01
GAP 0.14 2.99 0.00 0.15 3.46 0.00 0.17 3.09 0.00
obs. 438 406 438
R2 0.40 0.47 0.39
ρ 0.32 0.40
For definitions of variables and further explanations see table 3.2
Table 3.3: Regression results for the linear, Box-Cox and the log-linear speci-
fication; indicator of centralisation: combined indicator of centralisation and
coordination (OECD, 1997).
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Dependent variable: days lost per thousand employees (y)
Estimator Prais-Winsten Prais-Winsten Median-Regression
DFBETAS < 0.1
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
CENmed -86.68 -1.92 0.06 -57.90 -2.11 0.04 -63.06 -4.10 0.00
CENhi -103.01 -1.36 0.17 -97.23 -2.40 0.02 -98.14 -2.67 0.00
u 0.65 2.99 0.00 0.54 5.33 0.00 0.30 3.31 0.00
u2 0.00 -1.76 0.08 0.00 -3.21 0.00 0.00 -1.90 0.03
u¯ -0.36 -0.88 0.38 -0.35 -1.71 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.35
i 32.10 2.79 0.01 4.69 0.66 0.51 8.72 1.05 0.15
i2 -0.43 -0.88 0.38 1.10 3.54 0.00 1.31 1.97 0.02
GAP 9.11 1.08 0.28 10.62 2.08 0.04 4.83 1.36 0.09
obs. 438 398 438
R2 0.23 0.42 0.24
ρ 0.37 0.42
Dependent variable: (yλ − 1)/λ, λ = 0.12
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
CENmed -0.43 -1.31 0.19 -0.62 -2.10 0.04 -0.90 -3.16 0.00
CENhi -0.32 -0.66 0.51 -0.73 -1.59 0.11 -0.53 -1.30 0.10
u 0.01 5.71 0.00 0.01 6.85 0.00 0.01 4.24 0.00
u2 0.00 -2.49 0.00 0.00 -3.42 0.00 0.00 -1.86 0.03
u¯ 0.00 -0.18 0.85 0.00 -0.26 0.79 0.00 0.60 0.27
i 0.47 4.74 0.00 0.51 5.31 0.00 0.56 4.00 0.00
i2 -0.01 -2.39 0.02 -0.01 -3.13 0.00 -0.01 -1.66 0.05
GAP 0.21 2.95 0.00 0.17 2.64 0.01 0.17 2.73 0.00
obs. 438 401 438
R2 0.40 0.51 0.39
ρ 0.30 0.37
Dependent variable: ln(y)
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
CENmed -0.24 -1.09 0.28 -0.33 -1.63 0.10 -0.47 -2.78 0.00
CENhi -0.08 -0.26 0.80 -0.37 -1.20 0.23 -0.19 -0.88 0.19
u 0.01 5.78 0.00 0.01 6.71 0.00 0.01 4.24 0.00
u2 0.00 -2.55 0.02 0.00 -3.25 0.00 0.00 -1.77 0.04
u¯ 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00 -0.31 0.76 0.00 0.44 0.33
i 0.32 4.66 0.00 0.36 5.60 0.00 0.40 4.26 0.00
i2 -0.01 -2.53 0.01 -0.01 -3.55 0.00 -0.01 -2.07 0.02
GAP 0.15 3.06 0.00 0.13 2.93 0.00 0.13 3.04 0.00
obs. 438 406 438
R2 0.39 0.47 0.38
ρ 0.31 0.38
For definitions of variables and further explanations see table 3.2
Table 3.4: Regression results for the linear, Box-Cox and the log-linear speci-
fication; indicator of centralisation: indicator of centralisation (OECD, 1997).
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Dependent variable: days lost per 1000 employees(y)
Estimator Prais-Winsten Prais-Winsten Median-Regression
DFBETAS < 0.1
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
COOmed 32.71 0.76 0.45 -23.71 -0.96 0.34 -37.28 -0.96 0.17
COOhi -106.90 -2.33 0.02 -107.78 -3.70 0.00 -90.92 -3.86 0.00
u 0.65 3.06 0.00 0.50 4.54 0.00 0.30 3.30 0.00
u2 0.00 -2.02 0.04 0.00 -2.77 0.01 0.00 -2.25 0.01
u¯ -0.35 -0.88 0.38 -0.24 -1.13 0.26 -0.12 -0.38 0.35
i 26.36 2.42 0.02 1.18 0.19 0.85 3.46 0.29 0.39
i2 -0.23 -0.50 0.62 1.10 3.95 0.00 1.23 2.04 0.02
GAP 8.59 1.06 0.29 10.01 2.10 0.04 5.05 1.43 0.08
Beob. 438 400 438
R2 0.24 0.42 0.25
ρ 0.35 0.36
Dependent variable: (yλ − 1)/λ, λ = 0.12
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
COOmed -0.22 -0.68 0.50 -0.33 -1.31 0.19 -0.64 -1.58 0.06
COOhi -1.14 -3.22 0.00 -1.78 -5.59 0.00 -1.84 -4.30 0.00
u 0.01 5.36 0.00 0.01 6.05 0.00 0.01 3.64 0.00
u2 0.00 -2.57 0.01 0.00 -3.54 0.00 0.00 -1.66 0.05
u¯ 0.00 -0.12 0.90 0.00 0.19 0.85 0.00 0.20 0.42
i 0.44 4.51 0.00 0.50 5.94 0.00 0.46 3.85 0.00
i2 -0.01 -2.31 0.02 -0.01 -3.43 0.00 -0.01 -1.63 0.05
GAP 0.20 2.96 0.00 0.22 3.64 0.00 0.23 2.75 0.00
Beob. 438 391 438
R2 0.41 0.60 0.40
ρ 0.31 0.34
Dependent variable: ln(y)
Coeff. coeff. t PV coeff. t PV coeff. z PV
COOmed -0.17 -0.80 0.42 -0.23 -1.39 0.17 -0.37 -1.54 0.06
COOhi -0.65 -2.74 0.01 -1.12 -5.26 0.00 -1.16 -4.16 0.00
u 0.01 5.42 0.00 0.01 5.49 0.00 0.00 3.37 0.00
u2 0.00 -2.58 0.01 0.00 -3.12 0.00 0.00 -1.49 0.07
u¯ 0.00 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.03 0.98 0.00 0.37 0.35
i 0.30 4.52 0.00 0.32 5.61 0.00 0.33 4.22 0.00
i2 -0.01 -2.56 0.01 -0.01 -3.51 0.00 -0.01 -2.19 0.01
GAP 0.14 3.04 0.00 0.14 3.55 0.00 0.13 2.60 0.00
Beob. 438 395 438
0.40 0.53 0.39 0.39
ρ 0.32 0.39
For definitions of variables and further explanations see table 3.2
Table 3.5: Regression results for the linear, Box-Cox and the log-linear speci-
fication; indicator of centralisation: indicator of coordination (OECD, 1997).
Chapter 4
Two Centralisation Models
with Heterogenous Firms
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the introduction of the book, pleas against centralised bar-
gaining are often backed up by the argumentation that wages have to re-
flect heterogeneity of firms, regions and industries in order to obtain efficient
markte outcomes, and that decentralised bargaining matches these flexibility
requirements.
In this chapter we construct two models capturing certain aspects of firm
heterogeneity and show that they do not yield unambiguous results against
centralisation of wage bargaining. The first model is a straightforward ap-
plication of Robinson’s (1933) work on monopolistic discrimination. Though
the results can be derived in a quite general form, it is difficult to provide
an intuitive interpretation of the conditions required for positive (or negative
effects of centralisation. Among other problems, the model suffers from the
fact that the aggregation problem is solved by assuming it away (this will
become clear below).
The second model tries to address this problem by deriving the centralised
union objective using the median voter approach. Though things appear
more involved at the outset, it is easier to derive intuitive conditions for
positive (or negative) employment effects of centralisation in this modelling
framework.
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4.2 A Robinsonian Model of Union Wage
Discrimination∗
4.2.1 Introduction
We try to show here that employment and welfare effects are ambiguous for
a certain class of models. And we show that (in these models) an unam-
biguous relation of employment and welfare may not exist. Consequently,
positive employment effects of decentralisation in wage bargaining may be
simply waste of human resources. The result, originally relating to price
discrimination of monopolists, is not new. It was discovered by Robinson
(1933) long time ago and generalized by Edwards (1950) and Shih, Mai, &
Liu (1988). However, to the best of my knowledge, its implications for wage
setting institutions were not realised until now.
We do not claim the Robinson-argument to be of high relevance or to
dominate other aspects of centralisation. As we explain below, there are good
reasons to suspect that it is at least extremely difficult to test the argument
empirically or to assess its relevance. Thus the message of the model to
economists is rather: ‘be careful if you argue in favour of less centralisation
and be aware of the holes and uncertainties in your knowledge about the
issue.’
The idea is simple enough to be explained in five sentences: Consider a
union operating in an economy with (at least) two firms or sectors. Firms are
exposed to stochastic demand shocks1 which in turn imply different elastici-
ties of the firms’ labour demands (this is the core aspect of the model). Most
models on centralisation of wage negotiations ignore such heterogeneity. This
has two important reasons. The first is that economists prefer models without
stochastic shocks and firm heterogeneity, because they make models complex
and intractable in many circumstances.2 The second is that the frequency of
employment adjustments is higher than the frequency of wage negotiations
in practice. In theoretical models, this is accounted for by assuming that un-
certainty over labour demand prevails when wage negotiations take place and
∗An earlier version of this model was presented at the annual conference of the ‘Verein
fu¨r Socialpolitik’ 2002. I am indebted to the session participants, to Ekkehart Schlicht,
Michael Burda, Bernhard Rauch, Joachim Mo¨ller and Lutz Arnold for helpful comments.
1We do not formalize the type of demand shocks explicitly, but assume (for simplicity)
that they are serially uncorrelated. As will become clear below, the specific form of demand
shocks is not important.
2Fitzenberger & Franz (1999, 2000) are exceptions here. However they assume that
bargaining takes place before the shocks are revealed. Thus firms are homogenous ex ante
in their model.
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that employment adjustment is realized if demand uncertainty is resolved (at
least partially). But this is an idealization, since there remains much hetero-
geneity between firms or sectors even in the medium run. A large strand of
empirical literature is suggestive for this view (see Oi & Idson, 1986; Wag-
ner, 1997 for surveys on firm size effects and Lewis, 1986 for union effects).
Though it may be a good idea to exclude heterogeneity if some other aspects
of wage negotiations are focussed, an explicit analysis may yield additional
insights.
Consider the union as a monopolist who has the option to set the same
wage in both (all) firms or to discriminate between firms. This is simply
third degree price discrimination (see Varian, 1989). As is well known from
the literature, price discrimination increases profits (if there are no additional
costs associated with a discriminatory policy) and thus is pursued by monop-
olistic firms whenever possible. In our context this implied that unions prefer
firm level bargaining. At this stage of our investigation we do not consider
this problem by pointing to possibly high fixed costs associated with decen-
tralised negotiations3. These costs maybe come in the form of bargaining
costs or psychic cost which, in turn, depend on institutions and customs. Es-
pecially if firms are exposed to random demand fluctuations, their fate may
change again and again and therefore require corresponding wage changes.
Such distortions disappear at a more central level. Instead we ask for the
implications regarding employment. The results are readily available from
the literature mentioned above.
The plan of this section is as follows: in section 4.2.2 we review the re-
sults from Shih et al. (1988) and give some interpretations. Then we outline
a welfare analysis backed up with some illustrative numerical examples. The
conclusion discusses some implications and tries to assess the empirical rele-
vance of the issue.
4.2.2 Employment Effects
As emphasized in the introduction, the model is not new, the exposition
follows Shih et al. (1988) on the heels. The only contribution of this sec-
tion is to note that Robinson’s analysis may have significant implications for
bargaining outcomes.
In order to keep things tractable, we consider a monopoly union which is
able to set wages unilaterally for K firms.4 We start with the union utility
3However, we will discuss some implications of these costs in the welfare analysis.
4We did not check explicitly whether the result is invariant to a change of the bargaining
structure (substitution of the unilateral wage setting procedure by a Nash bargaining
solution). But we suspect that this would only complicate the computations and bear no
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function
U(n1, ..., nK) =
∑
i
ui(ni) (4.1)
where ui(ni) = u˜i(wi(ni), ni) is utility from employment ni in firm i and
wi(ni) is the (inverse) labour demand function of firm i. We assume U(...)
to be a sum or linear combination of the ui in order to rule out masked
aggregation effects.5 Furthermore, the model is formulated in real terms in
order to study isolated effects of discrimination. To obtain a clear and con-
sistent notation, we define vi(wi) := u˜i(wi, ni(wi)). Note that extending the
utility definition by adding an alternative wage (for example unemployment
compensation), i.e. substituting wi by wi − b does not change the results.
Therefore, we work with the simpler version for expositional convenience.
Note that the (inverse) labour demand functions are subscripted with
index i to represent labour demand heterogeneity and that labour demand
functions are independent here, i.e. labour demand of firm i does depend only
on its own wage. The latter assumption excludes wage competition between
firms and is therefore not fully realistic. Though it were in principle possi-
ble to admit competition, this would complicate the analysis considerably,
and is likely to yield little additional insight. In the case of perfect competi-
tion, wage differentials could not prevail. In this case our analysis would be
groundless.6 However, if wage competition takes on moderate forms, wage
differentiation will be restricted and reduce the employment effects. Because
of this, our analysis models the extreme case and overstates the true effects.
We put no further restrictions on the functional form7 of the wi(.) but
we assume that they are such that the utility maximisation problems of the
union possess unique solutions.
Now let us consider the union utility maximisation problems. If the union
discriminates (or if local unions set wages at the firm level independently of
each other), the set of first order conditions
u′i(ni) = 0, for i = 1, ..., K (4.2)
must hold.
If a central union instead fixes the same wage for all firms, the following
condition must hold:
d
dw
∑
i
vi(w) ≡
∑
i
v′i(w) = 0 (4.3)
additional findings.
5Of course, the additive separable form also simplifies the derivations below dramati-
cally, enabling us to obtain conclusive results at all.
6Cf. section 2.4.8 for further remarks and references.
7I.e. the wi(.) may have different functional forms.
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Since ni(wi) is the inverse of wi(ni), we get (with wi := w for i = 1, .., K)
8
∑
i
v′i(w) =
∑
i
u′i(ni)
w′i(ni)
= 0 (4.4)
Let n∗i be the number of employees in firm i under wage discrimination
and n0i be the employment for non-discriminatory wages. The mean value
theorem tells us that there exist n¯i between n
0
i and n
∗
i such that
u′i(n
0
i ) = u
′
i(n
∗
i ) + (n
0
i − n∗i )u′′i (n¯i) (4.5)
holds.
Now let S be a set containing all firm indices for which w∗i > w
0
i and
n∗i < n
0
i . Correspondingly, W contains the indices of firms with w
∗
i < w
0
i and
n∗i > n
0
i . The sets S and W simply comprise firms where the union is in a
strong and weak bargaining position, respectively. Then
n∗i < n¯i < n
0
i ∀i ∈ S
n0i < n¯i < n
∗
i ∀i ∈ W. (4.6)
Using u′i(n
∗
i ) ≡ 0 we can modify equation (4.5) and get
u′i(n
0
i )
w′i(n
0
i )
= (n0i − n∗i )
u′′i (n¯i)
w′i(n
0
i )
. (4.7)
After summation over i and substitution into equation (4.4), we arrive at∑
i
(n0i − n∗i )
u′′i (n¯i)
w′i(n
0
i )
= 0. (4.8)
Now define
E0i :=
w′i(n
0
i )
u′′i (n
0
i )
and Vi :=
u′′i (n
0
i )
u′′i (n¯i)
(4.9)
Then (4.8) can be written as∑
i∈S
(n0i − n∗i )
1
E0i Vi
=
∑
i∈W
(n∗i − n0i )
1
E0i Vi
(4.10)
This is the central formula of the model. In oder to interpret it, first observe
that
E0i T 1/2 ⇔ w′′i (ni) T 0 ∀i (4.11)
8The equality v′i(wi) = u
′
i(ni)/w
′
i(ni) becomes clear if we expand the derivatives
u′i(ni) = u˜
(1)
i w
′
i(ni) + u˜
(2)
i and v
′
i(wi) = u˜
(1)
i + u˜
(2)
i n
′
i(wi) where u˜
(h)
i denotes the par-
tial derivative of u˜i with respect to its h-th argument.
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As regards Vi, it is clear that Vi > 0 ∀ i (this would hold even if ui were
globally convex). Furthermore we have
Vi S 1⇔ u′′′i (ni) T 0 ∀i ∈ S
Vi T 1⇔ u′′′i (ni) T 0 ∀i ∈ W
(4.12)
If ui has the simple form wi(ni)ni, its second and third derivative are
u′′i (ni) = niw
′′
i (ni) + 2w
′
i(ni) (4.13)
u′′′(ni) = niw′′′i (ni) + 3w
′′
i (ni). (4.14)
From (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12) we see immediately that the degree of cen-
tralisation has no impact on total employment if all labour demand functions
are linear, since then E0i and Vi are constant and equal for both groups. Since
all other results are analogous to Proposition 2 in Shih et al. (1988) we simply
repeat it here (with minor modifications):
Proposition 1 If all values of E0i Vi in K firms are equal, then total em-
ployment is the same under discrimination (local wage setting) as it is under
simple central wage setting. Moreover, if the value of E0i Vi in each of the
firms in W is greater than that of E0i Vi in all of the firms in S, then total
employment will be greater under discrimination, and vice versa.
A remark of Edwards (1950) is simply a special case of this: If K = 2,
if both marginal utilities are concave, and if the slope ratio in the firm with
more elastic demand is smaller than that in the less elastic one at central
wage setting, then total output under discrimination is less than under central
wage setting. Here ’slope ratio’ means the slope of the labour demand curve
of firm i divided by the slope of the utility corresponding to firm i.
Shih et al. (1988) formulate corollaries dealing with special cases and
explaining the relations between their general derivation and the results in
Robinson (1933), Edwards (1950) and Formby, Layson, & Smith (1983). We
do not repeat them here, because they are of minor importance in our context.
As should be clear now, the result above tells us that higher employment
is possible with both centralised or decentralised wage setting. The outcome
depends on the curvature of labour demand functions and of the union utility
function. This result is interesting, but of course welfare is more important.
Unfortunately, I didn’t manage to derive a general welfare analysis until
now. Therefore I proceed by considering some important cases and by listing
numerical examples showing that also welfare effects may be ambiguous in
some cases.
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4.2.3 Welfare Analysis
Before we step into the details of the numeric examples let us pause for a
moment to consider some fundamental issues concerning the union utility
and welfare.
As mentioned above, the definition of the union utility function is very
special and ignores some important aspects. It is sensible to use this special
form in order to eliminate aggregation problems and employment changes
(artifacts) generated by the functional form of the utility function. But
when considering welfare, we have to remember that wage discrimination
maximises union utility for additive separable utility functions. I.e. in our
setting the union will set equal wages only if exogenous (for example insti-
tutional or legal) restrictions urge it to do so. If centralised bargaining takes
place in absence of exogenous restrictions, then we can conclude from a re-
vealed preference argument that either discrimination is associated with costs
overcompensating its gains9 or workers have a strong preference for egalitar-
ian wages. In these cases, equal wages maximise welfare in our setting, since
gross production is maximised in this economy by equalization of marginal
productivities between firms.10 Thus we arrive at the clear result that equal
wages are efficient in an economy where unions deliberately set equal wages.
Of course, this result depends heavily on the assumption that our model is
the correct one in reality.
In other cases, we obtain no unique results. Consider the welfare measure
W =
∑
i
vi(wi) + pi
∗
i (wi)
where the asterisk indicates that pii is maximised with respect to ni and write
the difference in welfare between central and local wage setting (W 0 −W ∗)
9This argument hinges on the assumption that the information on costs available to
the union is reliable.
10This is simply the law of one price.
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using the mean value theorem11
W 0 −W ∗ =
∑
i
(w − w∗i )
∂W
∂wi
∣∣∣∣
wi=w¯i
=
∑
i
(w − w∗i ){v′i(w¯i)− ni(w¯i)}
=
∑
i
(n0i − n∗i ){u′i(n¯i)− w′i(nˆi)n¯i}
where the last line follows from a further application of the mean value theo-
rem: (w−w∗i ) = (n0i −n∗i )w′i(nˆi). Again, one could split the sum into subsets
with strong and weak firms. However, I didn’t manage to obtain any further
clear results because of the complexity of these expressions.12
Therefore, we illustrate the ambiguity of centralisation with respect to
employment and welfare using a simple utility function of the form
U(n1, n2) =
∑
i
ui(ni) =
∑
i
= wi(ni)ni
and CES production functions
fi(ni) = θi {(aini)ρi + 1}1/ρi i = 1, 2
Unfortunately, even with these simple functional forms, the problem of
the central union cannot be solved symbolically, forcing us to use a numerical
solution procedure. We compute relative employment and welfare changes
by varying some parameters of the production functions and by evaluating
the union maximisation problem numerically for the respective parameter
values.
The two columns of the figure represent each one example. In row 1 of
each column, you find two (inverse) labour demand functions representing
the extreme cases of the considered scenarios. Row 2 contains a graph show-
ing the relative employment difference (ncent−nloc)/nloc between centralised
and decentralised wage setting. And row 3 contains the corresponding rel-
ative welfare differences based on the simple unweighted utilitarian welfare
definition
W = u(n1) + u(n2) + f1(n1)− w1n1 + f2(n2)− w2n2
11The strategy to obtain lower and upper bounds to the welfare change by Taylor ap-
proximations around W 0 and W ∗ is not applicable here since we cannot assume W to
be convex nor concave around W 0 or W ∗ without further assumptions. Furthermore, the
differences n0i − n∗i are not marginal ones.
12As the following numerical examples show/suggest, the sign of this expression is not
unique. But the examples are only casual evidence and do not allow more general state-
ments.
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Figure 4.1: inverse labour demand functions (row 1), relative employment
(row 2) and welfare (row 3) differences
Parameter values in production functions The range notations [α, ω] indicate that the
corresponding parameter is varied within α and ω to obtain the graphs.
column a1 a2 ρ1 ρ2 θ1 θ2
1 [1, 4] 1 -1.5 -1.5 1 1
2 2 1 -2 -1.5 [1,4] 1
Even these two examples demonstrate that almost everything can hap-
pen. Centralisation may be accompanied by positive employment and welfare
effects (left hand side). But other cases are possible as well. The right hand
side graphs show scenarios where negative employment effects are associated
with positive welfare effects and vice versa.
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4.2.4 Conclusion with some Qualifications
The main aim of the model is to show that employment and welfare effects
of decentralisation in wage bargaining are ambiguous if labour demand het-
erogeneity plays a significant role. This contrasts the view held by many
economists that more flexibility or additional degrees of freedom in utility
optimization ‘automagically’ increase employment and welfare. Furthermore,
the setting suggests that employment effects may be a wrong indicator for
welfare considerations.
The plan to gather empirical evidence suitable to feed the model with
empirical content appears impracticable, since firm heterogeneity is a central
issue here and therefore an econometrican would have to estimate labour
demand functions at the firm or sector level allowing for heterogeneity and
flexibility in functional forms.
At the theoretical level, our model shares an important shortcoming of
all economic models: It considers some – possibly relevant – aspects of the
centralisation debate and ignores many others. Thus we should not close the
discussion without some remarks regarding the problems assumed away in
our model.
A possibly crucial blind spot of the model concerns worker mobility. Ef-
ficiency of centralised wage setting is often justified by the argument that
wage equalisation ‘simulates’ competition, and by this fosters reallocation
of workers to the most productive firms/jobs. Our model does not address
this issue directly, since the assumption of independent firm labour demand
functions implicitly excludes noteworthy mobility of workers: basically every
firm resides on an island with its own pool of workers. The law of one price
works nevertheless in face of unemployment, since unemployment is lower in
the islands with more productive firms.
A further issue, stressed often by proponents of more decentralised bar-
gaining, but disregarded in our model, concerns shutdown costs of firms. If
firms are hit by averse shocks, centralised collective wage agreements may
hinder them to adjust wages (temporarily) to avoid a shutdown. Firm or
plant closures may generate noteworthy loss of tangible and intangible (accu-
mulated knowledge, experience etc.) assets and thus imply significant welfare
losses. A closer inspection of the empirical evidence reveals, however, that
this argument suffers from a clear foundation. At least in Germany, many
collective wage agreements contain provisions for such cases (cf. Bundesmin-
isterium, 2001, 2002; Freter, 1998) e.g. hardship clauses,13 allowing firms
and their workers to deviate from standard wages if they are hit by adverse
13For a short compilation of hardship clauses and other and special case regulations in
German collective wage agreements c.f. Bundesministerium (2002), pages 29ff.
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shocks. Qualitative empirical evidence even shows that these clauses are not
very strict, since many firms apparently do not exploit applicable exceptions,
see for example Oppolzer & Zachert (2000).
Nevertheless, proponents of decentralised bargaining assess the conditions
for the application of hardship clauses as too restrictive (cf. Freter, 1998).
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any founded empirical (case) studies es-
tablishing that restrictiveness of hardship clauses be responsible for plant
closures. In some sense this debate seems to be motivated by the attempt to
make curls on a bald head, since membership in firms is voluntary in Germany
and generally binding collective wage agreements (‘Allgemeinverbindlichkeit-
serkla¨rungen’) do not play a significant role anymore. Bundesministerium
(2001) reports that only 53 of 14518 collective wage agreements fixing wages
are declared generally binding in 2001 in Germany.14
Our model ignores also – possibly important – costs of local bargaining,
namely for additional bargaining costs. As emphasized often by bargain-
ing practitioners, real time costs (time required for bargaining and writing
the contract) and psychic cost (social peace) of local bargaining may be
considerable. Most empirical evidence collected by social psychologists and
sociologists is in favour of this position and shows that also managers agree
with union representatives on this issue.15
To summarize, the mode adds a further question mark regarding the
centralisation debate and extends the strand of models where the chance to
obtain clear empirical evidence is out of reach.
14The term ‘generally binding’ is somewhat misleading, since many of these ‘generally
binding’ contracts relate to narrows defined occupational groups in certain regions. Again
we remind that the declaration of generally binding contracts requires unanimous requests
of unions and employers.
15Cf. the detailed case studies by Kotthoff (1981), Kotthoff & Reindl (1990). In his
interviews managers often emphasize the importance of ‘social peace’ in the work force.
And they repeat the pacifying force of wage and job standard rules coming from outside
again and again. E.g. managers are happy to be able to prevent the access of unions to
working councils and admit that this is alleviated by centrally set wages.
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4.3 A Median Voter Model of Centralisa-
tion∗
4.3.1 Introduction
A weakness of the model presented in the last section is, that it rests upon a
somewhat ad hoc specification of the union utility function U =
∑
i ui(wi, ni).
Here we replace this ad hoc specification by another one: The median voter
mechanism. Though the median voter approach is not less problematic in our
view, since the existence of a voting equilibrium depends on single peakedness
of worker utility functions and thus is applicable only as long as wages are
the only concern of workers (cf. the discussion in section 2.3.1), it provides
a consistent micro foundation of the aggregation problem in bargaining and
therefore is approbated by many economists.
We anticipate that the employment effects are not unique. We are able
to state some general properties of utility and production functions which
are responsible for the direction of the employment effects, but this is only
possible at the cost of realism, i.e. we have to confine the analysis to a very
simple setting with two firms (or industries) only. An important shortcom-
ing of the ‘general’ statements it that they are hardly testable empirically.
Therefore the model leaves many questions unanswered.
In the following section we present a general formulation of the model.
Then we try to obtain some general statements regarding employment effects
of centralisation. Since the general statements are rather weak and give us no
clue about the magnitude and relative importance of the effects, we illustrate
them in a small simulation, and conclude the section with a short discussion
of the central model assumptions.
4.3.2 The Model
The framework of our voting model follows Blair & Crawford (1984). Blair
& Crawford investigate the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
a voting equilibrium in union member decisions. To clarify things in the
employment and welfare analysis later on, our notation is a little bit more
fussy than theirs.
Labour demand of firm i is
ni = max{0, φi(wi) + θi + ξi}
∗An earlier version of this model was presented at the annual EALE conference in
Sevilla. I am indebted to the session participants, Ekkehart Schlicht, Bernhard Rauch,
Joachim Mo¨ller, and Lutz Arnold for helpful comments.
4.3. A MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 149
with φ′i(wi) < 0.
16 θi denotes a random disturbance term which is revealed
after bargaining has taken place whereas ξi is known before contracting. Note
that the additive form φi(wi) + θi implies a shock having no effect on labour
demand and technology parameters. Therefore, additiveness of shocks is
plausible in the short run since, for this period, the Leontieff technology is a
good approximation to reality. This argument is much weaker for ξ, since ξ
represents (at least) medium run heterogeneity between firms which has more
structure in reality, and should be represented by differences in production
function parameters.
The max operator eliminates the possibility that demand could become
negative for sufficient small values of θi and ξi. The interpretation is straight-
forward: If φi(w) < −θi − ξi, the firm closes down. Depending on the distri-
bution of ξi, there is a positive probability that this happens. At this stage
of our analysis, we take ξi as given (deterministic).
To employ the median voter theorem for our analysis, we have to check
whether the expected utility functions of all workers are single-peaked. To
this aim consider the utility maximisation problem of a worker with seniority
s and von-Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility function
E[U(w|s)] = u(w)P [n > s] + u(b)P [n < s]
with wage w and alternative income level b which is assumed to be exogenous
in our simple setting. u(w) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable
with u′(w) > 0 and u′′(w) < 0, i.e. workers are risk-averse.17 Usage of the
seniority index s implies that we assume the existence of a unique ordering of
all workers (including unemployed ones) prescribing in which order employees
are dismissed if labour demand decreases.18
After substitution of n we can write the probability that the worker be-
comes unemployed P (n < s) as F (s−ni(w)−ξi) where F (.) is the cumulative
16The max operator is introduced here to handle the possibility that θi < −φi(wi)− ξi.
This saves us to restrict the range of θi. Blair & Crawford are a little bit sloppy here.
They omit the max operator and point to the fact that “the assumption of an additive
Error can lead to negative labor demand, a situation that is clearly impossible. This
specification was chosen largely for expositional convenience.” With the max operator the
obvious interpretation is that the firm is shut down (i.e. employment of the firm is zero)
with strictly positive probability.
17Note that we deviate here from Blair & Crawford (1984) by removing the index relating
to u(·). We do this for convenience (since even then the model contains more heterogeneity
in the model than we can handle).
18We use the term ’seniority’ in a metaphorical manner, since seniority is not the only cri-
terion commanding dismissal. For unemployed workers it is not applicable at all. However,
other properties of workers may substitute seniority, for example productivity differences
not reflected by remuneration. For a discussion of the problems associated with a seniority
index see Blair & Crawford (1984), Grossman (1983), Burda (1990).
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distribution function of θi (without loss of generality we can set the expecta-
tion of θi to zero
19). Then a more explicit expression of the expected utility
is
E[U(w|s)] = u(w){1− F (s− φ(w)− ξi)}+ u(b)F (s− φ(w)− ξi)
with first and second order conditions
∂
∂w
E[U(w|s)] = u′(w){1− F (θ¯i)}+ φ′(w)f(θ¯){u(w)− u(b)} = 0(4.15)
∂2
∂w2
E[U(w|s)] = 2f(θ¯i)u′(w)φ′(w) + (1− F (θ¯i))u′′(w) (4.16)
+(u(w)− u(b)){f(θ¯i)φ′′(w)− f ′(θ¯i)φ′(w)2 < 0}
where θ¯i := s−φ(w)−ξi. Blair & Crawford (1984) show (by setting (4.15) to
zero and straightforward manipulation) that E[U(w|s)] has a unique maxi-
mum if the inverse mill’s ratio
f(θ¯)
1− F (θ¯) (4.17)
is increasing and the expression
−u′(w)
φ′i(w)(u(w)− u(b))
(4.18)
is decreasing in w. We do not try to present an exhausting analysis of the
conditions necessary to guarantee single-peakedness of expected utility here
but assume here simply that they are met.20
By setting the derivative in (4.15) to zero, we obtain the preferred wage,
call it ω(ξ, s) of a worker with seniority s as an implicit function of the
parameters b, ξi and the parameters of the distribution function F (θ). Let
us pause here for a moment to derive some results on the derivatives and
shape of ω. The derivatives ∂ω/∂s and ∂ω/∂ξ are of central interest in our
context. ∂ω/∂s is obtained by implicit differentiation
∂ω
∂s
= −∂
2E[U ]/∂w∂s
∂2E[U ]/∂w2
Since ∂2E[U ]/∂w2 must be negative (by utility maximisation), the sign
of ω′(s) is equal to the sign of the numerator
∂2
∂w∂s
E[U(w|s)] = φ′(w){u(w)− u(b)}f ′(θ¯)− u′(w)f(θ¯)
19This is so because ni is shifted by ξ.
20Again we refer to the relevant literature Blair & Crawford (1984), Grossman (1983),
and Burda (1990).
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To show that this is negative we substitute φ′(w) from (4.15) to obtain
∂2
∂w∂s
E[U(w|s)] = −u′(w)
{
f ′(θ¯)
f(θ¯)
(1− F (θ¯)) + f(θ¯)
}
As noted above, single-peakedness requires the inverse mills ratio (4.17) to
be an increasing function of w. Substitution of this condition, i.e.
d
dw
[
f(θ¯)
1− F (θ¯)
]
=− φ′(w)f(θ¯)
2 − {1− F (θ¯)}f ′(θ¯)
{1− F (θ¯)}2 > 0
⇔ f(θ¯)2 − {1− F (θ¯)}f ′(θ¯) > 0
into the expression in curly braces of (4.3.2) gives the (in no respect surpris-
ing) result. Since ξ appears like s inside f(·) and f ′(·) but with opposite
sign, dω/dξ > 0 by the same argument. Below we will find that the second
derivatives of ω play an important role in the evaluation of centralisation or
decentralisation. Unfortunately, we could not derive a unique sign for these
derivatives. The attempt to characterise more general intuitive conditions
for a unique sign were unsuccessful too. After insertion of all available re-
strictions (the first order condition (4.15), the single-peakedness conditions
(4.17), and (4.18)) into dω2/ds2, we obtained a complicated expression de-
pending on f , φ, and u. The sign remained ambiguous even after application
of further simplifying assumptions (risk neutral workers and linear labour
demand functions).21 Nevertheless, d2ω/ds2 > 0 for all choices of f and u in
our numerical applications below. Furthermore, we know that
∂2ω
∂s2
= − ∂
2ω
∂ξ∂s
and
∂2ω
∂s2
=
∂2ω
∂ξ2
(4.19)
because ξ and s enter all subexpressions of E[U ] with opposite sign.
We want to use this framework now in order to assess employment and
of centralisation in wage bargaining. For simplicity we consider an economy
where firms do not compete for workers, i.e. labour demand functions are
independent of each other. Though this is an extreme case applying only
when firms are far away from each other and worker mobility is small (or
labour is differentiated in some other way, for example qualification) this
assumption gathers an essential feature of labour markets, since heterogeneity
considerations are groundless in labour markets with perfect competition.22
Nevertheless, we possibly introduce a significant inconsistency into the model.
21The derivations are available from the author on request.
22The fast growing current literature on thin labour markets backs up this view. See
Bhaskar & To (1999a, 1999b), Bhaskar et al. (2002), Manning (2002), Lewis (1986).
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Cost which reduced mobility of workers may influence the labour demand of
firms too and, by this, change the model predictions. We will come back to
this issue below.
In our simple economy central wage setting occurs if all workers in the
economy vote for one single wage, whereas local wage setting takes place
when only workers in the employment pool (region/branch) of each firm vote
for a wage applying to this firm. As will become clear below, the comparison
of central and local bargaining outcomes is quite involved for models with
more than two firms and general forms of firm heterogeneity. Therefore we
confine our analysis to the simplest case with two firms only and additive
stochastic heterogeneity. Though this is a serious limitation, it allows us to
gather some first insights into the structure of the problems.
4.3.3 Analytical results
If wages are set locally, we obtain the median wage wi in firm i ∈ {1, 2}
simply by setting si to qi/2 where qi is the mass of the employment pool
related to firm i:
wi = ωi(ξi, qi/2)
If the workers in both pools vote for a common wage claim, the median
worker index s˜ is implicitly defined by the equation
ω1(ξ1, s˜)− ω2 (ξ2, (q1 + q2)/2− s˜) = 0. (4.20)
We assume that the pool sizes q1 and q2 and the ranges of the heterogeneity
parameters ξi are such that s˜ ∈ [0, q1] to eliminate ‘degenerate’ special cases
here. Figure 4.3.3 illustrates the relation between local and central median
wages.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
Ω1
W
Ω2
Figure 4.2: ωi and Ω
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Note that our definition of ω implies that all workers in the catchment
area of a firm, employed and unemployed union members vote for the wage.
Though this assumption may be not realistic in some cases, it can be shown,
that it does not lead to qualitative changes of the main results.23 The
meaning of s2 = (q1 + q2)/2 − s1 becomes clear if we write it in the form
s1 + s2 = (q1 + q2)/2 which is simply a generalisation of s1 + s2 = 1, i.e. the
definition of the median for q1 6= 1 and q2 6= 1.
The common wage, call it Ω, depends (through s˜) on all ξi and qi. We
write down the definition here, since it will play a central role in the following
sections.
Ω(ξ1, ξ2, q1, q2) := ω1
(
ξ1, s˜(ξ1, ξ2, q1, q2)
)
.
As will be explained below, a general analysis of employment effects of
centralisation (going without restrictions on the functions ωi and the qi) is
quite involved. But we obtain intuitive first results already from a special
case where the ξi are the only source of heterogeneity, i.e. production function
parameters are equal and employment pools have equal size (q1 := q2:= 1
24).
Our strategy is simple: We start from a situation where outcomes in central
and local bargaining are identical in our setting and generate a ‘perturbation’
by changing one parameter (here: the stochastic shock ξ1). Then we can use
calculus to analyse differences between employment in local and central wage
setting. Let
ηl = φ
(
ω(ξ1, 1/2)
)
+ ξ1 + θ1 + φ
(
ω(ξ2, 1/2)
)
+ ξ2 + θ2
denote gross employment in a local and
ηc = φ
(
Ω(ξ1, ξ2)
)
+ ξ1 + θ1 + φ
(
Ω(ξ1, ξ2)
)
+ ξ2 + θ2
in a central wage setting environment. Note that φ and ω are not indexed
any more, and that we have set q1 := q2 := 1, implying that the ξi are the
only remaining source of heterogeneity.
23Lindblom (1949) initiated the so-called ‘Ceshire Cat’ discussion with the hypothesis,
that unions have a natural tendency to shrink if unemployed workers leave the union
or have no voting rights. This occurs since the least senior workers with preferences
for lower wages become unemployed first and the remaining ones will generate additional
unemployment in the next bargain by raising wages. This process continues until the union
looses bargaining power because of small membership. Blair & Crawford (1984) (c.f. also
Farber, 1986) clear this point by arguing that this problem vanishes if union members
account for it in an intertemporal utility maximisation procedure. Burda (1990) shows
the validity of the argument (at least in many realistic situations) in an intertemporal
formal model.
24Since s is a (continuous) index, we can set the qi to unity without loss of generality
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To compute the expected employment levels observe that (in general)
E[η|ξ] =
∞∫
−∞
max{0, z(ξ) + θ} dF (θ) =
∞∫
−z(ξ)
(z(ξ) + θ) dF (θ)
= z(ξ){1− F (−z(ξ))}+
∞∫
−z(ξ)
θ dF (θ)
= {1− F (−z(ξ))} {z(ξ) + E[θ|θ > −z(ξ)]}
with shorthand z(ξ) := φ(ω(ξ)) + ξ. The expression in the last line has an
obvious interpretation. The first term in curly braces represents simply the
probability that employment is positive and the second one is the expected
employment, given employment is positive.
Applying this to local and central gross employment levels yields the
expected values
E[ηl|ξ1, ξ2] =
∑
i∈{1,2}
z(ξi){1− F (−z(ξi))}+
∞∫
−z(ξi)
θ dF (θ)

E[ηc|ξ1, ξ2] =
∑
i∈{1,2}
zi(ξ1, ξ2){1− F (−zi(ξ1, ξ2))}+
∞∫
−zi(ξ1,ξ2)
θ dF (θ)

where zi(ξ1, ξ2) := φ(Ω(ξ1, ξ2)) + ξi. We evaluate the expected employment
difference E[ηc|ξ1, ξ2]−E[ηl|ξ1, ξ2] by means of a Taylor series approximation
starting from a situation where ξ01 = ξ
0
2 =: ξ0. If (as assumed here) the ξi are
the only source of heterogeneity, E[ηc] = E[ηl] in this situation. Since the
situation is symmetric (q1 = q2), it suffices to consider an increase in ξ1 when
holding ξ2 constant. With local wage setting, only expected employment in
firm 1 changes. Then
∂E[ηl]
∂ξ1
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξ0
=
{
1 + φ′(w0)
∂ω(ξ)
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξ0
}
{1− F (−φ(w0)− ξ0)} (4.21)
where w0 = ω(ξ0, 1/2). Henceforth we will drop the second argument of ω for
notational convenience if this does not lead to confusion. For central wage
setting, wages in both firms increase, but the increase is smaller. We obtain
∂E[ηc]
∂ξ1
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξ0
=
{
1 + 2φ′(w0)
dΩ(ξ1, ξ2)
dξ1
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξ0
}
{1−F (−φ(w0)− ξ0)} (4.22)
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The expressions in large curly braces give the increase in employment, given
employment is positive. They split into the direct effect 1 and the indirect
effects φ′dω/dξ1. The factor 1 − F (·) accounts for the fact that a marginal
increase of ξ1 has effects only if employment is positive, i.e. if θ > −φ(w0)−ξ0.
Comparison of the both expressions reveals that central wages generate
higher (equal/lower) employment than local ones if
∂ω(ξ)
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
ξ=ξ0
S 2 dΩ(ξ1, ξ2)
dξ1
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξ0
(4.23)
The interpretation of this condition is straightforward. With local wage
setting, only the wage of firm 1 is affected by rise of ξ1, whereas with central
wage setting, both firms face the same (but lower) wage increase. We will
show below that (4.23) is met tautologically with equality. At a glance one
would conclude from this that no centralisation effects exist. A closer look,
however, reveals that this result were valid only if φ(·) and ω(·) were linear
functions (since we applied a first order Taylor series expansion until now)
and if changes of ξ1 are marginal ones. Thus the effects must be of second
order. In reality, the difference ξ1 − ξ2 may be large, destroying the validity
of first order approximations.25
Before we proceed with the straightforward but tedious computations, let
us pause for a moment to get some intuition for the issues involved. First
consider the median wage. If ω is linear in s, the definition of the median wage
(4.20) tells us that (after an increase of ξ1) the change of ˜ω(ξ1, ξ2) is exactly
one half of the change in ω(ξ1). If φ is linear too, it is clear that centralisation
has no employment effects. However, if φ is convex, centralisation must
have negative employment effects, since then a wage increase of dw in one
firm leads to a smaller employment reduction than the sum of employment
reductions from wage increases dw/2 in two firms. However, since ω(·) and
s˜(·) are nonlinear functions too, the median wage increase possibly is smaller
than 1/2 of the local wage increase in firm 1. This may overcompensate
the labour demand function effect. However, things are a little bit more
complicated since changes of ξ1 affects also the truncation (represented by
the factor 1− F (·)).
To show formally that first order effects vanish, we compute
dΩ(ξ1, ξ2)/dξ1. After substitution of Ω(ξ1, ξ2) ≡ ω(ξ1, s˜(ξ1, ξ2)) we have
dΩ(ξ1, ξ2)
dξ1
=
∂ω
∂ξ
+
∂ω
∂s˜
ds˜
dξ1
(4.24)
25The Existence of second order effects only does not mean that they must be small
or ignorable. They are small only at the margin and grow with order proportional to
(ξ1 − ξ2)2.
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ds˜/dξ1 is obtained by implicit differentiation of (4.20)
ds˜
dξ1
= − ∂ω(ξ1, s)/∂ξ1
∂ω(ξ1, s)/∂s+ ∂ω(ξ2, 1− s)/∂s > 0 (4.25)
For s = 1− s and ξ1 = ξ2 =: ξ0 this simplifies to
ds˜
dξ1
= − ∂ω(ξ, s)/∂ξ
2 ∂ω(ξ, s)/∂s
(4.26)
After substitution of (4.24) and (4.26) into (4.23), we see that it is an equality.
Now let us investigate the second order derivatives. We have
∂2E[ηl]
∂ξ21
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξ0
= (1 + ωξ φ
′)2 f + (1− F ) {φ′ ωξξ + ω2ξ φ′′} (4.27)
∂2E[ηc]
∂ξ2
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξ0
=
{
1 + 2φ′Ω(ξ1)(1 + φ
′Ω(ξ1))
}
f
+2 (1− F ) {φ′′Ω2(ξ1) + φ′Ω(ξ1ξ1)} (4.28)
where we have dropped all arguments of the functions for notational conve-
nience. Note that whereas ωh, ωhh denote the first and second partial deriva-
tives of ω with respect to h, Ω(h),Ω(hh) denote the first and second total
derivatives of Ω with respect to h.
Let us again pause a moment to interpret the second order derivatives
before we proceed with our investigations. The terms multiplied by (1− F )
represent the change of the derivative of employment, given positive employ-
ment (in the sense that φ(w) + ξ + θ > 0). The other terms account for the
change of the truncation limit P (employment > 0) due to a shift of ξ1.
26
After substitution of Ω(ξ1) = ωξ/2 the difference of the second derivatives
has the form
∂2E[ηc]
∂ξ21
− ∂
2E[ηl]
∂ξ21
=(1− F )φ′
{
2Ω(ξ1ξ1) − ωξξ −
ω2ξ φ
′′
2φ′
}
− f ωξ φ′ (1 + ωξ φ′/2)
(4.29)
Implying that centralisation leads to higher employment if
(1− F )
{
2Ω(ξ1ξ1) − ωξξ −
ω2ξ φ
′′
2φ′
}
< f ωξ (1 + ωξ φ
′/2) (4.30)
26A change of ξ causes P (n1 > 0) to increase by (1 + ωξφ′) f for local wage setting.
Consequently, the term (1+ωξφ′)2 f represents the expected change of the derivative due
to the effect on truncation. With central wages, different reactions of employment in firm
1 and 2 complicate the situation a little bit. The change in P (n > 0) is f (1 + φ′Ω(ξ1)) for
firm 1 and f φ′Ω(ξ1) for firm 2.
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This expression shows that the effects of ξ on ‘uncensored’ employment pos-
sibly are contrary to the effects on truncation (represented by the right hand
side term). Still it is not very handy. It will turn out that no clear and
unambiguous result can be derived. But we can exploit the formulas, (a) to
learn something about the model properties favouring local or central wages,
and (b) to provide more accessible results for special cases.
As a first (important) special case, suppose that truncation (of the dis-
tribution of employment) does not occur, i.e. that employment is positive in
both firms.27 Then the condition above reduces to 2Ω(ξ1ξ1)−ωξξ−ω2ξφ′′/(2φ′).
If we insert
Ω(ξ1ξ1) ≡
d2Ω(ξ1, ξ2)
dξ21
≡ ∂
2ω
∂ξ21
+
{
2
∂2ω
∂ξ∂s
+
∂2ω
∂s2
}
∂s˜
∂ξ
+
∂ω
∂s
∂2s˜
∂ξ21
and ωs = −ωx (from equation 4.19) and assume labour demand to be linear
(φ′′ ≡ 0), then this expression reduces to
(ωss − 3ωξs)ωs < 0.
Substitution from (4.19) shows that this is met for convex wage setting func-
tions, i.e. ωss > 0. However, the calculations above have shown that ωss is
a rather complex expression and that a simple relation between ω and the
properties of (u,φ,F ) does not exist. The expression in curly braces in (4.30)
also shows that convexity of the labour demand function is unambiguously
in favour of local wages.
Now let us inspect the more general case where truncation occurs. Then
the truncation term works in favour of central wage setting if
f ωξφ
′ (1 + ωξφ′/2) < 0
or ωξφ
′ < −2. In the case of linear labour demand it is met if
1 >
2 ((1− F )u′′ − 2u′ φ′ 2)((1− F )u′′ − u′ φ′ 2)
(1− F ) (u′ φ′)2 .
In this expression 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 capture the single peakedness conditions
(i.e. positivity and negativity of the derivatives of (4.17) and (4.18))
1 ≡ f 2/(1− F )− f ′
2 ≡ f − 1− F
φ′
{
φ′′
φ′
− u
′′
u′
}
27Of course, this implies restrictions on F , u and φ. We do not try to state them
formally.
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The condition above reduces to 1 > 4 
2
2/(1 − F ) if workers are expected
earnings maximisers (i.e. u′ = 1 and u′′ = 0). After backsubstitution from
(4.31) this reads
f ′ < −3f 2/(1− F ),
meaning that θ¯ = s− φ− ξ must be located where f is decreasing.
Probably it would be possible to squeeze some further results out of the
model. But we have good reasons to doubt that they would be worth the
effort, since we deal with the simplest version of the model and even here the
dependence of employment effects on properties of u, φ, and F is intranspar-
ent. Therefore we summarise the most important results here and proceed
by illustrating the effects in two parametric numerical examples.
As we noted already, if the wage claim function ω is convex in s,
2 Ω(ξ1,ξ1) < wξξ. This makes the left hand side of (4.30) small and is conse-
quently in favour of central wage setting. The direct consequence of convexity
of ω is that the reaction of the central wage to a demand shock ξ in one firm
is less than half of the reaction of a local wage in one firm (hit by the shock).
The more moderate increase of central wages must overcompensate at
least the adverse effect (represented by ω2ξφ
′′/(2φ′)) stemming from convexity
of labour demand function. Convexity simply means that (other things equal)
a wage increase of two units in one firm reduces employment less than one-
unit increases in two (identical) firms.
Finally, truncation of the distribution of labour demand (represented by
the right hand side of (4.30) generates a third effect on relative employment.
It’s sign is ambiguous, however, and we see – again from inspection of (4.30)
– that it is negligible if unemployment risks of the median worker are low,
since then employment probability 1− F is high and f small.
This seems to be all we can say about the model at a general level. Since
it seems hardly possible to consider less restrictive scenarios (e.g. heterogene-
ity with respect to q or production function parameters) and the analytical
results tell us no clue about the magnitude or relative importance of the
effects, we amend our small investigation by a short numerical illustration.
4.3.4 Some Numerical Illustrations
Here we evaluate centralisation effects using a parameterised model. This
allows us to relax some of the restrictions applied above. We confine our
analysis to the special case of two firms but relax the assumption q1 = q2
and consider more general form of heterogeneity of labour demand.
We use the constant relative risk aversion utility function
u(w) = wβ,
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and a CES production function with fixed capital stock (normalised to unity)
h(n) = λ
{
(αn)ρ + 1
}1/ρ
and labour demand function
φ(w) =
1
α
{(
w
αλ
)ρ/(1−ρ) − 1}1/ρ
λ can be intepreted as total factor productivity or demand shift indicator. θ
is assumed to be distributed according to a Weibull distribution with CDF
F (θ; a, b) = 1−exp(−(θ/b)a). The Weibull distribution is used because of its
flexible functional form (with two parameters only) and its simple and closed
form CDF representation. Furthermore, the Mill’s ratio has the simple form
xa−1a/ba and is increasing (as required for single-peakedness) for a > 1. Its
support is [0,∞), but we can produce negative shocks to the labour demand
by rescaling ξ. The model is solved by numerical optimisation and root
search procedures.28 The following figures compile results of four simulations.
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Figure 4.3: relative employment effect of a change in ξ
All graphs are obtained by varying one parameter, while holding all other
constant. The standard parameter values are
probability distribution a = 1.5 b = 1.0
utility function β = 0.3 w0 = 1
production function α = 1 ρ = −2 λ = 3
other q = 1 ξ0 = −1.5
28In some cases the Newton root search algorithm failed to find the correct solution to
(4.20). Therefore we reformulated the root search problem as a (degenerate) minimisa-
tion problem and used a robust global minimisation algorithm to solve it. We followed
this strategy mainly for convenience reasons, since our symbolic mathematics Package
(Mathematica) provides convenient and robust global minimisation routines.
160 CHAPTER 4. HETEROGENOUS FIRMS
and relative employment difference ((E[nc]−E[nl])/E[ηl]) is defined such
that a positive value implies higher employment with central wage setting.
In the first simulation we vary ξ holding all other parameters constant. To
interpret the magnitude of the effect correctly, note that the maximum dif-
ference of ξ is equal to central employment for ξ1 − ξ2 = 0. Since this is a
rather large difference, the graph shows that significant employment effects
(maximum is about 1.5 percent here) occur only if firm size differences are
large. However, the scenario appears not unrealistic, since the relative dif-
ference of wages at the extreme points is about 6.5 percent. This is rather
moderate compared to maximum firm size wage effects of more than 20 per-
cent reported in the empirical literature (c.f. Oi & Idson, 1986 for a survey
or Wagner, 1991 for Germany).
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of nonlinear and (almost) linear case (obtained by
setting b := 3)
Figure 4.4 shows that centralisation effects vanish if ω approaches a linear
function. The right hand side graph was obtained by setting the distribution
function parameter b := 3 such that ω(·) becomes (almost) linear.
Figure 4.5 relates to the case of risk neutral workers. It shows that the
centralisation effect diminishes, but a maximum effect of about 1 percent
remains.
Figure 4.6 shows that the effects increase ceteris paribus to about 2.5
percent if the catchment areas (and thus unemployment rates in the areas)
of firms differ. In the simulation q2 was set to 1.5, i.e. catchment area is 50
percent larger in firm 1. The effects are not symmetric with respect to the
difference ξ1 − ξ2, and it matters whether firm 2 or firm 1 is affected by the
change if ξ. As can be seen in the figure, the effect becomes even negative for
certain values of ξ but the magnitude is small. Figure 4.7 contains an example
for negative centralisation effects. They occur if the labour productivity
parameter α varies between firms. These effects are of considerable size for a
4.3. A MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 161
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Ξ1-Ξ2
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
re
l.
em
p.
di
ff.
Figure 4.5: Relative employment effects in the case of risk neutral workers
(β = 1)
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Figure 4.6: Differences in catchment area sizes (q2 = 1.5). ξ1 varies in the
left hand side and ξ2 varies in the right hand side.
negative difference α1−α2 = −0.15.29 The last figure illustrates the positive
but small effects of a change in the total factor productivity parameter λ. To
sum up, we find positive as well as negative employment effects. Considering
the simple structure of the model, it appears less promising to ‘estimate’ the
model empirically.
A Qualification
The probably most severe shortcoming of our model is the restriction to the
case of two firms only. Since the generalisation of the model with respect to
the number of firms promises to be complicated and tedious, we are content
with some speculations here. If a large number of firms in our economy is
homogenous (with respect to labour demand characteristics) and only a few
firms deviate, the relative importance of the deviating firms in wage setting
29We have to note that the computations become unstable for larger differences of α.
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Figure 4.7: Employment effects associated with a change of α.
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Figure 4.8: Employment effects associated with a change in λ.
and employment becomes small and we expect that centralisation effects
are negligible. Even in an economy with heterogenous firms, the effects
shrink if we have a continuum of firm sizes. Consequently our results tend
to overestimate the real effects.
4.3.5 An even Simpler Version of the Model with a
Closed Form Solution
If one is willing to throw away even little realism, it is possible to construct a
version of the model with a closed form solution. Contrary to the simulation
model its results can be verified directly (i.e. without use of an intranspar-
ent computer program). Again we employ a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function
u(W ) =W β
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and a Cobb-Douglas type production function g(N) = γNα with labour
demand function
φ(W ) =
(
W
αγ
)1/(α−1)
or ln[φ(w)] = ψ − ηw
where ψ = ln(αγ)/(α − 1) and η = 1/(1 − α). In order to obtain model
with a closed form solution we have to make some further restrictions and
normalisations. We set b := 0 (to eliminate the alternative income term) and
choose a multiplicative exponential specification for the terms ξ and θ. Then
E[U ] has the form
E[U(W |S)] =W βP [S ≤ φ(w)eξeθ]
=W β{1− P [s > ln(φ(W )) + ξ + θ]}
where lower case letters denote logs of the corresponding (latin) capital let-
ters. After further manipulation we arrive at
lnE[U(w|s)] = βw + ln [1− F (s+ ηw − ψ − ξ)]
where F (·) is the CDF of θ. If θ has a uniform distribution in the range [0; 1],
f(θ) = 1 and F (θ) = θ and the (log) worker utility function has the simple
form
ln(E[U |s, w, ξ]) = βw + ln
[
s− ξ − w
1− α +
ln(αγ)
1− α
]
Solving the worker’s utility maximisation problem gives
ω(s, ξ) = (s− ξ)(1− α)− 1/β + ln(αγ)
And also Ω(ξ1, ξ2) has now a closed form representation.
4.3.6 Effects of Changes in ξ
If firms and workers are identical with respect to all parameter values except
ξ, s˜ has the form
s˜ = (q1 + q2)/4 + (ξ1 − ξ2)/2
and the median wage is
Ω = ln(αγ)− 1/β + (1− α){(q1 + q2)/2− (ξ1 + ξ2)}/2
After setting q1 = q2 and some further straightforward manipulations we can
write the expected employment difference between central and local wage
setting as
E[ηc]− E[ηl] = (e− 1) e
2−β (α−1)
2 β(α−1)
{
e
−ξ1
2
− ξ2
2
(
eξ1 + eξ2
)− 2}
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This expression is positive if the expression in curly braces is. It is easy to
show that it is zero if and only if ξ1 = ξ2 and strictly positive otherwise.
Note that only the magnitude but not the sign does depend on α and β. α
and β have ceteris paribus a negative and positive effect on its magnitude.30
However, figure 4.9 shows, that the effects are ignorably small. The figure is
obtained by holding ξ2 = 0.5 constant and varying ξ1 in the interval [0.4; 0.6]
(note that the relative change of ξ1 is large, since the central employment
level is about 0.1 in our example). In the general case with differing worker
pool sizes (q1 6= q2), it can be shown that the effect of centralisation on
employment is ambiguous.
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Figure 4.9: Relative employment effects of a change in ξ
4.3.7 Effects of Changes in γ
Now consider the impact of variability in γ on employment. With ξi := 0
the general solution is
s˜ = −− ln(α1 γ1) + ln(α2 γ2) +
1
2
(q1 + q2)− 12 (q1 + q2)α2 + 1β1 − 1β2
α1 + α2 − 2
with further parameter equality restrictions (including q1 = q2 = 1) we obtain
s˜ =
α− 1 + ln(γ1)− ln(γ2)
2 (α− 1)
After further manipulations we obtain an algebraic expression for the em-
ployment difference
√
e (e− 1) e 1β (α−1) (γ1γ2)
1
2 (1−α)
{
γ
1
2 (α−1)
1 − γ
1
2 (α−1)
2
}2
.
30The derivatives of the exponent with respect to α and β are −1(a−1)2 b and
1
b2 (1−a) .
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Again it is immediately clear that employment differences are positive for all
γ2 6= γ1 and zero otherwise. However, the implied effects are considerably
large as figure 4.10 shows. It is generated by varying γ2 in the interval
[0.7, 1.0] holding γ1 = 1.0 constant.
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Figure 4.10: Relative employment effects of a change in γ
4.3.8 Conclusion
In our stylised median voter model we found ambiguous employment effects
of centralisation in wage setting. Considering the information requirements of
the model it seems to be at least difficult (and probably impossible) to predict
the effects on the base of available empirical data and parameters. However,
simple reasoning suggests that the effects found here shrink if the number of
firm increases and probably becomes negligible. On the other hand, since the
most graphs in the simulation plots are parabolas, the effects of differences
in some parameters could grow quadratic and thus create significant effects.
The most legitimate criticism of our model is its shortcoming of realism.
Thus we should conclude with a thorough discussion of its assumptions. Be-
fore we do this, we once more note that the aim of the model is not to derive
guidelines for politicians, unions and firms, but to show that institutional
changes in wage setting may generate possibly considerable employment ef-
fects which are less understood by economists.
Firstly, our model shares a crucial shortcoming with most other investiga-
tions of centralisation. It takes the degree of centralisation as given and does
not explain why unions choose the one or the other form. Many papers find
that central wage setting internalises externalities and thus must be efficient
(at least if the considered externalities were the only issue in bargaining), but
they don’t explain why wage setting remains decentralised in many countries
even if unions and employers were free to build bargaining coalitions. Most
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authors will respond to this critique with the custom argument that eco-
nomic models isolate some certain aspects of reality and ignore all other in
order to simplify things and that some of the ignored aspects (for example
firm heterogeneity or institutional costs) may be responsible for the observed
stability. This view assumes tacitly that the these aspects are neutral with
respect to employment – a rather heroic assumption.
We note that the degree of centralisation could in principle be endogenised
in our framework, with a clear and too a simple answer: In the special case
of two firms it is clear that wages would be set locally if θ were the only
stochastic parameter, since the work force of a firm will always prefer its
own local median to an aggregated one (by definition). If other parameters
are stochastic – at least in the medium and long run (for example ξ labour
demand parameters) – central wages are possible with risk averse workers,
since the central wage is less volatile than local ones. However, this result
is not likely, since firm heterogeneity appears to be a phenomenon with high
persistence.
Thus uncertainty alone cannot explain the existence and stability of cen-
tral wage setting regimes and we have to look for other arguments. The best
candidates to fill this gap are bargaining costs, institutional barriers, inter-
nalisation effects of centralisation, or deviations from the standard utility
independence assumptions. Fixed bargaining costs have the ‘advantage’ that
they can be introduced into the model without any other adaptions. How-
ever, we fear that other institutional issues and deviations from standard
utility theory are more important. But it is more difficult to tackle them in a
formal model and – even more important – they require (at least qualitative)
empirical evidence.
Secondly, the median voter solution to the aggregation problem requires
a merger of the unions. If the unions decided not to merge, but only to
cooperate, voting responsibility would remain in the respective individual
unions. The common wage had then to be found in a bargaining procedure.
Let E[U1(w
∗
1)] and E[U2(w
∗
2)] denote the respective utilities attainable by
the median workers in union 1 and 2 if wages are set locally, and E[Ui(W )]
denote the respective indirect utilities of the median workers if a common
wage W is set, then both unions find the common wage by maximising{
E[U1(W )]− E[U1(w∗1)]− Z1
}β {
E[U2(W )]− E[U2(w∗2)]− Z2
}1−β
with respect toW . The Zi represent the fixed increase of bargaining costs for
union i if bargaining has to be conducted at the firm level.31 Unfortunately,
no time was left to inspect this variant in further detail.
31Note that Zi > 0 is required to make cooperation sensible.
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Thirdly, an even more fundamental challenge to our model is based on
the suspicion that the aspects modelled here (wages and employment risk)
don’t play a prominent role in worker’s decisions at all, but are dominated by
fairness considerations. We cannot check the validity of this argument since
empirical evidence is rare. Experimental (cf. the references in section 2.4.10)
evidence suggests that fairness, framing effects, and adherence to norms play
an important role in everyday live interactions. But this evidence is not
specific enough for a direct application to our problem.
Fourthly, the model ignores fluctuation costs. If fluctuation costs, e.g.
costs of movements into and out of unemployment are noteworthy, central
wage setting may generate significant higher losses due to fluctuation than
local wage setting. Then productivity gains of centralisation (wage equalisa-
tion implies equalisation of marginal productivities in firm and, by this, yields
higher gross productivity) have to weighted up against fluctuation costs. Un-
fortunately, fluctuation costs render centralisation models highly complex in
presence of stochastic shocks. Because of this, no simple model with clear
and general predictions exists. To the best of our knowledge, Bertola & Ca-
ballero (1994) is the only advance into this direction. They construct a model
with heterogenous firms which are prone to stochastic shocks and conduct
costly searches for workers. The model predicts inefficiencies of decentralised
bargaining. But these predictions depend highly on a large number of special
assumptions.
Finally, the median voter mechanism relies on single-peakedness of utility
functions. As is well known from the literature on social welfare and voting
equilibria (and explained in section 2.3.1), a unique voting equilibrium may
not exist at all if workers vote on different variables (e.g. wages and working
time) simultaneously. However, even if this ‘curse of dimensionality problem’
were negligible, we had to assume full rationality of the workers and to ex-
clude any other institutional imperfections (e.g. manipulation of workers by
union leaders) in order to put the median voter results on save grounds. Es-
pecially the rationality assumptions are heroic; worker must understand the
voting mechanism and be capable of processing all relevant information.
168 CHAPTER 4. HETEROGENOUS FIRMS
Chapter 5
Reorganisation and Incentives∗
5.1 A Critique of an ‘Incentive’ Argument
against Centralisation
5.1.1 Introduction
Lindbeck & Snower (2001) investigate the effects of multitasking and team-
work on the efficiency of centralisation in collective setting. The authors
emphasize that workers likely have private information concerning their task
mix when multitasking plays a significant role in the production process.
They try to show in a formal model that only a complicated wage scheme
provides incentives for workers to choose an optimal task mix and suggest
that centralized wage setting cannot tackle this complexity.
Unfortunately, the authors miss to specify and analyse their basic as-
sumption regarding private information of the workers explicitly. A closer
inspection of the issue reveals that – contrary to the claims of the authors
– the wage scheme resulting from their model is not implementable for the
given information structure and therefore does not solve the information prob-
lem. Among this logical inconsistency the model suffers from a more general
conceptual problem. It is at odds with reality by presupposing utility tak-
ing behaviour of the firm. The conclusion that more specific remuneration of
factors (tasks) increases efficiency is a trivial consequence of this assumption.
But it seems to be empirically irrelevant.
We start with a short summary of Lindbeck & Snower’s model, followed
by an analysis of its logical problems. The rest of the section is devoted
to some remarks on the role of teamwork and multi-tasking within firms
∗I thank Ekkehart Schlicht, Joachim Mo¨ller, Stefan Seth, Lutz Arnold and Kurt Raster
for helpful conversations about the issue.
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and a short sketch of a case study contrasting Lindbeck & Snower’s view of
reorganised firms
5.1.2 A short summary of the model
Lindbeck & Snower consider the profit maximisation problem of a firm whose
production function q(λ1, λ2) requires two labour inputs (tasks) λ1 and λ2.
These tasks are performed by two types of workers. Workers of each type are
able to perform both tasks. According to the Lindbeck & Snower terminology,
a holistic firm is characterized (and distinguished from tayloristic firms) by
the fact that both worker types perform both tasks in optimum but type
1 workers have a comparative advantage in performing type 1 tasks in the
sense e1/e2 > E1/E2, where the ei denote efficiency units for type 1 workers
when performing task i and the Ei denote the corresponding measures for
type 2 workers. In general, lowercase letters are used for type 1 workers and
uppercase letters for type 2 workers. The ei and Ei are functions of the task
mix parameters, i.e. ei = ei(τ), Ei = Ei(T ) where τ and T denote the share
of the gross working time a worker devotes to task i.2 Together with the
definition of the ei and Ei, and the production function, a full representation
of the model consists of the specification of labour services
λ1 = e1 τ n+ E1 (1− T )N, (5.1)
λ2 = e2 (1− τ)n+ E2 T N, (5.2)
worker utility functions
u = w1 τ + w2 (t− τ) + v(τ), (5.3)
U = W1 (1− T ) +W2 T + V (T ), (5.4)
and participation constraints
w1 τ + w2 (1− τ) ≥ v(τ) (5.5)
W1 (1− T ) +W2 T ≥ V (T ) (5.6)
where v(τ) and V (T ) represent preferences of specialisation/diversification.3
In the formulas the wi, (Wi) denote wages for the respective tasks and n, (N)
2In the paper the functional dependence of the ei and Ei is decomposed further in the
form ei = ei(si, ci) where s1 = s1(τ) and s2 = s2(t− τ) denote the effects of specialisation
and complementarity on workers’ productivity respectively. Again the specification of the
Ei is fully analogous (with uppercase symbols) E1 = E1(S1(1 − T ), C1(T )). We ignore
this here, since it is irrelevant for the main point.
3Of course, v(τ) and V (T ) must be negative.
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the number of workers of type 1, (2). After substitution of the ei and the Ei,
output can be written as
q = q(τ, T, n,N),
and the cost function has the form
κ = {w1 τ + w2 (1− τ)}n+ {W1 (1− T ) +W2 T}N
By straightforward maximisation of the profit function subject to partici-
pation constraints, Lindbeck & Snower derive a wage structure (from the
maximising values τ ∗, T ∗, n∗, N∗) where w1 6= W1 and w2 6= W2 in general if
full specialisation does not occur, more formally, if an inner solution results,
we have 0 < τ ∗ < 1 and 0 < T ∗ < 1. This implies, for example, that type 1
and type 2 workers obtain different wages for performing task 1. In the case
of full specialisation only two instead of four wages are needed (since each
worker type performs only one task). Lindbeck & Snower associate the inner
and outer solution with the labels ‘holistic’ and ‘tayloristic’ production, and
conclude that the flexible form of wage setting required for holistic produc-
tion is incompatible with central collective bargaining, since centralized wage
setting puts natural restrictions on the number of wages. To emphasise the
problem, they note that the number of tasks is much larger in most firms
and the number of required wages rises quickly with the number of tasks and
worker types.
As noted above, the assumption that the task mix (i.e. the parameters τ
and T in their terminology) cannot be observed by the employer (principal),
is central for the model. If it were observable, the principal would simply
specify the optimum task mix to every worker type and pay every type it’s
outside option.
5.1.3 The Consistency Problem
For a clear discussion of the issues let us start with a quotation of what
Lindbeck & Snower say regarding the information structure. On page 1860
they write:
“An important aspect of multi-tasking, documented in the recent
empirical literature, is that employees often have discretion over
the proportions in which different tasks are performed. In prac-
tice, employers generally determine the range of tasks that each
of their employees perform, while the employees often have some
latitude in deciding the task mix... Beyond that, task mixing is
usually difficult to monitor, and thus managers often have lit-
tle alternative but to leave some of the decision making to the
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employees. Managers can, however, influence their employees de-
cisions through wage incentives. These wage incentives may be
distorted through centralized wage bargaining.”
A sensible interpretation of the central quotation above appears to be
that the task mix parameters τ and T are not observable for the principal.
This implies, however, that Lindbeck & Snower’s wage scheme cannot be
implemented. If τ is not observable, earnings of type 1 workers w1 τ+w2 (1−
τ) cannot be computed, simply because they depend on τ . In other words,
if the firm cannot observe the task mix, type 1 workers do not determine τ
by maximising utility from equation (5.3) u = w1 τ + w2 (t − τ) + v(τ), to
obtain Linbeck & Snower’s reactions functions (w1 − w2) + v′(τ) = 0 but
simply set v′(τ) = 0. Contrary to their claims, the authors set up and solve
a fully deterministic model of symmetric information. In the deterministic
case, however, the principal simply prescribes an optimum task mix for every
type and determines wages (call them ω and Ω) such that they meet the
participation constraints, e.g. ω := v(τ ∗),Ω := V (T ∗). A central collective
wage agreement can handle the task mix problem simply by specifying a wage
for the typical task mix instead of for tasks separately. The number of wages
to be determined is unaffected by this change. By the way: Jobs where
each worker specialises on exactly one task were exceptions also in the past,
and occupational groups in collective wage agreements relate to a typical task
mix. Of course, these standard wages are only approximations to an perfectly
efficient choice. But there is no reason to expect that a principal is able to
determine exact optimising wages for a firm with 10 worker types and 50
tasks (just compute the number of resulting Lindbeck-Snower wages!), even
if he could observe the realised task mix.
There is only one (trivial) way to construct heterogeneity in wages with
this model: If production functions of firms are heterogenous in the sense
that optimum task mix parameters differ between firms, worker types obtain
different wages in firms. Then, however, the model reduces simply to a nice
illustration of the old and well known compensating differentials argument.
Even in this case it is hard to comprehend a high significance of the argument
for the centralisation debate. As an empirical implication of compensating
differentials, we would observe some wage drift. Lindbeck & Snower’s ar-
gument would hit only if general collective wage agreements did not admit
upwards deviations of wages.
We will show now that an explicit treatment of the given information
structure will lead to utterly different results. Though further information
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asymmetries likely exist in several other respects4 and may even be more
important, let us start with the task mix observability problem.
Is there a way to trick employees into choosing the optimal task mix
when it is not observable? The standard advice from information economics
is to make wages contingent upon output. A closer look at the problem re-
veals that the principal in Lindbeck & Snower’s model faces a highly complex
moral hazard problem, since output does not depend on the task mix of a
single agent but of the whole work force. Before we report the relevant re-
sults from the information economics literature, we point to the fact that the
information structure in Lindbeck & Snower does not meet the standard as-
sumptions exactly. In most information economics models, it is assumed that
the agent’s effort or working time is not observable. Apparently , Lindbeck
& Snower’s model rests on the assumption that the gross working time is ob-
servable, but its division is not. This difference has no effect on qualitative
results, however.
If the principal cannot observe the individual task mix of each worker but
only gross output, the results from Holmstro¨m (1982) apply. For convenience
reasons we discuss only the simplest case where gross output q is observable
without error. Holmstro¨m considers incentive problems associated with a
setting where the output produced by a team of agents can be observed by all
players but the individual contributions of the agents are private information.
He shows that the team production moral hazard problem can be solved
efficiently via a simple group punishment incentive scheme: If production
equates the output attainable with the social optimum values of τ and T ,
the principal distributes gross revenues such that the wage of each worker is
(at least marginally) above his disutility of effort v(τ ∗) or V (T ∗). If it falls
short this level, every worker gets nothing.5
Several observations are in order here. Firstly, Holmstro¨m’s scheme does
not require different wages for different tasks as in Lindbeck & Snower’s
model. The earnings of each worker (strictly speaking: each worker type)
depend on his disutility of effort (or outside option value) and the number
of wages equals the number of worker types. It suffices to set a severe group
punishment and every worker (type) will choose his optimal task mix, since
otherwise productivity would fall short of the objective and trigger group
4The clause “...managers often have little alternative but to leave some of the decision
making to the employees” in the above citation probably means that employees have
private information on productivity effects of specialisation and task complementarities.
Unfortunately, Lindbeck & Snower don’t concretise this further. We will dwell on this
below.
5Holmstro¨m notes that this scheme is not the only viable and other solutions are
possible, for example bonding.
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punishment.6 Secondly, the scenario discussed in Holmstro¨m’s paper is too
simple for our application. In more realistic settings the principal doesn’t
have complete knowledge of other parameters. It is likely that the functions
determining the optimum task mix ei, Ei, si, Si, ci, Ci and the preferences of
the workers v and V are stochastic objects for the principal. For example,
workers may have private information on complementarities between tasks or
on the relevance of certain tasks for gross productivity. In the terminology
of information economics, we don’t face an isolated hidden action, but a
combination of hidden action and hidden information. We will discuss the
hidden information issue below. However, the main result that compensation
does not require wage differentiation, remains valid.
Could Lindbeck & Snower’s main argument be recovered by assuming
that the output of each individual worker can be observed, but not his task
mix? By the way: this scenario seems to have less in common with the one in
Lindbeck & Snower’s article, since the impossibility to observe task-specific
(and group-specific) output seems to be a defining property of teamwork.
Nevertheless, we discuss it in brief. If individual output is observable, we
have to differentiate further between the case where only gross output of a
worker, and the case when even the outputs for individual tasks are publicly
known. Let us first discuss the simpler former case. It is a standard result
from incentive theory that pay will depend on output then. But again,
we don’t need different wages for tasks. With output-dependent wages the
worker has an incentive to choose the optimal task mix in order to attain
high output.
Holmstro¨m & Milgrom (1991) deal with a special case of the situation
where task-specific individual outputs are observable. They consider a situa-
tion where one agent performs different tasks and each task can be observed
separately by the principal, but with error. Payment depends on individual
output n their linear incentive scheme7 and different piece rates are possible.
But Holmstro¨m & Milgrom show that fixed wages are optimal if efforts are
substitutes in the effort-cost function of the agent and some tasks are not
observable at all or only with large error. The intuition is clear and simple:
If an agent is awarded for tasks with observable output, he will put his effort
where it is awarded and will disregard other tasks.
A more realistic description of production in holistic firms seems to be a
situation where agents produce several goods in joint production and only
gross outputs are observable. Holmstro¨m & Milgrom (1990) analyse a model
6Of course the punishment scheme can be replaced by a bonus scheme. This is mainly
a matter of semantics.
7Of course, the linear incentive scheme is somewhat arbitrary. It can be shown, that it
is optimal if errors are distributed normally.
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with two agents and the following information structure. The principal ob-
serves
xi = fi(ai, bi) + i
where xi denotes output i, the i denote observation errors and ai(bi) the
unobservable inputs of agent 1(2) for output i. The fi determine, together
with the i, whether and to which degree of precision outputs are attributable
to inputs provided by an individual agent.
In general, optimal incentive schemes make all wages contingent on all
outputs. However, the low-powered incentive case is present here too: De-
pendence of wages on output may be small or zero if teamwork is important,
i.e. if some tasks raise performance of the colleague. This is intuitively clear,
since agents will withdraw cooperation and concentrate on producing the
goods which are attributable to their efforts if such behaviour is honoured.
These results explain Williamson’s observation that incentives offered to
employees within firms are generally “low-powered”, contrary to the incen-
tives to independent contractors, and thus vitiate the picture drawn by Lind-
beck & Snower. Their picture puts reality upside down: We observe piece
rates in old-fashioned tayloristic but not in holistic firms. In holistic firms
even the tie of earnings and working hours is loose.
5.1.4 Other (Likely more Important) Information
Problems
In reality, the hidden action problem (monitoring of task mix and effort)
may be less important than hidden information problems. For example,
the impact of complementarity and specialisation on worker’s productivity
is probably best known to the worker. Furthermore, the worker has private
information on his preferences, i.e. worker’s preferences for diversification
represented by the disutility of work functions v(τ) and V (T ) are unknown
(stochastic) to the principal. We give a short summary of the topic in order
to show the complexity of the issues involved.
A principal trying to find out the true preferences of his workers faces
a mechanism design problem. We obtain a formal representation of the sit-
uation by introduction of shift parameters which are stochastic from the
principal’s point of view. I.e. we extend v and V to v(τ, γ) and V (T,Γ).
The optimal incentive scheme (c.f. Fudenberg & Tirole (1991), chapter 7)
makes wages contingent on the task mix parameter τ . For scalar problems (τ
and T are one-dimensional) this problem has a simple solution (gross earn-
ings of the worker depend on the realized task mix). However, in settings
with more than two tasks, the principal faces a multidimensional screening
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problem and τ, T, γ and Γ become vectors. Then a generalisation of the well
known single crossing property introduced by Spence and Mirrlees is required
in order to generate an incentive scheme implementable via transfers. And
it is very difficult then to get sufficient conditions for the implementability
of the transfer scheme if v(τ, γ) and V (T,Γ) are not linear with respect to
γ and Γ (see Rochet, 1987, proposition 3 or Rochet & Stole, 2001, formula
(3”)). Plausible forms of v and V do not meet these linearity conditions in
the multidimensional case, implying that the incentive scheme is not imple-
mentable. Even if the scheme were implementable, it required observation of
τ and T (or a proxy) for each single worker. If τ and T are not observable,
output suggests itself as proxy. But this brings back the complicated and
almost surely unresolvable observational problems mentioned above.
5.1.5 An Alternative View of Teamwork and Multi-
Tasking
Among its formal problems, the model is based on a one-sided and too a
narrow view of teamwork and multitasking.
It is a commonplace of the relevant literature that job rotation, teamwork
and multitasking are not exclusively, but also natural solutions to the infor-
mation problems of firms. Firstly, in many firms job rotation is a prerequisite
for promotion. For future managers and leaders this is not only an opportu-
nity to become acquainted with the task but also to get some experience on
mean work load, task-specific disutility of effort, contentment of the workers,
task-specific specialisation gains, synergies with other tasks and the role of
the task for the gross productivity of the firm. Apparently, the information
gathering function of job rotation is more important than learning specific
tasks (which most managers will no longer perform after promotion).
Secondly, and even more important, teamwork is or implies a system of
mutual monitoring. If every worker knows his colleagues’ tasks from own
experience, he has a clear comprehension of mean work load, specialisation
effects and synergies, disutility of effort and its contribution to gross output
and will unmask false claims and reveal harmful behaviour of his colleagues –
at least if they imply disadvantages for him. Employees not complying fully
with the concept of homo oeconomicus will do even more – in many cases to
the benefit of the firm.
5.1.6 Evidence from a Case Study
Lindbeck & Snower’s paper starts with a detailed “overview of the evidence”
showing that teamwork, quality circles, multi-tasking, job rotation and other
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aspects of the reorganisation trend can be observed in many branches and
countries and that this trend is accompanied with a reduction of the degree
of centralisation in wage setting. But they don’t provide a single example
for wage schemes similar to the one resulting from their model! 8 We sus-
pect that, if such wage schemes existed at all, they were rather exceptions
than standard and could more likely be observed within traditional tayloris-
tic firms. The simple reason is that complicated production processes and
teamwork production make it extremely difficult to evaluate the marginal
contribution of an individual task. By application of a simple cost argument
we conclude that the allocation of tasks is found via rules of thumb and that
the sharing rules used in practice are rough approximations to an optimal
one. This is particularly clear if production processes change frequently, and
if this necessitates adjustment of the task mix.
We did not discover a current case study reporting the introduction of
and experience with a payment scheme as described by Lindbeck & Snower.
However, we found an interesting study from Kotthoff & Reindl (1990)9 which
describes a traditional firm matching the picture of highly flexible reorganised
production. Nevertheless, a traditional payment scheme appears to solve the
firm’s motivation problems to the advantage of all involved agents.
The firm, employing 65 workers, produces and installs top-class fitted
kitchens. The workforce is mixed of skilled and unskilled workers, and firm-
specific knowledge appears to play an important role (see the descriptions
below). Flexibility requirements are extreme because of small production
runs (and frequent unique-copy production). We start with some excerpts
characterising the flexibility requirements, the importance of teamwork, and
the flatness of hierarchy.
On page 89 the authors write: “... If we used the terms ‘sales manager’
and ‘foreman’, then the hierarchical aspect of the term was misleading. Every
job assignment in the firm had to be put into quotation marks, ... The sales
manager is an ordinary blue collar worker, employed for 30 years in the
firm, and has performed almost every task as main task over the years...
There exist no titles (action or job designators) in the firm. Everyone has
his name and all colleagues know the bundle of tasks associated with him.”
On page 91 they add: “Every worker is attributed to a job (task) as main
job, but rotations to other tasks occur so frequently and natural that it is
inappropriate to view this as fixed division of labour.” [All translations by
8I admit that it quickened my phantasy to imagine such a payment scheme with large
numbers of tasks and worker types and the reaction of a firm’s workforce to it, or the
reaction of the accountant’s department responsible for the wage bill.
9A qualitative approach is adopted in the study, i.e. information is gathered in several
interviews (each lasting more than one hour) with workers and management.
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Johannes Ludsteck]
Furthermore, responsibility appears to be distributed evenly among the
workers, and detailed instructions and monitoring are reduced to a minimum
level. When the boss is asked how he runs and instructs the wickerwork tangle
of production, his answer is very short:10 “Everything regulates itself. They
[the workers] are experts!” The statements from worker interviews agree
to this view of self responsibility, for example Worker-1: “The work quota
is working well. It does not matter whether I require 20 or 25 hours with
cutting. This is not determined, the main thing is that I do not make errors.”
Worker-1: “I was in all the years, when I was [employed] here, virtually in
every corner. This is so in the small plant. Everyone has here to help in
other jobs if nothing is to do in his job. It is a wheel, it has to go on. This
goes here directly from man to man... Everyone looks around here. Halt!
we have to do something different. This has to stay behind, that has to be
brought forward. And we make this do-it-yourself. The boss does not have
to tell us: There is a change of order. This is certainly not possible in large
plants. It works in our plant, and it works pretty well.” [Interviewer: “How
can it work well if the boss does not arrange it?”] “Oh, it works! It must
be in the interest of workers. There must not be pigheaded persons. We
have to talk to one another. Here are many workers which were trained here,
which work here for 25, 30 years, they know the workshop.” [The colloquial
speaking of the workers required a free translation sometimes.]
Now let us consider the payment and incentive scheme. On page 93 we
read: “In the firm all work is payed by hourly wage rates. There is no
attempt to introduce time management... The boss who is not a member of
the employers’ association obeys all rules of the collective wage agreement.
Christmas bonus, leave pay, overtime premiums, and the length of payed
leave are handled according to the collective wage agreement. All standard
wage increases are obeyed, though the boss emphasises sometimes that he
were not obliged to do so, since effective wages are 20% above standard
wages.”
What about wage differentiation? “The boss does not want to introduce
wage discrimination – as far as possible. He prefers an egalitarian philoso-
phy, since he fears needless frictions [‘Reibereien’], i.e. a real test [‘Zerreis-
sprobe’] of the ‘community of equals’. He considers equity as pilar of the
self-regulating capabilities of the producer’s cooperative”.
Taken all information from the study together, there is nothing new or
special with the payment scheme. It fits neatly into traditional efficiency
10Other interviews from workers reveal that this is an exaggeration, however. The boss
is, of course, present in the workplace, and participates in team work.
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wage or gift exchange theories, and agrees to trivial transaction cost ar-
guments. As a by-product, the reports suggest that Lindbeck & Snower’s
reasoning is based on misconceptions of multi-tasking and flexibility. In the
quotations below, ‘flexibility’ just means that workers change their actual
task mix almost permanently in response to changing demands, and that they
do this on their own authority. Translated into Lindbeck & Snower’s model,
this implied that wages and task mix parameters change permanently, and
that every worker had to keep account of his actual task mix. Coase (1937)
showed a long time ago that firms exist because markets cannot provide so-
lutions to such flexibility requirements. Apparently his seminal contribution
has sunk to oblivion.
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Chapter 6
Centralisation Effects in
‘Custom Models’ of Union
Membership∗
6.1 Introduction
The existence of unions in face of missing monetary incentives for entry has
puzzled economists a long time. Since membership is costly and also non-
members participate in the advantages of union activity through higher wages
and improved working conditions, rational workers have no incentive to join.
The social custom model of Akerlof (1980) smoothed the way to a solution
of this puzzle. Booth (1985), Naylor (1989, 1990), Naylor & Raaum (1993),
Booth & Chatterji (1993), and Booth & Chatterji (1995) applied Akerlof’s
basic idea fruitfully to the union membership problem by introducing repu-
tation utility as a counterbalance to the monetary incentives of free riding.
Put simply, workers derive utility or reputation from union membership by
obeying a social norm.2 Corneo (1993, 1995) applies the social custom frame-
work to the centralisation debate and finds positive effects of centralisation
on union membership and bargaining power. We survey his interesting con-
tribution, point to some problems, and contrast his arguments with another
one, implying opposite effects.
To start with, let us summarise Corneo’s central idea in a few sentences.
∗I thank Ekkehart Schlicht and his assistants for a helpful conversation about the issue.
2The scope of Akerlof’s contribution was somewhat wider. He showed that an custom
generating ‘inefficient’ outcome can nevertheless persist in the long run, but that it may
be prone to erosion if monetary rewards for deviation from norms are too large. Romer
(1984) extends Akerlof’s argument by showing that inefficient customs may persist also in
a continuous model, i.e. a model where marginal deviations from norms are possible.
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Corneo investigates management opposition to union activity in a reputation3
model. According to his theory, it may be profitable for the firm to ‘shrink’
the union by offering a positive reward to nonmembers if the decrease of the
bargained wage due to union weakness outweighs the bonus costs. Centrali-
sation of bargaining depreciates the gains of paying a bonus to nonmembers
by reducing the effect of local management opposition on centrally bargained
wages. This is the case because local union density has then only a small
impact on gross density. If the bonus system is not enforceable by a central
employers’ association, firms save the costs of opposition and union power
increases.
We claim that Corneo’s model ignores one possibly important aspect of
reputation. He uses the reputation argument only in order to fill a consistency
gap of union membership models. But he fails to analyze the sources and
behavioral consequences of reputation effects. Reputation is an exogenously
given ‘consumption good’ in his model and workers are neoclassical utility
functions with a less integrated preference for reputation. Consequently,
they don’t respond to management opposition and the centralisation effects
become one-sided.
We contrast Corneo’s mechanism with another one, leading to opposite
effects. The reverse effect comes up if we account for significant strategic
aspects of reputation and allow the workers to respond to management’s
discrimination activities. However, we have to note that model is not aimed
to provide a satisfactory theory of reputation effects for wage bargaining
and its implications for centralisation. We are content here by pointing to
an instance of the fundamental problems of the available models and the
possibly significant bias on model results.
6.2 Corneo’s Model
Corneo (1993, 1995) uses a social custom approach in order to discuss the
effects of centralisation in wage bargaining on membership and wages. He
considers workers with the following utility function:
Ui = {w + (1− di) δ}L+ w0 (1− L) + di (ri − c) (6.1)
where w denotes the bargained wage, L is employment, di is a dummy, taking
on value 1 for union members and 0 otherwise, c is the membership fee and
ri denotes utility from reputation. We have normalised the mass of workers
(denoted by N in Corneo’s model) to unity without loss of generality.
3Note that the term ‘reputation’ does not have the special meaning (together with its
implications) it represents in information-theoretic models.
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Heterogeneity of workers is represented by the distribution of ri. For sake
of simplicity, Corneo assumes ri to follow a uniform distribution with support
[0,Θ].
For convenience and readability we ‘expand’ the compact representation
(using a variable) of the utility function above into separate formulas for
members and free riders
Uui = wL− w0 (1− L) + ri − c
U fi = (w + δ)L− w0 (1− L)
and give a verbal summary: union members obtain wage w if employed and
w0 as outside option. They receive reputation ri and have to pay the fee c
irrespective of employment status. Free riders obtain the union wage w plus
a free rider bonus δ if employed and w0 otherwise. They save c, but have to
do without reputation utility.
The model is a simple three stage game, solved by backward induction.
In the first stage, the firm determines a bonus δ as reward for non-members.
Then workers decide on membership and finally the bargain is struck.
The profit function of the firm is
pi = R(L)− wM − (w + δ) (L−M) (6.2)
whereM denotes union membership. In order to simplify things considerably,
Corneo assumes efficient bargaining which implies full employment (L = 1).4
The wage is determined in a generalised Nash bargaining solution, i.e. by
maximisation of
(U − U0)α(pi − pi0)1−α (6.3)
where U and pi denote utility of the median member and profit of the firm
in case of an agreement, and U0 and pi0 denote the respective thread points.
The components of this expression are
U = w + rU − c
U0 = w0 + rU − c
pi = R(1)− wM − (w + δ) (1−M)
pi0 = R(1−M)− (w0 + δ) (1−M)
4The plausibility of efficient bargaining deteriorates considerably with the transition to
centralised wage setting, since the level of employment determined in efficient bargaining is
too high ex post from the firm’s point of view. And the employers’ association is faced with
the difficulty to distribute the high level of employment over firms. Here the assumption
is made, however, only in order to isolate the relevant effects, to retain the applicability
of the ceteris paribus clause, and to keep the model as simple as possible.
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To the best of my understanding, pi0 is specified incorrectly. Corneo assumes
that the firm pays the bonus δ (as markup on the outside wage) to free riders
also during a strike. This is not optimal for the firm, since w0 is – by definition
– the wage workers are willing to work for if they are not unionised. If the
rules of the game allowed free riders to reverse their membership decision, pi0
had to be determined (recursively) in a bargaining process. Consequently,
we see that the firm will not pay a bonus to strike breakers for two reasons
(a direct and an indirect one) if we take the rules of the game seriously.
The bonus lowers profits during a strike and weakens the bargaining position
against the union by lowering the firm’s thread point.
Another minor flaw of the specification concerns the constraint δ ≥ 0 in
the firm’s profit maximisation problem. δ ≥ 0 is not a natural exogenous
constraint.5 It is simple to show that −c < δ < 0 is an optimising choice for
certain values of the exogenous parameters. In the conclusion we will discuss
several other reasons for this constraint. We will correct these points here,
but note that Corneo’s minor lapse does not change the qualitative results
of his model.
The solution of the model (by backward induction) is straightforward.
Maximisation of the Nash product gives the wage6
w = w0 (1− αM) + α {R(1)−R(1−M) + δ (1−M)} (6.4)
Straightforward comparison of the member and nonmember utility positions
shows that reputation must be higher than the sum of the lost bonus and the
membership fee to make membership attractive. From this Corneo derives
M =
{
1− (δ + c)/Θ if δ < Θ− c
0 otherwise
(6.5)
if r is distributed uniformly in [0,Θ]. Again, we have some reservations
against this computation. We think that is valid only when a union is already
present. If no union exists, the worker has not to compare w+ r− c with w,
but w+r−c with w0, the relevant wage for the union-free firm. Consequently
a worker enters the union if r > w0 − w + c. At a glance, this detail seems
5In most countries wage differentiation between members and nonmembers is not
banned. ‘Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserkla¨rungen’ in Germany are an exception here. How-
ever, they are not general in scope, but relate only to certain industries or regions, and
the are applied seldomness now.
6The corresponding solution in Corneo’s paper (for bonus payments during a strike) is
w = w0 (1−M) + α{R(1)−R(1−M)}
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to be not important for the central results of the model. Therefore we will
discuss the issue in the conclusion.
After Insertion of M and w into the profit function we can perform the
maximisation procedure of the firm in the first stage of the game. To show
the existence of an outcome with δ∗ > 0, we have to consider three cases. In
the ‘trivial’ case c ≥ Θ, i.e. even maximum reputation does not compensate
the membership fee and no worker joins the union. Thus δ∗ = 0. If contrary
c < Θ, we have to check whether δ < Θ−c for the optimum choice of δ, since
M = 0 if δ ≥ Θ− c. If δ∗ meets this condition, an interior solution exists if.7
∂pi
∂δ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
> 0 ⇔ R′(c/Θ) > w0 + 1− α
α
c (6.6)
The second order conditions are fulfilled. After an extensive comparative
statics investigation of the model properties (which is of minor interest for us
here), Corneo applies this model to the centralisation debate and finds that it
predicts gross membership and wages to be larger in a centralised bargaining
environment, since an individual firm’s union density has a smaller effect on
wages than for local bargaining. Consequently, the gain to the firm associated
with the bonus payment shrinks with the number of firms in the economy.
If a central employers’ association cannot enforce the payment of a bonus,
each single firm will save this cost, management opposition shrinks and union
membership and wages rise. It should be emphasised that Corneo’s argument
rests heavily on the fact that bonus payment violates equal treatment laws.
Otherwise bonus payment could be fixed in collective labor agreements and
free riders could enforce payment by law. This implies that bonus payments
have to be masked in most cases, e.g. the have to take place in biased
promotion or firing procedures.
6.3 A Stylised Model with Sanctions
We will provide a short discussion of the question whether the centralisation
effect is relevant at all in a section below. Here we contrast Corneo’s manage-
ment opposition mechanism with a simple ‘member acquisition’ mechanism.
We claim that Corneo’s reputation function hides an important aspect of
the membership decision and the rules of his game are too restrictive for a
7Again we report the corresponding solution in Corneo’s paper (for bonus payments
during a strike)
R′(c/Θ) > w0 + c/α.
A comparison of both conditions and the corresponding first order condition shows that
δ∗ is larger in the unrestricted case.
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simulation of reality. Corneo’s workers like high wages and reputation and
consume reputation just as they consume bread and fish. Their social pref-
erences or fairness conceptions relate only to union membership.8 But they
are indifferent with regard to discrimination and don’t envy free riders. And
– more important – they don’t respond to discrimination.
So we come to the point: The model does not explain why unions try to
attract members. We try to show now that a simple model, explaining why
workers are not indifferent with respect to membership of their colleagues,
can generate contrary predictions of centralisation effects. Since there exist
several doubts whether our model captures all relevant aspects of reality, we
will devote a section to a short discussion below. Consequently, we have to
be cautious interpreting the results. Because of many remaining question
marks, we will not believe too much in its predictions. Rather we are happy
to show that models with an unclear foundation of its behavioral assumptions
should be taken with care.
We expand the repertoire of actions of workers by giving them control
on kindness9 against members and nonmembers. This is utterly obvious,
since reputation is related intimately to kindness. It were even possible to
define the reputation of a person by the number of (significant) others being
kindly against her, admiring her or holding her in great respect. Of course,
as reputation is a complex psychological and social entity, kindness may not
capture all its relevant facets, but surely a certain fact. There exist several
types of sanctions against free riders: Members could reduce kindness against
them, exert social pressure on them or refute to cooperate with them. In some
escalated situations even harassment is conciveable. Though picket lines are
not violent actions generally10, they nevertheless generate significant social
pressure – especially if the free riders believe in the social norm, but don’t
join the union because of monetary rewards.
Of course, there exist also more ‘positive’ types of action. E.g members
could organise social events from which nonmembers are excluded or provide
legal advice exclusively for members and other services or simply be more
friendly to comrades. (We will use only the term ‘kindness’ in the rest of the
paper for sake of convenience. But we have to keep in mind that it is only a
proxy for other mechanisms.) The allocation of such services is aimed to at-
8Unfortunately, most economic papers using the reputation effect don’t contain a thor-
ough discussion of where these effects come from.
9The economic standard vocabulary is more tough. Most economists tend to replace
‘kindness’ by the more distinct term ‘harassment’ (with inverse meaning). We try to enrich
the literature here with a somewhat unusual terminology.
10For a description and analysis of picketing action see Batstone, Boraston, & Frenkel
(1978).
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tract members and not given exogenously. In our very simple formulation we
assume that union members have control on kindness k against nonmembers,
but that reduction of kindness comes at a psychological cost K(k). Formally
Ui = {w + (1− di)(δ − k)}L+ w0 (1− L) + di (ri − c−K(k)) (6.7)
Note that we have defined k negatively for notational convenience, i.e. we
define k = 0 as the natural level of kindness of members against members
and k > 0 as a lower level of kindness. K(k) represents a psychological
cost depending on k. We assume K(.) to be a continuous C2 function with
K(0) = 0, K(k) > 0 for k > 0, K ′(k) > 0 for k > 0, and that there
exist no fixed costs of reducing kindness.11 Note that we do not make further
assumptions regarding the second derivative ofK(.) here. Below we will show
that our argument works for concave and convex K(.). This is important
since K ′′(k) > 0 appears to be the most appropriate assumption.
Some comments and warnings are in order here. Firstly, in a more realistic
formulation K(.) should depend on membership M too, since the density
of the union matters. A minority of free riders probably may be highly
vulnerable by disregard of union colleagues. This may change or even be
reverted in a firm where free riders become a majority. We will deal with
this issue in an extension of the model but ignore it here for convenience
and for the sake of comparability with Corneo’s model. (By the way, this
reasoning applies to reputation too, i.e. a more realistic formulation of the
reputation function were, for example ri + ρiM .
12)
As a last problem, it seems artificial and arbitrary to consider r and k as
different objects. Of course, we do this only for sake of convenience, since this
makes it simpler to identify exogenous given reputation sensitivity r from the
endogenous action parameter k.
Though most readers will consider it trivial then, and refute to go on
reading,13 we anticipate the underlying mechanism. Purposeful disregard
of free riders increases membership which in turn (through improvement of
the bargaining position) raises wages. This effect vanishes in a centralised
bargaining environment since local membership looses its impact on wages.
We end with negative effects of centralisation on membership and wages.
It suffices to show that equilibria with k∗ > 0 exist and that centralisation
reduces k∗.
11Also the ‘no fixed cost’ - assumption is made for sake of convenience in order to avoid
additional case differentiations. Nevertheless it seems to be plausible.
12Booth & Chatterji (1993) specify reputation by the term riM .
13It is probably efficient to skip the rest of this section and to proceed with the conclusion
if the basic idea is clear.
188 CHAPTER 6. CUSTOMS AND UNION MEMBERSHIP
In our model we assume that the firm is restricted to set δ = 0, i.e.
cannot use a bonus scheme to fight the union. We do this for the sake
of convenience, since the more general case renders the model much more
complicated. Consequently, our model cannot characterise the conditions for
inner and corner solutions, when both parties can make use of their strategic
instruments (k and δ).
The timing of our model is completely analogous to Corneo’s: In the first
stage, the (future) union members decide on kindness, then workers decide
on membership (given kindness), and in the last stage the union bargains
with the firm over (employment and) wages. Again some remarks are in
order here.
Firstly, the threads associated with harassment and kindness are not sub-
game perfect. If negotiations are finished, rational unionised workers have no
incentive to harass free-riders, rendering the thread implausible. Below we
will report experimental evidence suggesting that behaviour of people apply
and enforce non subgame perfect threads in everyday live.
Secondly, this game seems to require or contain schizophrenic workers.
Potential union members of a not yet existing union set the level of kindness
against potential free riders. And an implication of the model is that the
marginal union member which plans to disregard free riders could become
a disregarded free rider due a small parameter change. Again the model is
not realistic in this respect, since the entry into a union will change the way
how workers perceive labour relations and other relevant issues.14 It will
furthermore change the cannels of information available to him. Eventually
the worker can predict these influences and take them as constraints for his
membership decision. Similar (symmetric) forces are at work for free riders.
If they believe in the custom, cognitive dissonance mechanisms will urge
them to reinterpret their conception of labour relation and seek for another
free-rider friendly ideology.15
Our model probably underestimates the true ex post heterogeneity of the
workforce due to its static nature. But – again for sake of simplicity – we
ignore these effects. Anyway, we claim that the sequence of the game captures
an central aspect of reality: It represents the fact that the behaviour of union
14A large strand of psychological experimental evidence shows that group membership
affects the perception of group members and outsiders significantly even if these groups
are artificial ones and membership is determined by highly arbitrary or trivial criteria (e.g.
similar estimation of the number of dots on a screen). The classical paper is Taifel et al.
(1971), Haslam (1995) provides a survey (chapter 2) with several interesting applications
to organisational psychology.
15Similar problems arise in Akerlof & Dickens (1982), where the economic consequences
of cognitive dissonance are analysed.
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members is given for the individual worker at the time when he decides on
membership.
With this at hand we can proceed by solving the wage bargain.16 Substi-
tution of the utility function and the profit function into the Nash product
and solution of the first order condition gives
w∗ = w0 (1− αM) + (1− α)K(k) + α {R(1)−R(1−M)}. (6.8)
The formula shows that membership has a positive impact on wages.17 Of
course, this comes from the fact that higher membership reduces the firm’s
threat point.
The membership decision is based now on a comparison of UU = w+ r−
K(k)− c and UF = w − k giving the reputation for the marginal member
r˜ = c+K(k)− k
with the simple interpretation that the reputation effect must compensate
the sum of union fees and disutility (−k) of kindness reduction less costs
of being disregarded by colleagues. Evaluation of the membership decision
yields
M =
{
1− (c+K(k)− k)/Θ if c+K(k)− k < Θ
0 otherwise
(6.9)
The derivative of M with respect to k, ∂M/∂k = −(K ′(k) − 1)/Θ is posi-
tive for K ′(k) < 1, meaning that the cost of being unfriendly for the union
member is less than the harm of being treated unfriendly to nonmembers.
At the first stage of the game a democratic union maximises the utility
of the median member. In the case of the uniform distribution the median
reputation rm is simply
rm = (r˜ +Θ)/2 = (Θ + c+K(k)− k)/2
after insertion into the utility function we obtain the first order condition
∂Um
∂k
=
dw∗
dk
+
∂rm
∂k
−K ′(k)
= −1
2
(K ′(k) + 1) + (1− α)K ′(k) + α (K
′(k)− 1) {R′(1−M(k))− w0}
Θ
(6.10)
16We replicate Corneo’s efficient bargaining assumption here for sake of comparability.
17To state it formally, the derivative ∂w∗/∂M = α (R′(1 − M) − w0) is positive for
R′(1−M) > w0 which is the case for the plausible assumption w0 ≤ R′(1).
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We will now investigate the conditions for the existence of a solution with
k∗ > 0. For the special case of equal bargaining power (α = 1/2) we obtain
(after straightforward manipulation)
∂Um
∂k
=
1
2Θ
{(1−K ′(k)) {R′(1−M(k))− w0} −Θ} (6.11)
This derivative is strictly positive if
K ′(k)− 1 < − Θ
w0 −R′(1−M(k))
To investigate this inequality further, consider first the derivative at the right
boundary of k, i.e. for the value of k solving M(k) = 1. If M(k) → 1 then
R′(1−M)→∞ and Θ/(R′(1−M)− w0)→ 0.18 This implies that Um has
a positive derivative near the right boundary of k if K ′(k) < 1. In words,
increasing k is profitable if the marginal cost of disregarding free riders is
lower than the (constant) marginal loss of disregard for free riders.
Now consider the opposite boundary solution k = 0. Substituting this
into the membership and revenue function gives
K ′(0)− 1 < Θ
w0 −R′(1− c/Θ)
At this general level of analysis nothing more can be said, except that the
condition may be met for some functions K(.) and R(.), and values of c and
Θ. I.e. it is possible that Um is strictly increasing over the whole range of k,
implying that k∗ = 1. Of course, centralisation exerts a negative impact on
wages and membership in such cases.
A closer inspection of the second order derivative shows that indirect
utility U is convex for many realistic parameter values, implying the existence
of corner solutions. In this case we have to compare the utilities associated
with the two corner solutions.
To simplify the relevant expressions we again consider only the special
case α = 1/2. Then
∂2Um
∂k2
=
{Θ(w0 −R′(1−M(k))K ′′(k)− (K ′(k)− 1)2R′′(1−M(k))}
2Θ2
(6.12)
Straightforward manipulation shows that Um is convex in k if
K ′′(k) <
(K ′(k)− 1)2R′′(1−M(k))
Θ (w0 −R′(1−M(k))) (6.13)
18The last implication requires that labor is a necessary input for the firm, a standard
and sensible assumption.
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Since the right hand side of this expression is positive, a sufficient but not
necessary condition for Um to be convex is K(k) to be concave. But Um is
convex too if K ′′(k) is ‘not too large’, and it is simple to construct numerical
examples which meet the condition. Finally we obtain an inner solution if
K ′′(k) exceeds this limit and the first derivative ∂Um/∂k > 0 for k = 0.
To summarise, we have shown that functions K(.) and R(.), and pa-
rameter values c,Θ exist such that the k set by the union is strictly positive
implying that centralisation in wage bargaining reduces k∗. The trivial ratio-
nale is that k raises U by increasing membership, which in turn strengthens
the bargaining position of the union (more precisely: weakens the firms bar-
gaining position by lowering its threat point) and raises the wage. Of course,
raising k also lowers utility directly through cost K(.). But this loss is out-
weighted by wage gains. Centralised bargaining reduces the effect of local
membership on the bargained wage and therefore reduces k∗, M(k) and w.
The model presented so far is only a half of the story, since it is based on
the restriction δ = 0. If we relax this assumption, union and firm determine
k and δ simultaneously at the first stage of the game, we expect that positive
as well as negative net effects of centralisation are possible.
6.4 Discussion
As noted above, central assumptions of our model are questionable and re-
strictive in several respects. Therefore we devote a special section for a more
detailed discussion of the most crucial problems. Furthermore, we try to
guess whether and how central results of the model change if they are re-
laxed or replaced by more realistic ones. In addition, we investigate here
some qualifications of Corneo’s model which are not related directly to our
main argument.
Strategic Application of Reputation Effects
At the outset we have to justify the claim that social relations in general and
kindness (‘soft’ incentives) play a significant role at all. This seems to be
the simplest task here, since k is relevant if r is. In his somewhat one-sided
description Olson (1965) tries to establish an intimate association of union
organisation with compulsory membership and violence.19 One has not to
appeal to violence, however, since also mild social pressure and regard may
exert considerable effects.
19Olson does not even mention violence applied by employers towards union members.
192 CHAPTER 6. CUSTOMS AND UNION MEMBERSHIP
Our argument requires, however, that the level of kindness can be deter-
mined by union members and that they are willing to exploit it strategically.
Though the existence of reputation effects does not necessarily imply strate-
gic exploitation of such effects, exploitation seems to be in accordance with
social norms. Unions are not an end in itself but a coalition of workers
formed to bargain for fair wages and working conditions.20 Therefore, it is
not inconsistent to exploit strategic means in order to attain these ends, at
least if they appear to be fair, and the means do not contradict the ends.
Furthermore we have indirect evidence for the application of social pres-
sure on both sides. Why should workers build picket lines instead of taking
advantage of striking days by enjoying leisure or indulging their hobbies? Of
course, several indications suggest that social pressure is exerted by man-
agers and free riders too. The right to keep union membership secret seems
to be older than many other privacy regulations. And ‘unionist’ is an invec-
tive in some plants where unions don’t exist or are weak. Finally, it should
be clear that social norms are generated and kept alive by different degrees
of sanctions and that social norms are the result of social and individual
preferences.
Two problems remain. Firstly, the kindness thread is not incentive com-
patible, since union members reduce their utility by reducing kindness to
free-riders when bargaining is over. Secondly, union strength is a collective
good increasing the wage and utility of all union members. Since each union
member has to bear the cost of collective action individually, the tragedy of
the commons may destroy the argument. Among the casual evidence now
several experimental studies show that people act reciprocatively (and retali-
tatory), i.e. they apply (and enforce) threads which are not subgame perfect
ex post. Experimental evidence in favour of this contains Fehr et al. (1993,
1997). Furthermore, people they try to enforce public goods provision mech-
anisms by punishing free riders, even if punishment is costly to them, see
e.g. Fehr & Gachter (2000), Fischbacher, Gachter, & Fehr (2001), Ostrom,
Walker, & Gardner (1992), Keser & Winden (2000).21 These effects, initially
observed by Ostrom et al. (1992) in repeated face-to-face interaction, pre-
vail even in one-shot stranger treatment experiments. Reputation effects can
be derived in a straightforward application of the punishment mechanism.
Workers consider the yields of worker organisation as a public good and
therefore try to enforce it by costly punishment. Note that the punishment
strategies don’t increase conflicts if they are successful, since potential free
20We do not want to initiate a discussion on what should be considered as fair here.
Instead we take fairness conceptions of workers as an empirical fact.
21For a general survey including related work see Fehr & Schmidt (2000).
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riders can avoid punishment by joining the union. For the union membership
game this means that no conflict within the workforce arises if all workers
join the union. Our investigation above shows that this is the case for convex
utility functions with u|M(k∗)=1 > u|M(k∗)=0.
Realism of Kindness Effects Representation
As noted above, the specification of the utility loss due to disregard of col-
leagues is too simple. In a more realistic formulation this loss should depend
on the relation of members and nonmembers in the firm. Consequently −k
should be replaced by D(k,M). By a similar argumentM should enter K(.).
For sake of simplicity D(k,M) could be approximated by −M k.22 If we ex-
pand the reputation component accordingly, union and free rider utilities
become
UUi = w + riM −K(k)− c
UFi = w − kM
the reputation of the marginal member then has the form
r˜ =
K(k) + c
M
− k. (6.14)
with implied membership function
M =
k +Θ−√(k +Θ)2 − rΘ(c+K(K))
2Θ
(6.15)
Substitution of these expressions into the utility function leads now to more
complex expressions and the analysis becomes much more tedious. We give
here only a short summary of the consequences of these extensions. Consider
a reference situation where workers cannot apply kindness as a strategic vari-
able, i.e. where k = 0. If equilibrium membership is small (say, less than
50%), then union members will face high costs if they try to put social pres-
sure on free riders and free riders were hardly vulnerable. Thus, exerting
social pressure may not be profitable and k∗ = 0 will result. If contrarily
union density is high ex ante, the relation of social pressure cost and vulner-
ability is reversed and k∗ > 0.
The attentive reader may have noted that this formulation is still unreal-
istic in an important respect: It is not symmetric, since only union members
22The approximation is exakt if kindness is additive for the recipient.
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actively exert social pressure and free riders are passive. In a symmetric for-
mulation free riders could choose a kindness parameter too. Then the utility
functions have the form
UUi = w + vi {kUU M − kFU (1−M)} −KUU(kUU)−KUF (kUF )− c
UFi = w + vi {kFF M − kUF (1−M)} −KFF (kFF )−KFU(kFU)
The vi have to be interpreted as receptivity for kindness and disregard
23, kij
are the levels of kindness/disregard of members of group i towards members
of group j, and Kij are the associated cost functions. In the case of pairwise
identical functions24 Kij(x), free riders save c and therefore have a compet-
itive advantage in the ‘union density battle’. The returning puzzle of union
existence can be solved in several ways. Firstly, the cost of exerting social
pressure towards free riders and the cost of kindness towards members may
be lower, either because union members are the more sociable types, or be-
cause they are organised. c can then be considered as a fixed cost for lowering
KU.(.). Secondly, this formulation is too symmetric if all workers believe in
the ‘usefulness’ of unions. Then also free riders share this belief, but to a
lesser degree, urging them to take a rather defensive position. Formally this
implied that ri has to be introduced again into U
U .
Though it may not be worthwhile to analyse these extensions in full detail,
our short exploration qualifies the basic simple model in the section above. It
serves as a sensible approximation to reality only if union membership were
considerably high even in absence of strategic application of social pressure
(i.e. if k = 0 due to exogenous constraints). Then the possibilities to exert
social pressure are restricted severely for free riders making them passive.
By the way, the model could be extended (and completed) by making
ri dependent on Mi, i.e. defining a replicator function where utility from
reputation depends on how many workers obey the social norm. In a dynamic
context (rti = r
t
i(M
t−1
i )), we could then derive conditions for the erosion or
persistence of the social norm in the long run.25 We did not pursue this here,
since it does not add much to the understanding of the argument here.
Unintended side effects
Reducing kindness may have (unintended) side effects on productivity. It
should be clear that cooperation becomes more difficult due to conflicts be-
23Of course, they have a distribution as the ri.
24More precisely KUU (x) ≡ KFF (x) and KUF (x) ≡ KFU (x).
25This analysis is performed in Akerlof (1980), Romer (1984) and Corneo (1996).
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tween members and free riders. It is simple to see that a reduction of coop-
eration with free riders decreases the bargained wage. This were probably
not the case if less cooperation affects only the productivity of free riders.
However, then we have to check whether the firm has an incentive to lower
wages for free riders. We resist the temptation to deepen this discussion. It
would open Pandora’s box.
It appears to be plausible that firms initiate a vitious circle by paying a
bonus to free riders in a world with emotional and limited rational workers.
Even if productivity effects are not intended at the outset, they may oc-
cur even at low levels of escalation. And the self-energising nature of many
conflict strategies seems to be an empirical fact. Everyone knows that dog
owners have to wipe the excrements of their dogs from sidewalks and play-
grounds and that passengers should not throw away butts on playgrounds.
But most people don’t call on them to obey this rule if they catch dog owners
red-handed. Parents, whose childs have digged out the excrements from the
playground, behave often differently. In some cases they become even very
aggressive though they know that sanctioning dog owners has no significant
effect on the probability that their childs will find dog excrements again.
Moral aggression is triggered if a perception threshold is exceeded. This per-
ception threshold may be lower in local wage bargaining, since workers are
more directly involved there.
Finally, note that union affiliation influences worker’s perception of the
labor relation, of other members and free riders. It determines the cannels
of information he will use and the information filters which he will apply
in future. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that free riders will have to
apply several strategies to justify their behavior in order to regain internal
consistency of their mind, especially if they believe in the norm demanding
support for the union. Our formal model does not account for such issues.
In principle this could be tackled, see Akerlof & Dickens (1982).
Other problems with Corneo’s approach
Corneo states the condition for a subgame perfect solution with a positive
bonus formally, but fails to provide an assessment of whether the sufficient
conditions are given in many cases. A closer look at the relevant formula of
the proposition reveals, however, that the condition is not met in most cases.
Consider (6.6)
R′(c/Θ) > w0 +
1− α
α
c
This means that the marginal revenue product of employing strike breakers
R′(c/Θ) ≡ R′(1−M(δ))|δ=0 during a strike must be above the outside wage.
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This is not the case for firms where cooperation plays a significant role. In
many cases production becomes unprofitable if only 20% of the workforce
is missing, pushing the firm’s thread point to zero.26 Then bonus payment
becomes unprofitable even with small union densities, and Corneo’s argument
becomes irrelevant.
A further effect reducing δ results if (union) workers have an aversion
against discrimination, e.g. uUi = w − ri − c − l(δ), with l(0) = 0 and
l′(δ) > 0. Even if union members cannot respond strategically to manage-
ment opposition by sanctioning free riders, the contribution of l(.) to the
Nash product will reduce δ∗.
Last but not least, the probably most important effect in this context is
a motivational one. If workers dislike discrimination, motivation will be af-
fected negatively, even if this motivational effect is not exploited strategically.
The implied reduction of productivity again prevents the firm from manage-
ment opposition. Basically, this is a simple efficiency wage argument. Again
it does not create centralisation effects but destroys them. This ‘internal con-
sistency’ argument could explain why firms apparently don’t discriminate if
unions are established in a firm, but often try to prevent the formation of
a union. As a consequence for model building, it appears more sensible to
model an all-or-nothing scenario where the firm tries to discourage work-
ers from organizing by paying them wages above the market clearing wage
or slightly below the union wage.27 But if a union is founded, the firm no
longer does discriminate.
6.5 Conclusion
The shortcomings of all models discussed here (ours included) urge us to
conclude with further qualifications and warnings. In principle, Corneo’s as
well as our arguments are drawn from thin air. Our knowledge of manage-
ment opposition and union activities is too small to be a reliable guideline
for model building. Corneo’s model does not care for the structure of repu-
tation effects and rests on several strong assumptions. Our main argument
postulates that union members exploit kindness strategically. Probably this
aspect is less important than other unintended motivational consequences of
management opposition. Consequently, the main achievement of our ‘smart
workers model’ is to show what is required in order to generate positive cen-
26It is evident that the linear revenue function in Corneo (1995) is used only for con-
venience. Anyway it is misleading, since it implies that workers can be replaced by free
riders or even outsiders without adjustment cost.
27Lazear (1983) follows this approach in a very interesting model.
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tralisation effects for firms. The other noteworthy benefit of the paper seems
to be the indication that reputation effects should discussed in some detail
before applying them to fill consistency gaps in union models.
The model can be interpreted as a (less satisfying) formal derivation of
the common sense argument that centralisation of wage bargaining reduces
conflicts and act as a ‘pacifying’ force. It is less satisfying since it likely cap-
tures only a secondary aspect of reputation. Other – possibly unintended –
motivational effects of bargaining (i.e. the fact that local union members have
to fight for wages and working conditions face-to-face with their managers)
seem to me more important.
Thus the advice to be drawn from this section is to enforce quantitative
and qualitative empirical research on industrial relations. An indirect test of
Corneo’s model (and the counterargument) could be performed by comparing
the distribution of union membership at the firm level between centralised
and decentralised bargaining institutions. Unfortunately, union density data
at the firm level are not available for Germany.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The header of this section is somewhat euphemistic: we cannot draw a clear
conclusion from our investigations – at least not an unambiguous one. The-
oretical reasoning cannot establish a universal ‘optimum degree of centrali-
sation’. Quite the contrary, the variety of theoretical models, dealing with a
large number of possibly relevant details, at best enables us to give advice
of the form ‘it depends on...’ This advice is less helpful because empiri-
cal research does not deliver precise estimates of parameters on which the
results depend. At best, empirical research delivers some summary informa-
tion of the form ‘centralisation seems to have reduced unemployment in the
last twenty years, but we cannot tell why.’ Though many empirical papers
testing the hump-shape hypothesis pretend to check the relevance of output
price externalities, they only deliver modestly stable partial correlations –
without direct relation to price externalities.
Nevertheless, this investigation has attained its goal if we managed to
show two points. Firstly, the diagnosis (sometimes put in a tone of utter
conviction) that decentralised wage setting is a superior arrangement for
collective wage setting is not backed up by a clear understanding of the
relevant aspects of bargaining and a body of conclusive empirical evidence.
Secondly, economic knowledge on centralisation of wage bargaining suffers
from several blind spots, but these blind spots are not entirely god-given,
but seem to persist because of prejudiced and biased research strategies. It
suffices to mention two examples.
If economic investigations of centralisation issues culminate in the advice
to adjust bargaining institutions, this advice is not based on a thorough in-
vestigation of the reasons why the bargaining parties are not able to realise
the advantages of adjustment by themselves. E.g. the council of economic ex-
perts calls upon the government to change the legal framework for bargaining,
or urges the bargaining parties to establish possibilities for individual firms
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to deviate from collective agreements.1 But they do not ask why firms do not
get rid of collective wage agreements by leaving the employers’ association,
why hardship clauses are not applied by firms though they were applicable,
why some firms simply undercut standard wages with toleration of the work-
force and the local union representatives, and why some firms (which are not
members of the employers’ association) nevertheless observe standard wages
and fear that the general collective wage agreement could be abandoned.2 We
think that a closer investigation of these issues would deliver some insights
into the effective rigidity of institutions, on how complex organisations adjust
to a changing environment, and how they react to influences from outside.
Again we stress Ronald Coase: “I think we should try to develop gener-
alizations which would us give guidance as to how various activities should
be best organized and financed. But such generalizations are not likely to
be helpful unless they are derived from studies of how such activities are
actually carried out within different institutional frameworks.”
The second example concerns the custom to disregard transaction costs
in theories of collective wage bargaining. They deliver a simple answer to the
question ‘why repeating the wage bargaining procedure in many firms again
and again when differences between firms are moderate’? Unfortunately, the
apparently trivial argument does not require a formal treatment, i.e. cannot
pose challenges to mathematically oriented economists. On the other hand,
it poses too high a challenge to empirical researchers since transaction costs,
especially psychic costs, are extremely hard to quantify. These reasons ex-
plain why it is almost impossible to find even passing remarks on transaction
costs in economic studies: There is no reason to talk about things which are
almost unknown. Then, however, they should be added to a lengthy list of
disclaimers in policy advice memoranda – but these lists are quite short or
missing in many cases.
Between the blind spots, we find areas which are investigated extensively,
for example macroeconometric studies of centralisation effects on unemploy-
ment. But it seems that macroeconomic studies deliver about the same in-
formation on the functioning of bargaining institutions as a look at the clock
yields on the functioning of its clockwork mechanism. And even this ‘outside’
evidence is inconclusive. Besides that, the challenges to the standard hump-
shape hypothesis, raised by theories on the interaction of centralisation and
central bank independence, suggest that is was a good idea to abstain from
rash conclusions.
We think that this strategy (i.e. to abstain from rash conclusions) re-
1See, Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2003), §462-§466.
2Most of these questions are asked in the empirical study Oppolzer & Zachert (2000).
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mains sensible in face of the current state of our knowledge on bargaining
institutions and centralisation effects, and we invite economists to take a
laissez-faire attitude towards bargaining institutions, to investigate their po-
tential to adjustment instead of trying to optimise them now from outside in
an excessive desire for action.
Darwinian evolution theory tells us that real world evolution processes
generate perfect adaption of species to their environment only in exceptional
cases, and that perfectly adapted species suffer from extreme risks to die
out. Everyone acquainted with genetic optimisation algorithms knows that a
considerable number of suboptimal individuals in the population makes the
procedure more ‘creative’ and protects it from being caught in local maxima.
You may object that evolutionary algorithms are bad examples: They are
unconscious processes, functioning without knowledge of the function to be
maximised. After the stocktaking in the survey of this book, we contend that
they are a not so bad approximation to the work of economics.
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Appendix A
Synopsis of Some
Centralisation Indicators
203
204APPENDIX A. SYNOPSIS OF SOME CENTRALISATION INDICATORS
OECD (1994,1997) CD TAR JLN
CENT COOR COMB UCO ECO
Austria 2 3 3 1 1 3 3
Belgium 2 2 2 8 7 2 2
Germany 2 3 3 6 2 2 3
Denmark 3↘ 2 3 3 4 4 3 3
France 2 2 2 11 9 2 2
Finland 3↘ 2 2 3↘ 2 5 6 3 3
Italy 1, 3 (92) 2, 3 (92) 1, 3 (92) 13 12 2 1
Netherlands 2 2,3 (82) 2, 3 (82) 7 6 2 2
Sweden 3↘ 2 3↘ 1, 2 (91) 3↘ 2 3 4 3 3
UK 2↘ 1 1 2↘ 1 12 11 1 1
Switzerland 2 2 2 15 3 1 3
Norway 3 3 3 2 4 3 3
Australia 2, 1 (88) 2, 1 (88) 2, 1 (88) 10 6 2 1
Canada 1 1 1 17 7 1 1
Japan 1 3 1 14 3 2 2
New Zealand 2,1 (91) 1 2,1 (91) 9 8 2 1
USA 1 1 1 16 7 1 1
Sources: OECD (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Layard et al.
(1991).
Note: Since we present the OECD indicator values as reference for our strike incidence
estimations, we report here the recoded values from Elmeskov et al. (1998) instead of the
original indicator values from OECD (1994,1997). The reason is that the OECD tables
show intermediate values (e.g. 2+) in some cases which ‘cancel out’ after recoding into
three dummy variables.
Legend:
The notation x ↘ y indicates a gradual change of the indicator value from x to y. The
notation x, y(z) indicates a ‘jump’ change of the indicator value from x to y in year 19z.
Shorthands
CD Calmfors & Driffill ranking (1988)
TAR Tarantelli’s (1986) corporatism indicator
JLN Jackman et al. (1991)
CENT centralisation indicator
COOR coordination indicator
COMB combined indicator (CENT ∪ COOR)
UCO union coordination
ECO employer coordination
Table A.1: Synopsis of some centralisation indicators
Appendix B
Empirical Evidence on
Bargaining Structures
Brown & Ashenfelter (1986), Card (1986), MaCurdy & Pencavel (1986), and
Bean & Turnbull (1988) try to find out with econometric methods whether
efficient bargaining or right-to-manage is the more relevant bargaining struc-
ture in practice. Though their findings are in favour of efficient bargaining,
a closer look at the applied empirical strategies reveals severe weakness. Let
us explain.
The strategy allowing to discriminate between the both game structures
is based on the fact that the wage equals marginal revenue for a right-to-
manage solution and that it equals the sum of marginal revenue and the
union’s marginal rate of substitution between wage and employment (u(w)−
u(b))/u′(w) for a efficient bargaining solution (see e.g. Booth, 1995). A
testable implication of this is that the outside wage b has explanatory power
for marginal revenues in a regression model only if efficient bargaining applies.
This can be tested (after application of some simplifying assumptions) with
a reduced form wage equation. The authors above interpreted significant
coefficients of the alternative wage in line with this logic as evidence in favour
of efficient bargaining
This strategy is prone to several identification and specification problems.
Firstly, the outside wage may become significant even in a right-to-manage
solution because of specification problems (nonlinearity, incorrect specifica-
tion of the union utility function, omission of relevant variables which are
correlated with the outside wage).1 Secondly, the outside wage appears also
in an efficiency wage framework, and third, the outside wage can prevail also
in right-to-manage solutions. One example for this is (Lockwood & Manning,
1Booth (1995) contain a more comprehensible discussion on pages 134–140.
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1989). The outside reappears in their model because of adjustments costs
for employment changes. Carruth & Oswald (1985) give another example
by showing that the contract curve of efficient bargaining lies on the labour
demand curve if the union maximises only the utility of employed members.
This situation applies if unemployed members leave the union.
Appendix C
Computation of the Bootstrap
and Monte Carlo Confidence
bounds
Here we describe the computation of confidence bounds for Iversen’s (1998,
1999) estimation results reported on page 104 in section 2.5.4.
The long run (or steady-state) impact of C and I on unemployment is
computed from Iversen’s estimated equation above as
u¯cet.par. =
1
1− b7
{
b1 C¯ + b2C¯
2 + b3 C¯ I¯ + b5 C¯
2 I¯ + b6 I¯ + x¯ β
}
Because of the highly nonlinear form of the relationship, the algebraic formula
(delta-method, based on a Taylor series approximation) for the computation
of confidence intervals may be biased significantly (for an example see Staiger,
Stock, & Watson, 1996). Therefore we use three alternative methods. (1) a
wild bootstrap, (2) a monte carlo method, and (3) an algebraic formula for
a static version of Iversen’s model.
The bootstrap confidence bounds were computed by replicating Iversen’s
estimation with 10000 resamples (generated by independent draws with re-
placement). Coefficient and regressor values were substituted into the equa-
tion above to obtain the effect (for different values of C and I) for each
replication. Confidence bounds were computet as 5% and 95% quantiles
from the saved vector of impact realisations. A problem with the bootstrap
procedure here is that is does not account for correlation of the residuals (see
Vinod, 1993; Kim & Maddal, 1998).
This problem is not present in the monte carlo procedure. It is based on
the (heteroscedasticity and panel-correlation- corrected) covariance matrix
estimated from the original sample. We draw 10000 realisations from the
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multinormal distribution of this matrix and compute the nonlinear effect in
each replication. The computation of confidence bounds is then analogous
to the bootstrap case.
As an additional check, we compute confidence bounds from a static
specification, i.e. we estimate Iversen’s equation after elimination of the
lagged endogenous variable.1 With the static version, the denominator 1−b7
in the impact formula above drops out, and the remaining effect is linear
in the coefficients. This allows us to compute the standard deviation of the
effect by the formula √
z′Σbz
with z = (C,C2, C I, C2 I) and the variance-covariance matrix Σb of the
coefficients b = (b1, b2, b3, b4). As can be seen from the graphs in figure
2.1, the change of the specification leads to moderate changes of the point
estimates. The estimation of the confidence bounds, however, appears to be
quite robust.
As a qualification we should note that the graphs for accommodating and
non-accommodating monetary policy relate to values of the independence
indicator one standard deviation below and above of the indicator’s mean
for the sample. The mean of the index is 0.43 and the standard deviation
0.21. The range of the indicator in the sample (i.e. the realised values) is
[0.035; 0.98]. The regimes (mean ± one standard deviation) represent already
nearly polar cases, since the 10% quantile and 90% quantile of the empirical
distribution of I in the sample are 0.2 und 0.6, respectively. Since the shapes
and locations of the graphs above respond only slightly to changes of I, choice
of somewhat more distant regimes (for example mean ± one 2 standard
deviations) would have minor impact on the outcomes and interpretation of
Iversen’s empirical model.
1This should have no severe detrimental effects on inference, since we account for serial
correlation of the residuals by application of the Prais-Winsten transformation.
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